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LIBRARY 
UNIVERSITY   OF  CALIFORNIA. 

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<sfr- 


LOTZE'S 

OUTLINES  OF  PHILOSOPHY 


METAPHYSIC 


THE  editor  and  publishers  of  this 
volume  beg  leave  to  announce  that 
two  other  numbers  of  the  series  of 
philosophical  "OUTLINES"  by  LOTZE, 
viz.,  the  one  on  the  "  PHILOSOPHY  OF 
RELIGION"  and  the  one  on  "  MORAL 
PHILOSOPHY,"  may  be  expected  within 
a  few  months.  Should  the  reception 
met  by  these  three  volumes  be  suf- 
ficiently encouraging,  it  is  hoped  to 
publish  the  "OUTLINES  of  PSYCHOL- 
OGY," of  "^STHETICS,"  and  of 
"LOGIC,"  still  later. 


OUTLINES 


OF 


METAPHYSIC 


DICTATED    PORTIONS 


LECTURES  OF  HERMANN  LOTZE 


TRANSLATED  AND  EDITED  BY 

GEORGE   T.   LADD 

PROFESSOR  OF 


BOSTON 

GINN,    HEATH,   &   CO. 
1884 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1884,  by 

GEORGE  T.  LADD, 
in  the  Office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress  at  Washington. 


J.  S.  GUSHING  &  Co.,  PRINTERS,  115  HIGH  STREET,  BOSTON. 


EDITOR'S 


THE  name  of  Rudolph  Hermann  Lotze,  philoso- 
pher, has  already  been  made  familiar  to  a  large 
number  of  readers  in  this  country,  and  no  little 
interest  has  been  awakened  in  his  opinions  upon 
various  philosophical  and  religious  themes.  But 
thus  far  the  number  who  have  attained  any  trust- 
worthy knowledge  as  to  what  those  opinions  are, 
has  remained  exceedingly  small.  Until  very  re- 
cently all  his  most  important  published  works  have 
been  inaccessible  to  every  one  unable  to  cope  with 
voluminous  philosophical  German.  Within  the  pres- 
ent year,  creditable  translations  of  the  two  large 
volumes  on  Logic  and  Metaphysic,  which  consti- 
tute all  of  his  System  of  Philosophy  that  thfe 
author  lived  to  publish,  have  appeared  in  Eng- 
land ;  and  a  translation  of  his  Mikrokosmus  (three 
volumes  in  German)  is  promised  soon  to  appear. 
These  works,  however  —  especially  the  two  former 
—  are  not  only  large  but  technical  and  difficult; 
few  are  likely  to  attempt  their  mastery  who  are 
not  already  trained  in  the  reading  of  German  phi- 


VI  EDITOR  S    PREFACE. 

losophy.  Yet  there  is  scarcely  any  other  recent 
writer  on  philosophical  subjects  whose  thoughts  are 
so  stimulating  for  their  breadth,  penetration  and 
candor;  or  with  whom  an  acquaintance  is  so  de- 
sirable for  purposes  of  general  culture  through  the 
philosophic  way  of  considering  life,  with  its  inter- 
ests in  not  merely  pure  thought,  but  also  in 
morals,  religion,  and  art. 

It  affords  me,  therefore,  the  pleasure  that  comes 
from  the  hope  of  being  useful  to  a  wide  circle  of 
persons,  to  announce  that  I  have  arranged  to  trans- 
late and  edit  several,  if  not  all,  of  those  little  books 
called  4  Outlines '  which  have  been  given  to  the  pub- 
lic in  Germany  since  the  death  of  their  lamented 
author.  These  *  Outlines '  cover  the  entire  ground 
of  Lotze's  mature  teaching  in  the  University  upon 
the  subjects  of  Logic,  Metaphysic,  Philosophy  of 
Nature,  Psychology,  ^Esthetics,  Moral  Philosophy, 
Philosophy  of  Religion,  and  History  of  German 
Philosophy  since  Kant.  A  word  of  explanation 
as  to  the  origin  of  these  books  will  suffice  to 
assure  the  reader  that  he  is  to  be  put  into  com- 
munication with  the  thoughts  of  this  philosopher 
in  a  way  which  he  can  trust  both  as  to  substance 
and  form  of  expression.  The  German  from  which 
the  translations  are  to  be  made  consists  of  the  dic- 
tated portions  of  his  latest  lectures  (at  Gb'ttingen, 


EDITOR  S    PREFACE.  vii 


and  for  a  few  months  at  Berlin)  as  formulated  by 
Lotze  himself,  recorded 'in  the  notes  of  his  hear- 
ers, and  subjected  to  the  most  competent  and 
thorough  revision  of  Professor  Rehmsch  of  Got- 
tingen.  The  'Outlines'  give,  therefore,  a  mature  and 
trustworthy  statement,  in  language  selected  by  this 
teacher  of  philosophy  himself,  of  what  may  be  con- 
sidered as  his  final  opinions  upon  a  wide  range  of 
subjects.  They  have  met  with  no  little  favor  in 
Germany. 

1  have  used  such  competence  and  diligence  as 
I  could  command  in  translating  this  first  one  of 
the  Lotze  series  which  it  is  proposed  to  publish. 
As  far  as  seemed  consistent  with  a  desirable  accu- 
racy, technical  language  has  been  avoided,  and  the 
work  presented  with  an  English  expression.  Some 
of  the  terms  employed  in  the  original,  however,  do 
not  admit  of  exact  and  elegant  representation  in 
our  language  ;  nor  has  it  been  possible  —  had  it 
been  deemed  desirable  —  wholly  to  disguise  the 
savor  of  the  class-room. 

The  Metaphysic  was  selected  as  the  first  one  of 
the  series  for  translation,  because  the  views  of  the 
author  on  this  subject  were  always  regarded  by 
himself  as  being,  and  in  fact  are,  fundamental  and 
initiatory  to  his  views  on  all  the  other  subjects  to 
be  treated.  No  one  can  make  any  progress  what- 


Vlll 


ever  in  understanding  the  philosophical  system  of 
Lotze,  or  even  in  seeing  the  true  bearing  of  his 
observations  on  aesthetic,  ethical  and  religious  mat- 
ters, who  has  not  mastered  his  metaphysical  notions. 
This  little  book,  then,  should  be  regarded  as  fur- 
nishing the  key  and  door  to  all  the  rest. 

Two  principal  objects  have  been  before  my  mind 
as  motives  for  undertaking  these  translations.  I 
wish,  in  the  first  place,  to  further  the  work  of 
teaching  philosophy  by  their  use.  Such  condensed, 
orderly,  and  mature  statements  of  conclusions  on  a 
wide  range  of  philosophical  questions  will  be  found 
exceedingly  valuable  for  both  teacher  and  pupil. 
They  furnish  a  scheme  for  all  the  instruction  which 
the  teacher  is  able  to  give  in  presenting  and  an- 
swering these  questions.  When  skilfully  used, 
they  may  be  made  to  introduce  the  pupil  to  the 
widest  fields  of  philosophy  under  the  guidance  of 
a  great  master,  and  in  an  interesting  way.  They 
present  the  applications  of  Metaphysic  to  art,  re- 
ligion, nature,  and  human  conduct  ;  —  and  they  thus 
open  regions  of  reflection  into  which  the  instruc- 
tion of  our  colleges  and  universities  scarcely  takes 
their  students  at  all,  —  regions,  however,  which  are 
precisely  the  ones  where  such  students  both  de- 
sire and  need  to  go. 

I    wish,    in    the    second    place,    to    have    these 


EDITOR  S    PREFACE.  IX 

thoughts  of  Lotze  do  their  legitimate  work  in 
liberalizing,  expanding  and  elevating  the  culture 
of  those  persons  who  are  wont  to  be  styled  the 
'educated  class.'  Perhaps,  since  what  is  here  of- 
fered to  them  is  presented  in  so  compact  and 
manageable  form,  not  a  few  will  be  glad  to  look 
on  life,  —  in  its  widest  extent,  human  and  divine, 
—  with  quickened  powers  of  reflection  under  the 
stimulating  words  of  this  teacher  from  another 
nation.  With  such  an  object  in  view,  it  may  be 
regretted  that  the  first  number  of  the  series  should 
be  the  most  abstract,  and  seemingly  foreign  to 
practical  interests,  of  them  all.  But,  then,  as  I 
have  already  said,  it  is  introductory  and  funda- 
mental. 

It  is  not  my  purpose  to  attempt  to  defend, 
refute,  or  even  characterize  the  opinions  which 
these  books  will,  for  themselves,  sufficiently  set 
forth.  Two  or  three  remarks,  however,  will  help 
to  guard  the  uninstructed  reader  against  certain 
misapprehensions  of  the  author  which  might  other- 
wise easily  arise.  The  philosophy  of  Lotze  is  a  re- 
markable combination  of  elements  from  the  school 
and  from  real  life.  The  elements  which  come 
from  the  school  are  both  directly  philosophical, 
and  also  only  indirectly  so  through  the  physical 
and  natural  sciences.  In  the  same  year  of  his 


EDITOR  S    PREFACE. 


life,  at  the  age  of  twenty-one,  he  gained  both  the 
degree  of  Doctor  of  Philosophy  and  that  of  Doctor 
of  Medicine.  Although  his  earliest  published 
works  were  on  Metaphysic  (1841)  and  Logic  (1843), 
the  first  to  be  much  noticed  were  those  upon  the 
science  which  deals  with  the  relations  of  physi- 
cal and  psychical  phenomena :  on  the  Physiology 
of  Life  (1851)  and  of  the  Soul  (1852).  The  thor- 
ough-going attempt  made  by  the  latter  works  to 
apply  the  conception  of  mechanism  to  the  phe- 
nomena of  mind  led  many  to  misunderstand  Lotze, 
and  even  to  class  him  among  so-called  scientific 
materialists.  The  freest  allowance  is  given  to  the 
scientific  conception  of  mechanism  in  this  series 
of  philosophical  'Outlines.'  But  the  reader  should 
never  forget  that  in  the  view  of  Lotze,  '  Mechan- 
ism '  —  or  the  coherency  of  the  phenomena  accord- 
ing to  fixed  laws  of  action  —  is  only  the  means  or 
'  way  of  behavior '  which  the  highest  Idea,  the  Idea 
of  the  Good,  has  chosen  to  realize  itself.  And  the 
whole  drift  and  aim  of  the  philosophical  system 
set  forth  in  these  little  books,  is  away  from  mate- 
rialism. The  disciples  of  Lotze  —  should  he  make 
any  among  us  —  would  become  uncommonly  at 
their  ease  concerning  the  ultimate  result  upon  our 
fundamental  faiths  and  aspirations,  of  materialistic 
science  and  destructive  criticism. 


EDITOR  S    PREFACE.  XI 

Some  readers  of  the  '  Outlines  of  Metaphysic ' 
may  be  betrayed  into  the  hasty  conclusion  that 
their  author  was  pantheistically  inclined.  Such 
should  remember  that  it  is  not  the  business  of 
Metaphysic  to  go  far  in  the  personification  of  that 
Absolute  Being  whom  it  discovers  as  the  '  Ground ' 
of  all  reality,  or  in  defining  the  true  personality 
of  the  finite  spirits  which  thus  apprehend  this 
Absolute  Being.  On  such  subjects,  the  '  Philoso- 
phy of  Religion  '  and  the  '  Philosophy  of  Ethics ' 
(Practical  Philosophy)  will  give  the  elaboration  and 
application  of  the  author's  metaphysical  concep- 
tions. It  is  my  plan  to  have  these  two  additional 
numbers  of  the  series  follow  the  one  on  Meta- 
physic, within  a  few  months.  In  the  meantime, 
if  this  philosopher  also  must  be  classed  with  others, 
let  us  affirm  our  hope  and  belief  that  his  conclu- 
sions will  be  in  the  main  acceptable  to  the  many 
who  are  feeling  strongly  a  certain  most  interesting 
and  promising  drift  in  modern  philosophy.  Among 
such  are  those  who  have  learned  much  from  Hegel, 
although  they  have  been  obliged  to  modify  many 
of  his  views.  The  method  of  Hegel  was,  indeed, 
always  opposed  by  Lotze ;  and  he  endeavored  to 
make  good  what  he  considered  the  deficiencies  of 
Hegel  by  substituting  for  a  movement  of  Absolute 
Thought,  a  movement  of  Absolute  Life,  as  the 


Xll  EDITOR  S    PREFACE. 

centre  and  sum  of  all  reality.  But,  with  all  the 
differences  in  both  method  and  conclusions  of  the 
two  thinkers,  Lotze  teaches  something  like  the 
same  spiritual  Monism  as  that  into  which  many 
who  have  learned  in  the  school  of  Hegel  are  lead- 
ing the  way.  And  for  such  as  do  not  feel  that 
they  have  learned,  even  indirectly,  from  Hegel  the 
secret  of  reconciling  science  with  aesthetics  and 
religious  impulse,  Spirit  with  so-called  Matter,  and 
Mechanism  with  Idea,  these  works  will  be  found 
useful  in  pointing  out  how  a  candid  and  well-fur- 
nished mind  considered  such  problem  of  reconcilia- 
tion, as  well  as  in  throwing  light  on  many  of  the 
subordinate  problems  the  solution  of  which  is  in- 
volved in  the  larger  one. 

It  should  be  mentioned  with  gratitude  that  these 
translations  have  been  undertaken  with  the  kind 
permission  of  the  German  publisher,  Herr  S.  Hirzel, 

of  Leipsic. 

GEORGE   T.   LADD. 

NEW  HAVEN,  October,   1884. 


TABLE    OF   CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

INTRODUCTION i 

FIRST   PRINCIPAL   DIVISION.     ONTOLOGY. 

PRELIMINARY  REMARKS 15 

CHAPTER      I.     Of  the   Significance  (Conception)  of 

Being 18 

CHAPTER    II.     Of  the  Content  of  the  Existent       .  25 

CHAPTER  III.     Of  the  Conception  of  Reality     .         .  35 

CHAPTER  IV.     Of  Change      ...'..  45 

CHAPTER    V.     Of  Causes  and  Effects        ...  57 

SECOND   PRINCIPAL   DIVISION.     COSMOLOGY. 

PRELIMINARY  REMARK 77 

CHAPTER      I.     Of  Space,  Time,  and  Motion      .         .  79 

CHAPTER    II.     Of  Matter 100 

CHAPTER  III.     Of  the  Coherency  of  Natural  Events  .  113 

THIRD   PRINCIPAL   DIVISION.     PHENOMENOLOGY. 

CHAPTER      I.     Of  the  Subjectivity  of  Cognition    .  129 

CHAPTER    II.     Of  the  Objectivity  of  Cognition .         .  143 

CHAPTER  III.     Summary  and  Conclusion       .         .  153 


§  1.  Our  every-day  apprehension  of  the  World  is 
pervaded  throughout  with  suppositions  concerning 
an  inner  coherency  of  its  phenomena,  which  is  in  no 
wise  immediately  perceived  by  us,  and  yet  is  re- 
garded as  needing  no  explanation  and  as  necessary. 
Thus,  for  example,  even  the  most  common  appre- 
hension of  the  world  is  impossible  without  articu- 
lating the  content  of  our  perceptions  in  such  a  man- 
ner that  we  assume  '  Things '  as  the  supports  and 
centres  of  its  phenomena  and  events,  and  all  kinds 
of  '  reciprocal  actions '  as  being  interchanged  be- 
tween them.  Neither  those  things,  however,  nor 
these  actions,  are  immediate  objects  of  perception. 
In  the  same  manner  are  both  a  theoretic  apprehen- 
sion and  a  practical  treatment  of  the  world  incon- 
ceivable without  the  supposition  of  a  causal  connec- 
tion of  that  which  has  actual  existence. 

All  these  and  other  suppositions  we  have  become 
accustomed  to  in  life  with  the  feeling  of  their 
necessity,  but  without  availing  ourselves  of  a  clear 
knowledge  of  their  precise  meaning  and  of  the 
grounds  and  limits  of  their  validity.  There  are 


OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 


therefore  never  wanting  occasions  where  doubts  at 
once  arise  in  us  concerning  their  validity.  Thus  in 
the  consideration  of  human  transactions,  the  new 
conception  of  freedom  stands  opposed  to  the  '  causal 
nexus '  previously  deemed  of  universal  applicability. 
Thus  on  consideration  of  the  soul,  the  conception  of 
'  Thing '  seems  to  be  in  general  inept  to  designate 
the  permanent  subject  of  its  changeable  phenomena. 

These  contradictions,  in  which  the  ^t'/r^-scientific 
form  of  representation  is  involved,  and  to  which  the 
particular  sciences  also  lead,  —  in  so  far  as  the  axi- 
oms which  some  one  of  them  follows  in  its  domain 
run  counter  to  those  which  another  of  them  leaves 
undisputed  in  its  domain,  —  make  us  sensible  of  the 
necessity  for  a  universal  science,  which  takes  as  the 
objects  of  its  investigation  those  conceptions  and 
propositions  that,  in  ordinary  life  and  in  the  particular 
sciences,  are  employed  as  principles  of  investigation. 

This  science  is  Metaphysic. 

§  2.  The  two  questions  that  lie.  nearest  at  hand 
would  accordingly  be  :  How  can  we  get  possession 
of  those  suppositions  completely,  in  order  to  have  in 
collective  form  that  total  content  of  our  reason 
which  is  necessary  to  thought  ?  and,  then :  How 
can  we  demonstrate  that  these  suppositions  have 
any  validity,  or  what  validity  they  have  ? 


THE    CATEGORIES    OF    KANT. 


As  to  the  former  question,  it  is  well  known  that 
Aristotle  first  directed  attention  to  those  most  gen- 
eral conceptions  which  are  expressed  concerning 
everything  actual  (the  '  Categories ')  ;  but  without 
conducting  his  search  for  them  according  to  any 
principle,  or  giving  any  security  that  his  enumera- 
tion of  their  series  was  complete.  In  more  recent 
times,  Kant  attempted  to  make  good  this  deficiency : 
Every  act  of  cognition,  he  held,  takes  place  by  com- 
bination of  ideas,  whose  form  is  that  of  logical  judg- 
ment. If  now  it  is  sought  to  discover  the  different 
suppositions  which  we  make  about  possible  or  nec- 
essary combinations  of  'Things,'  then  there  is  only 
need  to  collect  all  the  essentially  different  forms  of 
the  logical  judgment,  and  it  will  thereupon  be  found 
that  a  special  model  of  combination  has  been  fol- 
lowed in  each,  according  to  which  subject  and  predi- 
cate are  thought  of  as  cohering.  For  example  :  the 
categorical  judgment  ("gold  is  yellow")  simply  com- 
bines subject  and  predicate  as  thing  and  attribute; 
and  this  relation  between  thing  and  attribute  is  one 
of  those  suppositions  which  we  make  concerning  the 
coherency  of  things.  The  hypothetical  judgment 
("if  gold  is  heated,  it  melts")  unites  the  predicate 
to  the  subject,  not  absolutely  but  conditionally;  and 
the  thought  which  lies  herein,  —  namely,  that  of 
a  combination  of  changeable  phenomena  according 


OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 


to  a  law  of  conditionating,  is  a  second  of  those 
universal  suppositions.  Kant  expresses  them  both 
by  the  brief  titles  of  the  categories  of  '  substantiality 
and  of  causality.'  [In  reference  to  this  point  it  is 
common  to  remark,  that  the  correct  form,  in  which 
we  are  able  to  express  those  suppositions  concerning 
the  nature  of  actuality  that  are  necessities  of  our 
thought,  is  without  exception  that  of  the  proposition, 
not  that  of  the  conception.  Only  a  proposition 
states  a  truth  from  which,  by  application  to  particu- 
lar cases,  definite  determinations  can  be  deduced. 
Conceptions  are  only  elements  which  can  form 
truths  by  composition  ;  of  themselves  alone  they 
are  nothing,  until  \ve  are  told  what  is  to  be  done 
with  them.  It  was  on  this  account  a  hindrance  to 
the  history  of  philosophy,  and  led  to  inapplicable 
ways  of  speaking,  that  Aristotle  reduced  those 
thoughts  to  the  form  of  fundamental  conceptions ; 
and  that  Kant  also,  at  least  at  first,  represented  the 
truth  which  is  necessary  to  thought  as  a  series  of 
conceptions,  ('pure  notions  of  the  understanding'). 
In  a  round-about-way  he  annulled  again  this  defi- 
ciency, when  he  afterwards  sought  to  deduce  a 
system  of  fundamental  propositions  of  the  under- 
standing from  these  conceptions  of  the  understand- 
ing-] 

On   the   whole,   it   cannot   be    admitted    that    this 


THE    CATEGORIES    OF    KANT.  5 

clue,  or  that  the  series  of  forms  of  judgment  to 
which  it  conducts,  can  lead  to  the  complete,  correct, 
and  useful  discovery  of  the  metaphysical  supposi- 
tions. Logical  thinking  is  a  combination  of  ideas 
according  to  laws  of  a  universal  truth ;  but  these 
ideas  do  not  relate  to  what  is  merely  actual,  but  to 
all  that  is  thinkable,  even  to  all  abstractions  which 
can  never  of  themselves  have  any  actuality.  The 
logical  forms  are,  further,  modes  of  experience,  by 
means  of  which  our  human  thinking  combines  and 
disposes  manifold  ideas,  in  such  manner  that  a  cog- 
nition of  what  is  actual  can  be  gained  therefrom  ; 
but  these  logical  forms  themselves  are  not  imme- 
diate copies  of  the  combinations  which  take  place 
between  the  elements  of  actuality.  It  is  therefore 
to  be  expected,  that  this  clue  will  indeed  remind  us 
of  many  metaphysical  conceptions,  because,  of 
course,  even  that  which  is  actual  can  be  thought 
of  only  in  the  aforesaid  logical  forms ;  but  that,  on 
the  one  side,  we  cannot  be  led  by  it  to  all  the  funda- 
mental propositions  of  metaphysic,  and  that,  on  the 
other  side,  we  may  by  following  this  clue  hit  upon 
conceptions  which  have  merely  a  logical  value,  and 
of  which  the  metaphysical  applicability  is  not  clear. 

§  3.    In  the   above-mentioned  way  Kant  had  dis- 
covered twelve  categories,   and,   on   account  of  the 


OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 


consciousness  of  necessary  and  universal  validity 
which  accompanied  them,  had  considered  them  as 
not  derived  from  experience,  but  as  an  originally 
inborn  possession  of  our  spirit. 

Fichte  took  offence  at  the  view  that  our  spirit, 
which  every  one  inclines  to  think  of  as  a  unity  in 
the  strictest  sense,  be  supposed  to  possess  twelve 
different,  isolated,  fundamental  conceptions  ;  and  he 
proposed  to  deduce  these  Kantian  categories  from  a 
single  original  act  or  original  truth  of  the  spirit,  as 
a  series  of  consequences,  every  one  of  which  has  its 
definite  place  beside  the  others.  Such  original  act 
he  found  in  this,  that  the  spirit  never  merely  is 
(namely,  as  object  for  another  observer),  but  contin- 
uously, and  in  all  forms  of  its  activity,  withal  is 
1  for  itself  (fur  sich  ist)  ;  that  is,  it  knows,  feels, 
enjoys,  or  possesses  itself,  etc.  ("the  Ego  posits 
itself  ").  And  now  Fichte  sought  to  show  how  this 
*  self-positing,'  in  order  to  accomplish  what  it  wishes 
or  is  obliged  to  accomplish,  necessarily  leads  also  to 
the  positing  of  a  '  non-ego,'  to  the  ascription  of 
quality  to  the  non-ego,  to  the  assumption  of  its 
divisibility,  etc.  ;  that  is  to  say,  how  the  spirit  is 
necessitated  by  its  original  act  to  represent  in  gen- 
eral an  external  world,  and  to  make,  with  reference 
to  the  inner  coherence  of  the  component  parts  of 
this  world,  those  necessary  suppositions  which  are 
expressed  by  the  categories  of  Kant. 


THE    IDEALISM    OF    FICHTE. 


§  4.  Kant  had  considered  the  '  pure  notions  of  the 
understanding*  as  only  subjective  forms  of  cognition 
belonging  to  our  spirit,  and  therefore  as  valid  only 
for  that  which  has  once  become  '  phenomenon '  for 
us,  and  not  as  valid  for  things  themselves.  But  that 
such  '  Things '  in  general  exist,  he  had  constantly  in 
praxi  assumed. 

Even  this  the  idealism  of  Fichte  had  to  call  in 
question  :  even  that  there  are  *  Things'  appeared  to 
it  as  an  imagination  unavoidable  by  our  spirit,  the 
external  world  as  a  mere  product  of  a  faculty  of 
imagination  working  unconsciously  within  us.  The 
necessity  of  explaining  how  different  spirits  con- 
struct pictures  of  the  world  that  fit  together  so  as  to 
make  one  common  world,  led  to  the  assumption  of  a 
single  creative  power,  which,  harmoniously  active  in 
all  spirits,  both  images  before  them  the  phenomenal 
world,  and  also  necessitates  them  to  judge  of  this 
same  world  according  to  certain  suppositions. 

Henceforward  this  fundamental  conception  of  an 
'  Absolute  '  determined  the  character  of  Metaphysic. 
The  attempt  was  made  to  translate  one's  self  imme- 
diately into  the  nature  of  this  Absolute,  in  such  a 
manner  as  to  have  a  real  experience  of  its  develop- 
ments, and  not  merely  bring  them  to  one's  contem- 
plation from  without  by  the  quondam  means  of 
human  cognition,  comparison  of  conceptions,  and 


8  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

adduction  of  proof.  In  a  '  dialectical  method  '  (con- 
cerning which,  further  on)  the  means  appeared  to 
be  given  of  beholding  this  self-development  of  the 
Absolute  within  us,  in  its  simplicity  and  without 
disturbing  it  by  admixture  of  subjective  investiga- 
tion. Schelling  withal  does  not  separate  the  two 
problems  of  deducing  from  this  Absolute  the  gene- 
ral laws  of  all  actuality  and  the  definite  particular 
forms  of  phenomena.  Hegel  designs  at  least  to 
make  this  separation ;  and  in  his  Metaphysic  (which 
he  calls  '  Logic ' )  he  intends  to  depict  that  first 
inner  development  of  the  Absolute,  through  which 
it  projects  within  itself  those  laws  of  every  future 

possible  world  that  are  necessities  of  thought. 

/ 

§  5.  Without  passing  judgment  in  this  place  upon 
the  substantial  value  of  the  above-mentioned  appre- 
hension of  the  world,  we  cannot  approve  of  the 
method  it  employs.  For  it  takes  its  departure  from 
an  assumption  (the  conception  of  the  Absolute) 
which  lies  very  remote  from  the  common  representa- 
tion ;  the  content  of  which  is  very  difficult  for  even 
the  philosophers  to  define  exhaustively ;  but  the 
erroneous  determinations  of  which  become  sources 
of  mistakes  in  all  subsequent  investigations,  —  mis- 
takes that  are  always  the  more  hazardous,  the  more 
decidedly  it  is  proposed  to  deduce  the  entire  content 


HERBART  S    VIEW    APPROVED. 


of  Metaphysic,  in  an  unbroken  series  and  without 
anywhere  taking  a  new  start,  from  a  single 
principle. 

Such  kind  of  deduction  appears  to  us  the  natural 
method  of  representing  a  truth  with  which  we  are 
already  acquainted.  Investigation,  on  the  contrary, 
whose  first  business  is  to  discover  the  truth,  must 
take  its  departure  from  the  largest  possible  number 
of  independent,  perfectly  obvious  and  well-recog- 
nized considerations,  with  the  proviso  that  the 
results  which  the  prosecution  of  one  consideration 
yields,  shall  be  subsequently  corrected,  so  far  as  is 
necessary,  by  the  results  of  the  rest. 

In  this  matter,  therefore,  we  esteem  Herbart 
right,  who  assumes  as  many  independent  sections 
of  Metaphysic  as  there  are  different  distinct  ques- 
tions, problems,  or  contradictions,  that  meet  us  in 
our  common  contemplation  of  the  world,  and  that 
are  the  separate  causes  of  our  philosophizing  in  gene- 
ral. For  they  compel  us  to  attempt  the  reduction  of 
the  problems  or  contradictions  given  in  perception^ 
to  one  consistent,  actual  'way  of  behavior*  on  the 
part  of  '  the  Existent '  ;  and,  more  precisely,  to  such 
a  way  of  behavior  as  will  withal  furnish  an  explana- 
tion, how  the  appearance  of  contradiction  cannot  fail 
to  originate  for  our  point  of  view. 


IO  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

§  6.  That  we  are  right  in  following  Herbart  in 
this  matter  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  the  most  differ- 
ent schools,  however  wide  the  other  differences  of 
their  fundamental  views  and  their  methods,  have, 
nevertheless,  composed  an  articulated  system  of 
Metaphysic  in  quite  analogous  manner. 

All  these  different  schools  experienced  the  neces- 
sity of  discussing  in  the  first  place,  in  a  section  on 
'  Ontology, '  (so  the  old  Metaphysic  and  Herbart ; 
called  '  Doctrine  of  Being'  in  Hegel)  those  most 
general  suppositions  which  we  cannot  avoid  making 
concerning  the  nature  of  all  things  and  the  possi- 
bility of  their  coherence.  *  Being,'  'Becoming,'  'efri 
cient  causation,'  and  such  questions  form  the  chief 
problems  of  all  this  section.  They  experienced 

(2)  The  necessity  of  examining  the  forms  in  which 
the  particular  elements  of  actuality  are  united  in  one 
orderly  totality.     The  intuitions  of  '  Space,'   '  Time/ 
*  Motion,'  and  the  most  abstract  of  the   cognate  con- 
ceptions of  'the  Natural,'  form  the  chief  points  of 
this   section,  called    '  Cosmology,'   ('  Synechology  in 
Herbart ' ;    '  Doctrine  of  Essence  and   Phenomenon 
in  Hegel).     Finally, 

(3)  They  all  arrive  at  the  inquiry  concerning  the 
relation  in  which  the  objective  world  stands  to  that 
world  of  spirits  by  which  it  is  apprehended.     Within 
wider  or  narrower  limits,  the  '  Rational  Psychology  ' 


HOW    IT    IS    CERTIFIED.  I  I 

of  the  old  school,  the  '  Eidolology '  of  Herbart  (doc- 
trine of  the  forms  of  cognition),  and  Hegel's  'Doc- 
trine of  the  Idea,'  treat  of  the  same  subjects. 

§  7.  The  second  of  the  questions  adduced  above 
(§  2),  —  namely,  How  we  can  certify  ourselves  of  the 
truth  and  validity  of  our  metaphysical  suppositions, 
cannot  be  decided  previous  to,  but  only  in  and  by 
Metaphysic  itself.  For  the  bare  question  is  without 
meaning  so  long  as  it  concerns  merely  the  validity 
in  general  of  these  suppositions ;  it  interests  us  only 
so  far  as  it  touches  upon  the  validity  of  metaphysical 
cognition  in  reference  to  an  actual  world,  which  we 
think  of  as  an  object  standing  over  opposite  to  us. 
But  the  question  whether  such  a  world  may  be 
thought  of,  and  how  it  may  be  thought  of,  is  a 
metaphysical  one.  And  as  a  rule  it  will  always  be 
found  that  those  who,  previous  to  the  application  of 
our  cognition  to  actuality,  are  pleased  first  to  decide 
the  point  whether  it  is  thus  applicable  at  all  or  not, 
judge  this  point  in  such  a  way  as  to  assume  ready- 
made  a  crowd  of  propositions  concerning  the  nature 
of  objective  actuality,  concerning  the  nature  of  the 
cognitive  spirit,  and  concerning  a  possible  relation 
of  interaction  between  the  two  ;  while,  nevertheless, 
it  is  only  Metaphysic  that  can  in  the  first  instance 
demonstrate  these  propositions.  The  question  which 


12  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

is  disposed  of  unconsciously  in  such  cases,  we  are 
going  to  undertake  consciously ;  and  we  relegate  it 
to  the  third  principal  division  of  Metaphysic. 


FIRST    PRINCIPAL    DIVISION. 


ONTOLOGY. 


FIRST    PRINCIPAL    DIVISION. 
ONTOLOGY. 

(Or  THE  COHERENCY  OF  THINGS.) 

PRELIMINARY    REMARKS. 

§  8.  Metaphysic  is  the  science  of  that  which  is 
actual,  not  of  that  which  is  merely  thinkable.  By 
actuality  we  distinguish  a  thing  that  is  from  one  that 
is  not,  an  event  that  happens  from  one  that  does  not 
happen,  a  relation  that  exists  from  one  that  does  not 
exist. 

It  is  improper  to  apply  the  term  '  Being '  to  this 
distinction  ;  for  this  term,  according  to  the  custom- 
ary usage  of  speech,  designates  only  one  kind  of 
actuality,  —  namely,  the  motionless  existence  of 
things,  in  opposition,  for  example,  to  the  happening 
of  events. 

Yet  more  hazardous  are  the  designations  of  '  Po- 
sition'  and  'Putting.'  For,  since  the  very  form  of 
the  word  in  this  case  indicates  a  transaction,  these 
designations  easily  mislead  us  into  the  wrong  course 


l6  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

of  wishing  to  understand  or  describe  this  transaction 
of  '  putting '  or  '  positing ' ;  or  rather  (as  we  choose 
to  express  the  thought)  of  raising  the  inquiry,  how 
'actuality  in  general'  is  made.  But  no  one  can  tell 
precisely  how  it  is  brought  about  that,  in  general, 
something  is,  instead  of  there  not  being  anything  at 
all ;  or  how  it  is  made  possible  that  something  enters 
existence  through  coming  to  pass,  instead  of  every- 
thing remaining  as  it  was  of  old. 

This  problem  is  not  merely  hopeless,  but  also  con- 
tradictory. For  every  attempt  to  show  how  actuality 
originates,  assumes  the  antecedent  actuality  of  some 
conditions  or  other,  out  of  which,  or  according  to 
which,  it  originates.  We  can  therefore  never  deduce 
all  actuality,  but  always  merely  one  form  of  actuality 
from  another.  And  the  problem  of  metaphysic  is 
actually  this  :  To  discover  the  laws  of  the  connection 
which  unites  the  particular  (simultaneous  or  succes- 
sive) elements  of  actuality. 

§  9.  If  we  summarize  the  most  universal  factors 
of  the  ordinary  view  of  the  world,  it  will  be  found 
to  include  the  following  suppositions :  There  are 
'  Things '  in  indefinite  number ;  every  thing  sup- 
ports certain  'properties,'  and  can,  in  so  far  as  it 
has  a  previous  existence,  enter  into  all  manner  of 
'  relations '  with  other  things ;  and  these  relations 


THE    COMMON    VIEW    OBSCURE.  I/ 

are  the  reason  on  account  of  which  '  changes '  orig- 
inate in  the  things. 

How  much  that  is  not  lucid  these  suppositions 
contain,  will  be  shown  only  little  by  little.  At  pres- 
ent, it  is  enough  to  remark  that  the  two  simplest  of 
the  conceptions  here  employed,  that  of  a  '  Thing ' 
and  that  of  its  '  Being,'  however  lucid  they  appear  at 
first,  on  closer  consideration  grow  always  more  and 
more  obscure. 

While  we  require  that  the  '  Thing '  shall  be  think- 
able before  its  properties,  we,  for  all  that,  never 
achieve  the  actual  thought  of  it  otherwise  than  by 
means  of  its  properties.  While  we  further  require 
that  it  must  first  '  be,'  in  order  afterward  to  experi- 
ence somewhat  or  to  enter  into  relations  with  other 
things,  we,  for  all  that,  never  in  experience  find  a 
'  Being '  whose  apparent  rest  does  not  itself  rest 
upon  uninterrupted  motions  and  actions ;  nor  are  we 
able  even  in  our  thoughts  to  discover  a  perspicuous 
conception  of  what  we  mean  by  such  '  Being '  as  this. 

These  dilemmas  afford  us  the  first  materials  for 
our  investigation  ;  more  precisely,  we  treat  first  of 
the  true  significance  of  '  Being,'  and  afterward  of  the 
nature  of  that  to  which  this  particular  species  called 
actuality  can  appertain. 


CHAPTER   I. 

OF   THE    SIGNIFICANCE  (THE   CONCEPTION)  OF  'BEING.' 

§  10.  If  the  ordinary  understanding  is  questioned 
as  to  what  it  means  when  it  mentions  something  as 
'  Being,'  in  opposition  to  not  being,  it  will  without 
doubt  appeal  to  immediate  perception,  and  assert : 
That  '  is,'  which  may,  in  some  manner  or  other,  be 
the  subject  of  experience  by  the  senses. 

If,  however,  we  choose  to  formulate  this  expres- 
sion exactly  as  follows,  —  '  To  be  '  signifies  '  to  be 
the  subject  of  experience,'  —  then  this  definition  of 
'  Being '  would  by  no  means  completely  express  what 
we  actually  mean  by  the  word.  For  we  ascribe 
'  Being '  to  what  has  been  previously  perceived,  even 
when  it  is  no  longer  perceived ;  and  we  consider  its 
being  perceived  as  only  something  which  may  possi- 
bly appertain  to  the  thing  in  consequence  of  its 
unobserved,  separate  existence,  but  which  is  not 
identical  with  this. 

In  what  now  this  unobserved  '  Being '  consists,  the 
ordinary  understanding  explains  very  easily.  While 
the  things,  that  is  to  say,  disappear  from  our  percep- 
tion, they  still  continue  to  stand  in  all  kinds  of  rela- 
tions with  one  another ;  and  it  is  these  '  relations,' 


THE    SIGNIFICANCE    OF    BEING.  19 

in  which,  while  they  are  not  being  observed,  the 
'  Being '  of  things  consists,  and  by  which  it  is  distin- 
guished from  '  not  being.' 

In  more  general  terms  :  'To  be '  means  ' to  stand 
in  relations/  and  being  perceived  is  itself  only  one 
such  relation  beside  other  relations. 

§  11.  In  opposition  to  the  foregoing  mode  of 
apprehending  the  subject,  philosophy  is  wont  with 
great  vivacity  to  explain  :  '  Standing  in  relations ' 
can  be  asserted  only  of  that  which  exists  previous  to 
such  relations.  Accordingly,  the  '  Being  '  of  things 
can  consist  neither  in  their  relation  to  us,  nor  in 
their  relation  to  one  another ;  it  must  rather  be 
thought  of  as  a  perfectly  pure  and  simple  'position,' 
'affirmation,'  or  'putting,'  which  excludes  all  rela- 
tions, but  forms  the  ground  of  the  possibility  of 
becoming  related  at  all. 

If  we  attempt  to  think  of  this  pure  'Being,'  and  to 
give  to  ourselves  an  account  of  precisely  what  we 
mean  by  it,  then  we  meet  with  the  difficulty  of  being 
unable  to  specify  anything  by  which  such  a  'pure 
Being '  may  be  distinguished  from  non-being.  For 
if  we  actually  exclude  all  relations,  then  the  'pure 
Being'  would  consist  in  a  mere  'position ' ;  by  virtue 
of  which,  however,  that  which  is  thus  existent  can- 
not be  discovered  at  any  place  in  the  world,  or  at 


2O  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

any  point  of  time  in  the  succession  of  events,  and 
does  not  assert  itself  in  actuality  by  any  effect  upon 
anything  whatever,  and  cannot  be  affected  at  all  by 
any  element  of  actuality.  But  it  is  precisely  by 
these  same  features  that  we  recognize,  as  we  be- 
lieve, the  non-existent. 

Consequently,  the  definition,  which  represents 
'  Being '  as  '  Position  without  relation,1  is  so  imper- 
fect that  it  comprehends  precisely  the  opposite  of 
that  which  is  to  be  defined  ;  it  therefore  needs  cor- 
rection. 

REMARK.  The  purport  of  this  conclusion  is  exactly  the 
same  as  that  which  forms  the  beginning  of  the  Hegelian  logic, 
in  the  proposition :  '  Being  =  Nothing.'  But  the  succession  of 
mental  operations  which  we  have  in  this  case  accomplished 
(namely,  an  attempt  at  definition  ;  a  comparison  of  the  definition 
arrived  at  with  what  we  really  meant,  and  the  discovery  of  a 
contradiction  between  the  two ;  and,  finally,  a  discernment  of 
the  necessity  of  revising  our  definition),  appears  to  Hegel  as  an 
inner  development,  which  was  gone  through,  therefore,  not  by 
our  thoughts,  but  by  their  object :  the  Absolute,  first  thought  of 
as  pure  Being,  is  obliged  to  discover  itself  as  such  to  be  actually 
identical  with  Nothing,  and  then,  out  of  this  unseemly  identity, 
to  posit  itself  again  by  a  new  act  of  development  in  the  new  form 
of '  determinate  existence.' 

§  12.  It  will  be  objected  that,  none  the  less,  an 
existence,  previously  thought  of  in  relations,  cannot 
by  abstraction  of  these  relations,  pass  over  into  a 


UNRELATED    ' POSITION*    IMPOSSIBLE.  21 

non-existence ;  and  that,  therefore,  the  pure  Being 
of  the  existence,  which  remains  after  this  abstraction 
is  made,  is  even  still  the  contrary  of  non-being. 

This  objection  is  just  only  in  so  far  as  we  doubt- 
less mean  by  the  term  '  Being '  that  which  is  the 
opposite  to  non-being :  we  design  to  affirm  and  posit, 
not  to  deny  and  annul.  But  we  are  mistaken  in 
holding  that  it  is  sufficient  to  consider  this  positing 
or  affirming,  intended  by  us,  as  valid  in  actuality, 
without  concerning  ourselves  about  the  conditions 
under  which  these  two  conceptions  have  any  applica- 
bility to  actuality. 

These  conceptions  really  belong  to  the  large  class 
of  abstractions  which  we  correctly  produce  to  aid 
the  process  of  thinking,  and  which,  in  the  process  of 
thinking,  we  are  also  able,  by  combination  with  other 
conceptions,  to  convert  into  useful  results  :  they  are 
not,  however,  applicable  at  all  per  se ;  but  they  first 
become  applicable  to  what  is  actual,  when  we  attach 
to  them  again  the  abstracted  correlates  through 
which  their  meaning  is  completed. 

Thus  the  conception  of  '  positing '  is  not  applica- 
ble at  all,  if  it  is  designed,  without  media,  to  posit 
merely  something,  and  yet  not  posit  it  anywhere 
whatever.  Thus,  moreover,  we  cannot  ' affirm'  a 
Thing,  but  only  a  predicate  of 'a  thing. 

'Pure  Being,'  thus  apprehended,  would  therefore 


22  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

be  only  the  conception  of  an  affirmation,  to  which 
must  be  supplied  both  the  subject  of  which  the  affir- 
mation is  supposed  to  hold  good,  and  the  predicate 
which  is  supposed  to  attach  itself  to  the  subject. 

It  follows,  accordingly,  that,  as  was  shown  above, 
the  'Being'  of  things  can  consist  only  in  certain 
relations  on  which  the  act  of  positing  affirmatively 
falls,  and  not  in  a  pure  act  of  positing  without  any 
definite  condition  in  which  the  '  Thing '  was  posited 
by  the  act. 

§  13.  A  further  exception  can  be  taken  (so  Her- 
bart) :  If  any  existence,  in  order  to  be,  must  be 
related  to  some  other,  and  accordingly  pre-supposes 
this  other,  then  a  constant,  durable  positing  of  actu- 
ality can  never  come  to  pass. 

This  objection,  however,  confounds  the  useless 
question,  how  a  world  would  get  itself  made,  with 
the  metaphysical  question,  in  what  forms  of  coher- 
ence can  the  existing  world  consist.  And  even  if 
we  should  make  a  world,  it  would  remain  incompre- 
hensible why  the  creating  force,  which  we  must  then 
in  every  case  assume  and  can  in  no  case  further 
explain,  would  have  to  be  subject  absolutely  to  the 
limitation  of  positing  only  one  element  at  a  time. 
But  if  we  suppose  that  this  force  posited  the  entire 
manifoldness  of  the  elements  of  the  world,  as  related 


UNRELATED    'POSITION'    IMPOSSIBLE.  23 

to  each  other,  at  one  time,  then  the  whole  difficulty 
would  disappear,  and  all  the  elements  would  remain 
constant ;  although  each,  —  or  rather,  in  this  case, 
because  each,  —  is  related  to  the  other. 

Just  as  lacking  in  cogency  is  the  other  thought  of 
an  antecedent  unrelated  position,  which  is  needed  to 
make  possible  subsequent  relations.  An  element 
which  were  out  of  all  relation  to  all  other  elements, 
to  the  world  in  general,  could  not  even  subsequently 
enter  into  such  relation.  For,  since  it  is  obliged  to 
enter,  and  is  able  to  enter,  not  into  '  relations  in  gen- 
eral,' but  into  certain  perfectly  definite  ones,  to  the 
exclusion  of  others,  the  reason  for  this  selection  and 
this  exclusion  could  be  discovered  afresh  only  in 
other  '  relations '  that  would  be  already  existing 
between  the  above-said  element  and  the  world. 
There  is  therefore  no  transition  for  '  Things '  out  of 
unrelated  'Being'  into  the  condition  of  being  re- 
lated, but  only  an  interchange  of  different  relations. 

§  14.  For  the  sake  of  explaining  the  world,  even 
the  view  which  seeks  for  true  '  Being '  in  '  Position  ' 
without  relation,  is  still  compelled  to  assume  that 
things  do,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  everywhere  stand  in 
reciprocal  relations  ;  only  —  this  Realism  goes  on  to 
say  —  they  are  not  so  necessarily,  but  could  likewise*! 
'be/  devoid  of  all  relation. 


24  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

But  the  above  statement  means  nothing  else  than 
this  :  There  '  is '  actually  nothing  which  does  not 
stand  in  relations ;  or,  all  '  that  is '  does  stand  in 
relations.  To  speak,  indeed,  of  'pure,  unrelated 
Being,'  and  at  the  same  time  admit  that  there  is 
none  such,  means  the  same  as  to  speak,  not  of  the 
existent  (which  it  is  still  necessary  somehow  to 
make  good  as  'existing'),  but  of  the  non-existent, 
—  something  which  this  view  considers  possible, 
but  which  we  consider  a  mere  abstraction  that  has 
absolutely  no  direct  significance  with  reference  to 
actuality. 


CHAPTER   II. 

OF   THE    CONTENT    OF    THE    EXISTENT. 

§  15.  If  'to  be'  means  the  same  as  'to  stand  in 
relations,'  then  further  inquiry  arises :  partly,  What 
are  the  relations,  to  stand  in  which  constitutes  for 
things  their  '  being '  ?  partly  also,  What  are  the 
Things,  which  as  subjects  enter  into  the  relations? 

The  second  question,  to  which  from  reasons  of 
convenience  we  give  the  precedence,  does  not  mean 
that  the  characteristic  and  concrete  content  of 
things  is  to  be  specified, — whether  of  every  indi- 
vidual, in  so  far  as  they  might  happen  to  be  distinct 
from  one  another,  or  of  all  collectively,  in  so  far  as 
they  might  happen  to  be  of  one  essence.  We  have 
rather  in  this  case  to  do  only  with  the  discovery  of 
the  universal  formal  predicates  which  must  apper- 
tain to  all  that  (whatever  else  it  may  be)  which  is  to 
be  called  '  Thing/  or  which  is  to  appear  in  actuality 
as  the  '  Subject  of  relations.'  In  other  words :  we 
seek  a  definition  of  'Thingness'  (Dingheii). 

§  16.  The  belief  of  ordinary  intuition,  that  it  has 
an  immediate  perception  of  the  nature  of  things, 
can  be  only  very  short-lived.  On  closer  considera- 
tion, it  very  soon  learns  :  — 


26  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

(1)  That  all  perceptible  '  Things/  although  they 
first    appear  to    intuition    as    undivided    wholes,  are 
composed  of  many  elements,  and  that  all  their  sen- 
sible properties  depend  upon  the  form  of  this  com- 
position, and  change  with  it ; 

(2)  That  the  simple  elements,  in  which  we  must 
now  seek  for  the  genuine  '  Things,'  not  merely  re- 
main imperceptible,  but  that  it  would  also  be  in  vain 
to  want  to  define  their  essence  by  means  of  other 
sensible  qualities,  since  all  such  properties  are  de- 
pendent upon   conditions,   and,   accordingly,   cannot 
indicate  the  necessarily  unchanging  essence  of  the 
things,  but  only  their  way   of  behavior  varying  ac- 
cording to  circumstances  ;  finally  — 

(3)  That  sensible  properties  also  are  not  attached 
once  for  all,  as  changing  phenomena  to  a  single  sub- 
ject,  nor  do  they  proceed  from  it   alone,   but  that 
they  are  always  only  events  which  are  attached  to 
the  concurrence  of  different  things. 

For  this  reason,  therefore,  sensible  properties  are 
neither  directly  the  content  of  'the  Existent,'  nor 
are  they  phenomena  which,  although  in  an  indirect 
manner,  do,  nevertheless,  express  the  true  nature 
of  this  Existent ;  they  are  rather  events  which 
indicate  indeed  the  fact  and  the  manner  of  the 
affection  or  action  of  things,  but  never  specify  what 
the  things  are. 


CONTENT    OF    THE    EXISTENT.  2/ 

§  17.  After  it  is  obvious  that  no  kind  of  sensible 
properties  form  the  content  of  Things,  we  still  do 
not  need  to  resort  to  the  desperate  expedient  of 
speaking  of  an  existence  that  were  absolutely  devoid 
of  content,  and  the  entire  nature  of  which  consisted 
in  indeterminate  '  Being,'  without  any  definite  Some- 
what to  which  this  *  Being '  appertains.  The  very 
name,  '  the  Existent/  by  its  participial  form  (in  Ger- 
man, das  Seiende)  requires  somewhat  conceivable  in 
itself  which  may  as  it  were  participate  in  'Being.' 

It  would  therefore  be  most  pertinent,  as  a  rule, 
never  to  speak  of  '  the  Existent '  absolutely,  but 
always  only  of  this  or  that  definite  existence.  The 
first  expression  were  allowable  only  on  the  supposi- 
tion that  the  essence  of  all  things  be  identical,  and 
that  there  be,  accordingly,  only  one  existence,  which 
just  for  this  reason  could  be  designated  by  the  name 
of  'the  Existent? — a  name  which  in  that  case  would 
appertain  to  such  content  merely,  and  to  no  other. 
The  second  expression  makes  it  much  more  evident 
that  just  such  is  the  content  which  must  be  pre-sup- 
posed  as  the  content  of  '  Being';  and  since  it  is 
attributed  to  whatever  (no  matter  what  else  it  may 
consist  of)  has  the  universal  predicate  of  '  Being,'  it 
does  not  include  the  pre-supposition — which  it  would 
be  unjustifiable  to  make  at  this  stage  of  the  question 
—  of  the  identity  of  all  that  exists. 


28  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

§  18.  Now  since  a  content  for  '  the  Existent '  is 
indispensable,  some  persons  recur  to  Quality ;  but, 
instead  of  sensible  quality,  to  one  which  is  siiper- 
sensible,  which  remains  unknown,  and  from  which 
as  its  later  consequences  the  sensible  properties  are 
supposed  to  originate  (Herbart). 

If  this  assumption  is  not  supposed  barely  to  assert 
outright  that  the  essence  of  4  Things '  is  unknown, 
then  it  can  only  design  to  assert :  We  know  at  least 
so  much  concerning  this  essence  as  that  it  may  be 
formally  apprehended  under  the  general  notion  of 
quality.  The  inquiry  now  arises  :  In  what  does  the 
specific  character  of  this  conception  consist  ? 

Without  exception,  the  only  qualities  which  are 
known  to  us  as  simple  are  those  of  sense,  such  as 
'red/  'warm,'  'sweet,'  and  the  like;  what  we  might 
designate  as  sttfler-scnsiblc  qualities,  —  for  example, 
'strong,'  'pious,'  'good,'  and  the  like,  —  very  soon 
proves  to  be  a  form  of  representing  the  definite 
modes  of  the  behavior  of  one  subject  under  definite 
circumstances.  We  can  therefore  merely  form  the 
general  notion  of  'quality'  in  such  a  way  as  to  lead 
us  to  seek  further  for  the  universal  factor  of  all  sen- 
sible qualities.  Now  since  the  classes  of  these  quali- 
ties are  altogether  disparate,  — warm  and  sweet,  for 
example,  having  no  common  element  in  their  con- 
tent, —  such  universal  factor  lies  solely  in  the  form 
which  our  representation  gives  to  them  all. 


QUALITIES    ARE   ADJECTIVES.  2Q 

The  above-mentioned  form  of  representation  con- 
sists in  this,  that  every  prime  quality  is  perfectly 
homogeneous  ;  that  in  itself  it  furnishes  no  motive 
for  analyzing  it  into  parts,  or  compounding  it  out  of 
parts ;  further,  that  the  parts,  which  the  act  of 
thinking  undertakes  in  an  artificial  way  to  discern 
therein,  are  absolutely  indistinguishable  from  one 
another,  cannot  be  brought  into  any  essential  rela- 
tion with  one  another,  and  prove  to  be  mere  repe- 
titions of  our  representation  of  the  quality  ;  and 
further,  that  on  this  very  account,  '  Quality '  in  itself 
includes  no  reason  for  a  definite  form,  magnitude, 
and  limitation  of  its  own  content,  but  must  wait  to 
get  this  reason  from  something  else,  with  which,  as 
quality,  it  is  found. 

In  brief :  All  qualities  are  adjectives,  and  cannot 
designate  that  which  admits  of  being  thought  of 
merely  as  a  subject  ('Thing'),  but  only  that  which  is 
merely  predicate  affirmed  of  another  subject. 

§  19.  To  the  preceding  view  it  may  be  objected  : 
This  universal  '  Quality,'  that  we  had  but  now  in 
mind,  which  is  thought  of  as  formless,  and  only  just 
qualitatively  determined,  is,  of  course,  not  as  yet  a 
'Thing.'  But  just  as  little  must  it  be  assumed  as 
though  it  were  a  kind  of  '  Stuff,'  not  yet  cut  out, 
from  which,  by  an  act  of  limitation  that  is  still  waited 


3O  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

for,  actual  things  are  going  to  be  cut  out.  In  actual- 
ity there  is,  from  the  very  beginning  onward,  nothing 
but  just  these  individually  limited  and  definite  quali- 
ties, from  which  only  we,  by  our  comparative  thinking, 
subsequently  form  the  abstraction  of  a  universal,  un- 
moulded  *  Quality.'  And  it  is  precisely  the  aforesaid 
limited  qualities  that  are  the  things  themselves.  To 
require,  however,  a  demonstration  of  the  way  in 
which  conversely  '  Things '  originate  out  of  formless, 
universal  '  Quality,'  signifies  only  the  renewal  of  the 
old  senseless  inquiry,  how  '  Being '  is  made. 

Fundamentally  correct,  however,  as  the  foregoing 
refutation  is,  it  is  not  with  it  that  we  are  concerned. 
For  we  are  not  wanting  to  know  how  things  are 
made,  but  are  only  asserting  that  the  conception  of 
a  '  Thing '  is  not  thought  in  its  completeness,  when 
we  simply  think  it  by  means  of  the  two  conceptions 
of  an  individually  determined  '  Quality/  and  a  '  Po- 
sition '  that  rests  upon  this  quality.  For  mere  '  Posi- 
tion '  cannot  make  that  upon  which  it  falls  into 
anything  different  from  what  it  was  in  itself.  Even 
when  posited  through  an  unconditioned  '  Position,' 
those  qualities  would  always  remain  simply  qualities 
posited,  and  would  not  be  changed  into  '  Things  M*y 
the  act  of  positing. 

It  appears  then  that  the  conception  of  '  Thing '  is 
thought,  in  its  completeness,  only  by  means  of  three 


THINGS    AND    RELATIONS.  3! 

conceptions  :  namely,  first,  the  conception  of  the 
before-mentioned  Quality ;  second,  that  of  Position  ; 
and  third  that  of  a  Subject,  of  which  the  quality  is 
affirmed  by  means  of  the  position.  This,  as  ordi- 
narily expressed,  signifies  what  follows  :  '  Things ' 
cannot  be  qualities,  but  can  only  have  them. 

§  20.  The  above-mentioned  matter  will  be  better 
understood  if  we  reflect  upon  the  following  fact, 
namely,  that  we  do  not  assume  '  Things '  for  their 
own  sake,  but  in  order  that  we  may  have  them  as 
subjects, — as  the  points  of  egress  and  of  termina- 
tion for  '  events '  and  '  relations/  For  such  a  purpose 
a  '  Thing'  whose  nature  consisted  merely  in  a  simple 
quality  posited  unconditionally  would  be  quite  un- 
suitable. 

We  can  divide  all  relations  into  two  classes ;  first, 
relations  of  comparison,  which  originate  at  the  mo- 
ment when  our  perfectly  voluntary  attention  brings 
any  two  elements,  or  rather  their  mental  images,  into 
a  contact  with  each  other  that  is  quite  indifferent 
and  unessential  to  the  elements  themselves.  Such 
relations  —  for  example,  '  similarity,'  '  contrast,'  '  lar- 
k  r'  or  '  smaller,'  and  the  like  —  signify  nothing  at 
all  as  to  what  reciprocal  influences  the  things  have. 
The  second  class,  on  the  contrary,  —  that  of  objective 
relations,  —  expresses  a  proportion  which  is  not 


32  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

merely  constituted  between  things  by  our  thinking 
in  an  arbitrary  way,  but  which  is  really  extant  for  the 
things  themselves  in  such  manner  that  they  are  recip- 
rocally affected  in  this  same  proportion.  For  exam- 
ple :  The  merely  logical  relation  of  comparison  alluded 
to  above,  —  that  of  '  contrast '  (of  which,  in  itself,  the 
things  that  stand  in  it  do  not  need  to  take  any  note), 
—  would  become  an  objective  or  metaphysical  rela- 
tion, if  it  is  understood  as  a  resistance  which  things 
really  offer  to  one  another. 

Now  it  is  obvious  that  only  these  metaphysical 
objective  relations  are  of  any  value  with  respect  to  the 
essence  of  a  *  Thing.'  For  everything  that  can  be 
conceived  of  at  all,  the  unreal  as  well  as  the  real,  ad- 
mits of  such  merely  logical  comparison. 

§  21.  To  such  metaphysical  or  objective  relations 
as  the  foregoing,  —  that  is,  therefore,  to  being  affected 
by  one  another,  —  simple  qualities  are  quite  unsuitable. 
For  as  soon  as  the  qualities  are  simple,  every  change 
of  their  content  (and  such  a  change  is  included  in  the 
very  conception  of  being  affected  in  any  way)  com- 
pletely annuls  this  content,  and  then  an  altogether 
new  content  would  take  its  place.  This  new  content 
could,  it  is  true,  when  compared  with  the  former, 
appear  to  be  connected  with  it  by  a  definite  degree 
of  similarity.  But  this  relation  of  mere  comparison 


'THING'  is  NOT  SIMPLE  QUALITY.  33 

(by  which  even  what  is  most  diametrically  opposite, 
even  what  is  altogether  incomparable,  can  be  brought 
into  a  certain  connection)  does  not  by  any  means 
justify  the  assumption  of  an  interior  combining  of  the 
two  in  such  a  way  that  the  second  were  a  '  state '  of 
the  first. 

The  essence  of  a  thing,  if  it  merely  consisted  in  a 
simple  quality,  would  therefore  with  every  change  be 
itself  totally  changed  ;  that  is,  a  new  somewhat  would 
take  the  place  of  the  old  as  it  vanished,  and  the 
*  Thing '  would  have  in  itself  no  kind  of  '  reserve/  to 
which,  as  to  its  permanent  nature,  it  could  withdraw 
on  the  occasion  of  a  change  in  its  quality. 

REMARK.  The  reciprocal  effects  which  appear  to  take  place 
in  experience  between  simple  qualities,  everywhere  go  on  only 
apparently  between  these  qualities.  Warmth  per  se  does  not 
change  into  colcl  per  se ;  but  only  so  far  as  the  two  are  states  of 
the  same  body,  or  of  two  bodies  in  contact,  does  the  nature  of 
these  bodies  carry  along  with  it  the  impossibility  of  both  states 
occurring  together.  *  Cold  '  is  not  in  this  way  made  '  warm ' ;  but 
in  a  particular  body  the  state  of  being  cold  is  replaced  by  that  of 
being  warm.  So  that  all  action  and  reaction  here  depends  upon 
the  yet  unknown  nature  of  the  real  subject,  and,  on  the  contrary, 
only  appears  to  take  place  between  the  simple  qualities  in  them- 
selves. 

§  22.  To  sum  up  the  foregoing  observations :  The 
peculiar  deficiency  which  prevents  '  Quality '  from 


34  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

being  the  essence  of  a  '  Thing '  consists  in  its  sim- 
plicity. Because  of  this  simplicity,  quality,  on  the 
one  hand,  furnishes  no  inner  principle  of  limitation, 
and  never  forms  a  whole ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  it 
can  only  exist  or  not  exist,  but  can  never  during  its 
existence  be  the  subject  of  states  of  any  kind. 

We  are  obviously  obliged  to  require  a  certain 
'unity'  of  the  nature  of  'Thing.'  Just  such  unity, 
however,  never  appertains  to  what  is  simple,  but  in 
all  cases  only  to  that  kind  of  multiplicity  which,  by  a 
law  of  the  combination  of  its  parts,  is  so  connected 
as  to  resist  every  unregulated  increase,  diminution,  or 
change  of  its  consistence,  and  to  permit  only  such 
change  as  invariably  leaves  the  new  state  subjected  to 
the  same  law  of  its  composition. 

Passing  over  the  further  difficulties  of  this  subject, 
we  express  merely  our  provisional  result  as  follows : 
The  essence  of  4  Things  '  is  not  simplicity,  but  the 
above-mentioned  unity  ;  and  if  this  unity  is  to  be 
apprehended  in  thought  at  all,  such  apprehension 
cannot  happen  in  the  mental  form  of  the  intuition, 
the  object  of  which  is  a  quality,  but  only  in  the  form 
of  the  conception,  the  object  of  which  is  a  law  of 
the  combination  of  the  manifold. 


CHAPTER   III. 

OF    THE    CONCEPTION    OF    REALITY. 

§  23.  It  is  self-evident  that,  if  we  sought  for  the 
essence  of  *  Thing '  in  a  multiplicity  combined  into 
unity,  we  did  not  design  to  consider  this  multiplicity 
as  such,  but  only  the  bond  which  connects  it  together, 
as  constituting  this  essence.  On  the  contrary,  it  is 
well  worth  the  trouble  to  inquire  in  what  way  it  is 
possible  to  conceive  of  the  fact  that  this  bond,  which 
proximately  exists  only  in  our  thinking  as  the  mental 
picture  of  the  coherency  of  the  manifold,  is  also  really 
extant  in  the  '  Thing '  as  an  actual  power  over  its 
properties. 

§  24.  The  doubt  that  arises  next  in  order  is  the 
following :  Quality,  although  in  other  respects  insuf- 
ficient, at  least  furnished  us  with  an  intuitive,  con- 
cordant content  as  the  essence  of  '  Thing ' ;  but  the 
conception  which  apprehends  this  essence  as  Law, 
makes  it  appear  as  though  it  were  only  a  thought, 
which  itself,  in  turn,  is  a  net-work  of  relations  be- 
tween various  points  of  relation.  If  quality,  there- 
fore, was  too  simple,  then  a  law  is  not  simple  enough 
to  form  the  essence  of  '  Thing.' 


36  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

This  first  objection  is  not  dangerous.  For  the 
compositeness  and  multiplicity  of  those  operations 
of  thought,  by  means  of  which  we  are  wont  logically 
to  explain  and  to  express  the  content  we  mean,  is 
no  proof  whatever  that  the  reality  meant  by  that 
content  is  itself  also  composite.  If  therefore  the 
essence  of  a  '  Thing '  were  for  us  inexpressible  save 
by  many  circumlocutions,  yet  it  could  none  the  less 
be  a  perfect  unity,  and  need  not  itself  consist  <?/"those 
parts,  from  the  combination  of  which  we  originate 
its  expression. 

It  will  be  objected,  further,  that  a  law  appears  even 
much  less  capable  than  a  quality,  of  that  reality 
which  must  appertain  to  every  '  Thing.'  This  ob- 
jection we  might  obviate,  in  so  far  as  it  is  undoubt- 
edly self-evident  that,  wherever  we  design  to  define 
in  thought  the  essence  of  *  Thing/  the  thought- 
image  by  means  of  which  we  make  the  attempt, 
must  remain  as  a  mere  image  distinct  from  the  real 
Thing.  Moreover,  we  can  in  no  case  give  such  an 
expression  to  our  thought  of  the  essence  of  '  Thing ' 
as  would  be  the  real  Thing  itself,  and  not  merely 
a  designation  for  our  cognition.  And,  finally,  in 
every  case,  the  way  and  manner,  in  which  there 
becomes  attached  to  this  content  of  thought  in  its 
that  actuality  which  makes  the  content  to  be  a  Thing 
outside  of  us,  invariably  eludes  all  our  investigation. 


'  THING  '    NOT    MERE    LAW. 


§  25.  Nevertheless,  the  whole  matter  is  not  quite 
settled  ;  but  the  question  recurs,  Whether  a  '  Law,' 
even  if  we  think  of  it  as  actualized  by  means  of 
an  ever  incomprehensible  '  Position,'  can  in  that  case 
be  a  'Thing.' 

All  that,  to  which  we  in  other  matters  give  the 
name  of  '  law,'  is  merely  a  valid  rule,  or  a  truth  that 
prevails  in  the  connection  of  our  ideas,  or  in  the 
connection  of  events  as  well.  Of  a  '  Thing,'  on  the 
contrary,  we  demand  a  great  deal  more  ;  it  is  re- 
quired to  be  a  subject,  that  can  fall  into  states, 
and  be  affected  and  produce  effects. 

Nothing  of  this  kind,  however,  appears  possible 
as  occurring  in  the  case  of  a  truth,  which  is  always 
valid,  which  always  is  what  it  is,  and  which,  since 
it  never  changes,  can  never  pass  through  any  expe- 
rience. Every  such  Maw'  is  rather  comprehensible 
by  us  •  merely  as  that  mode  of  relation  wh*  h  flows 
from  the  inner  nature  of  somewhat  else  ;  and  it  is 
in  this  somewhat  else  that  we  are  now  looking  for 
the  true  essence  of  'Thing.' 

In  other  words  ;  our  consideration  of  what  was 
meant  by  the  essence  of  'Thing,'  leads  us  in  a  pro- 
visional way  to  the  opinion,  that  the  conception  of 
this  essence  cannot  be  exhaustively  defined  without 
the  use  of  three  thoughts  combined  together  :  — 

(i)    The   Quality  of  the  Thing,  that  is,  the  law 


38  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

considered  above,  or  the  essentia  by  which  the  Thing 
is  what  it  is,  and  by  which  one  thing  is  distinguished 
from  another  ; 

(2)  The   idea  of   the   '  Real/    the    substratum,   or 
'  stuff/  in  which  this  essentia  is  coined,  as  it  were  ; 

(3)  The  idea  of  '  Position/  by  means  of  which  the 
unity  of  both  the  foregoing  thoughts  is  formed  into 
the  conception   of  an  actual  thing,  in   antithesis  to 
the  bare  thought  of  the  same  thing. 


§  26.  The  conception  of  a  *  Stuff  '  (substratum, 
originates  from  the  ordinary  perception  that  a  mul- 
tiplicity of  homogeneous  parts,  by  diversity  in  the 
mode  of  combining  them,  is  fashioned  into  objects 
of  very  diverse  properties.  Those  homogeneous 
parts  therefore,  when  taken  together,  appear  to  us 
as  a  yet  crude  neutral  material,  which  is  transformed 
into  products  with  definite  characteristics  only  by  a 
subsequent  process  of  forming.  At  the  same  time, 
we  know  very  well  that  this  is  only  relatively  true. 
The  '  stuff  '  is  formless  only  in  comparison  with  the 
products  formable  from  it  ;  in  its  own  self,  however, 
it  has  a  form  which  distinguishes  it  from  other 
'stuffs/  and  is  just  as  much  a  complete  'Thing'  as 
are  those  which  originate  from  it. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  thought  of  a  '  stuff  '  loses 
all    significance,   if   we   are   no   longer  speaking   of 


'THING'  NOT  FORMLESS  'STUFF.'  39 

composite  secondary  things,  but  of  simple  primitive 
essences.  For  what  we  should  consider  in  every 
one  of  these  simple  essences  as  the  '  stuff '  in  which 
the  characteristic  essentia  (by  means  of  which  one 
thing  is  distinguished  from  another)  were  actualized 
as  form,  would  now  inevitably  have  to  be  regarded 
as  perfectly  indefinite,  as  a  so-called  '  mere  reality 
per  se ' ;  its  whole  nature  would  accordingly  consist 
in  '  Being '  in  general,  without  being  anything  in 
particular,  in  being  affected  and  producing  effects  in 
general,  without  being  affected  and  producing  effects 
in  any  definite  way  to  the  exclusion  of  all  others. 
That  is  to  say :  Such  a  '  reality '  would  obviously  be 
only  a  logical  abstraction,  which  could  never  have 
any  actuality  in  itself,  but  always  only  in  that  from 
which  it  has  been  abstracted. 

In  other  words  :  Reality  means  for  us  the  'Being' 
of  a  somewhat  that  is  capable  of  being  affected  and 
of  producing  effects.  Everything  with  which  this 
definition  comports,  is  accordingly  called  a  '  reality/ 
—  that  is  to  say,  has  this  title.  But  there  cannot 
be  a  '  reality  per  se '  —  which  were  nothing  —  as  the 
bearer  of  this  title.  What  is  supposed  to  be  real 
must  merit  this  designation  by  being  susceptible, 
through  its  own  definite  and  significant  nature,  of 
having  reality  in  the  meaning  alleged. 


40  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

§  27.  After  we  find  it  impossible  to  distinguish 
in  '  Thing '  a  kernel  of  unconditioned  reality,  and  a 
form  (essentia)  attaching  itself  or  given  to  this  ker- 
nel, we  are  driven  in  the  next  place  to  the  opposite 
view.  This  view  asserts  that  the  ever  incompre- 
hensible act  of  '  positing  '  (by  means  of  which  actual 
is  distinguished  from  non-actual)  does  not  in  the  first 
instance  fall  upon  somewhat  real  of  a  universal  kind 
contained  in  the  Thing,  in  such  manner  that  this 
somewhat  real,  by  the  stability  now  secured  to  it, 
acted  as  a  media  to  provide  permanency  and  actu- 
ality to  the  content  also  (by  means  of  which  this 
particular  thing  is  to  be  distinguished  from  others). 
[It  might,  in  fact,  even  be  shown  that  it  is  perfectly 
incomprehensible  how  such  a  process  could  happen ; 
and  that  all  expressions  of  the  kind  —  the  content 
'  attaches  itself '  to  the  reality,  or  '  inheres  '  in  it,  etc. 
—  are  ways  of  speaking  devoid  of  all  specifiable  sig- 
nification.] On  the  contrary,  the  aforesaid  act  of 
'  positing '  falls  entirely  without  media  upon  the  con- 
tent itself,  upon  the  essentia  by  means  of  which  one 
'  Thing '  is  distinguished  from  another.  But  since 
this  essentia  is  such  that  it,  in  its  relations  to  every 
thing  else,  always  behaves  consistently  in  accord- 
ance with  a  law,  there  originates  for  us  the  unavoid- 
able appearance  of  a  reason  for  this  consistency ; 
and  this  reason  being  distinct  from  all  particular 


REALITY  AN  IDEAL  CONTENT.          41 

properties  and  states  of  the  Thing,  and,  consequently, 
also  from  the  totality  of  its  content,  lies  at  the  back- 
ground of  that  content,  —  the  appearance,  that  is  to 
say,  of  an  unconditioned  reality  on  which  the  content 
depends. 

§  28.  The  second  view  mentioned  above  can  be 
briefly  expressed  as  follows :  '  Reality '  is  that  ideal 
content,  which,  by  means  of  what  it  is,  is  capable 
of  producing  the  appearance  of  a  substance  lying 
within  it,  to  which  it  belongs  as  predicate.  The 
manifold  difficulties  of  this  view  must  be  postponed 
for  subsequent  consideration  ;  in  this  connection  we 
shall  only  bring  to  light  the  fact  that  this  proposi- 
tion needs  supplementing  in  order  to  express,  —  not, 
to  be  sure,  a  specific  conclusion,  but,  at  the  least, 
an  accurate  postulate. 

If  by  the  term  '  Ideal '  we  understand  such  a  con- 
tent as  (or  a  content,  in  so  far  as)  can  be  exhaus- 
tively reproduced  in  thought,  then  such  an  'ideal' 
(even  if  it  be  not  apprehended  as  a  universal  prop- 
osition, law,  or  truth,  but  as  completely  individual- 
ized, somewhat  like  the  idea  of  a  definite  work  of  art) 
would  always  remain  a  mere  thought  ;  and,  even  if 
it  were  'posited'  as  actual,  it  would  not  in  this  way 
obtain  that  capability  for  producing  effects  and  being 
affected,  which  we  are  forced  to  consider  as  the  most 
essential  characteristic  of  'Thing.' 


42  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

We  are  forbidden,  therefore,  to  understand  the 
expression  'Ideal'  as  thus  opposed  to  the  '  Reality' 
previously  referred  to  ;  on  the  contrary,  we  must 
adopt  into  its  signification  the  auxiliary  definition, 
that  what  we  so  style  has  this  meaning  only  with 
respect  to  our  thinking.  That  is  to  say,  it  of  itself, 
in  a  manner  never  demonstrable  in  thought,  contains 
the  aforesaid  ideal  content  actualized  in  the  form  of 
an  energizing  existence  ;  but  it  does  not  owe  this 
power  of  energizing  to  a  real  '  stuff '  that  is  equally 
unattainable  by  thought.1 

Therefore,  neither  does  the  reality  precede  its 
content ;  nor  does  the  ideal  content,  apprehended  in 
a  one-sided  way  as  a  thought,  precede  its  own  reality. 
To  hold  fast  by  such  a  separation  of  the  two  would 
only  signify  that  we  were,  in  our  metaphysic,  re- 
garding the  manifoldness  of  the  logical  operations 
through  which  we  think  of  the  Existent  as  though  it 


1  Or  expressed  still  somewhat  differently  :  If  we  designate  the  essence  of 
1  Thing '  as  '  Idea,'  we  must  have  regard  to  the  two- fold  meaning  which  the 
expression  '  Idea'  then  has.  For,  of  course, 

(1)  the  '  Idea,'  which  we  form  from  the  nature  of 'Thing,'  is  always  a 
mere  image  of  thought,  which,  even  if  thought  of  as  actualized,  would  still 
invariably  be  only  an  existing  thought  and  not  an  energizing  '  Thing.'     We 
mean  specifically,  however,  by  this  word 

(2)  just  that  essence  of  '  Thing '  itself  which  is  never  to  be  metamor- 
phosed into  thoughts  in  general,  or  quite  exhausted  in  them ;  and  we  call 
it  '  Idea '  merely  because,  if  some  thought-image  of  it  is  to  be  formed,  it  must 
not  take  the  shape  of  a  monotonous  intuition,  but  rather  that  of  a  systema- 
tized conception,  in  which  one  law-giving  formula  brings  a  multiplicity  of 
different  determinations  together  into  a  Unity. 


EXAMPLE    OF    THE    SOUL.  43 

were  a  like  manifold  ness  of  processes  in  the  Existent 
itself.  Just  as  colors  do  not  first  give  forth  light  in 
general  and  then  (in  the  second  place)  become 
either  red  or  green ;  and  just  as,  conversely,  red  or 
green  does  not  already  exist  in  the  darkness  and 
merely  become  manifest  by  means  of  the  light ;  just 
as  little  is  there  first  a  reality  in  the  '  Thing '  which 
afterward  assumes  definite  form,  or  first  an  unactual 
form  which  is  afterward  realized  by  an  act  of  '  pos- 
iting/ 

§  29.  In  order  to  elucidate  in  some  degree  the 
meaning  of  our  previous  very  abstract  reflections  by 
a  concrete  example,  let  us  call  to  mind  an  idea  which 
we  very  ordinarily  are  wont  to  have  of  the  essence 
of  the  'soul.'  Since  we  only  have  to  do  with  eluci- 
dation, it  is  left  altogether  undecided  whether  this 
idea  is  of  itself  perfectly  correct,  or  whether  it,  like 
perhaps  our  own  result  as  thus  far  reached,  stands  in 
need  of  a  further  correction. 

(1)  No  one  looks  for  the  'being'  of  the  soul  in 
an    altogether  relationless,   self-sufficing  'position'; 
but  the  soul  is  only  so  far  as  it  lives,  —  that  is  to 
say,   stands  in  manifold  relations,   of  affection  and 
action,  to  an  external  world. 

(2)  No  one  looks  for  its  'essence'  in  a  'simple 
quality,'  so  that  the  true  nature   of  the  soul  would 


44  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

consist  in  this  quality,  while  the  entire  manifoldness 
of  its  further  development  would  only  contain  an, 
as  it  were,  incidental  succession  of  consequences, 
which  would  be  wrung  from  this  quality  by  circum- 
.  stances.  Rather  do  we  look  for  what  is  most  essen- 
tial to  the  soul  in  its  character ;  that  is  to  say,  in  that 
quite  peculiar  and  individual  law  which  appertains  to 
the  coherency  of  all  its  manifestations,  — a  law  which 
always  remains  identical,  while  the  occasions  for 
these  manifestations  are  variously  changed. 

(3)  We  have  no  thought  whatever,  at  least  in 
common  life,  of  taking  this  personal  character  of  the 
soul  to  be  an  '  Idea,'  of  itself  devoid  of  all  effect, 
which  as  pure  form  is  attached  to  a  '  soul-stuff '  that 
is  in  itself  formless,  but  for  this  reason,  all  the  more 
real.  On  the  contrary,  whoever  thinks  of  that 
character  of  the  ego  (or,  more  correctly,  of  that 
characteristic  ego),  believes  himself  therewith  to  be 
thinking  of  the  entire  essence  of  the  soul;  —  to  be 
thinking,  therefore,  of  that  which,  in  itself  and  with- 
out media>  constitutes  the  subject  of  all  spiritual 
affection  and  action,  and,  accordingly,  the  reality  of 
the  soul. 


CHAPTER   IV. 

OF  CHANGE. 

§  30.  If  our  conception  of  the  essence  of  '  Thing,' 
• —  that  it  is  an  individual  self-subsisting  Idea  —  is, 
little  by  little,  to  gain  the  clearness  in  which  it  is 
still  deficient,  then  the  thought  which  manifestly  lies 
concealed  in  it  must  first  be  brought  to  light : 
namely,  —  It  is  possible  that  any  a  may,  under  cer- 
tain ' conditions,'  assume  a  'form'  a,  or  a  'property' 
a,  or  a  '  state '  a,  which  it  would  not  have  without  this 
condition,  and  which,  accordingly,  is  different  from 
a ;  but  still  in  such  manner  that  a,  on  occasion  of 
this  transition  into  a,  remains  identical  with  itself. 
We  can  call  this  in  general  the  problem  of  change ; 
and  it  is  a  matter  of  indifference  for  us  at  present, 
whether  this  change  follows  in  time  on  account  of 
the  mutability  of  the  aforesaid  conditions,  or  whether 
a  permanent  condition  impresses  a  permanent  state 
a,  that  is  different  from  its  essence,  upon  the  a. 

§  31.  In  the  present  case  also  we  are  to  recollect 
that  our  problem  does  not  consist  in  showing  how, 
in  general,  a  'change'  (if  we  think  of  it  as  in  time- 
form),  or  a  '  state '  (which  we  may  be  able  to  think 


46  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

of  as  permanent,  and  therefore  not  in  time-form) 
is  made,  and  can  be  brought  to  pass.  The  attempt 
to  show  as  a  universal  law  by  what  mechanism  in 
'  Becoming '  the  sequence  of  one  condition  upon 
another  could  be  produced,  or  in  what  way  that 
which  we  call  a  'state'  could  be  imparted  to  a 
subject  in  general,  would  very  soon  teach  us  that 
these  questions  are  just  as  insoluble  as  the  question, 
how  '  Being '  is  made. 

Our  problem  can  merely  be,  to  conceive  of  *  Be- 
coming' in  such  manner  —  that  is,  so  completely,  with 
all  the  points  of  relation,  separations  and  combina- 
tions of  our  particular  ideas,  belonging  thereto — that 
the  total  idea  of  it  is  without  contradictions  and 
adequate  to  those  facts  of  experience  which  we  wish 
to  designate  by  means  of  it. 

§  32.  Two  opposite  views  attempt  to  solve  this 
contradiction,  —  that,  in  changing,  one  and  the  same 
being  is  assumed  to  be  both  like  and  unlike  itself,  — 
by  abolishing  the  unity  of  the  being  which  passes  for 
the  subject  of  the  contradictory  predicates. 

One  view  (that  of  Herbart  and  of  physics)  asserts 
that  all  individual  beings,  which  are  not  already 
aggregates  of  others,  remain  perfectly  unchanged; 
and  that  the  manifoldness  of  varying  sensible  proper- 
ties proceeds,  for  us,  merely  from  the  variation  of 


INTERIOR    CHANGE    NECESSARY. 


their  external  and  non-essential  relations  with  one 
another  (situation,  position,  combination  and  separa- 
tion, motion,  etc.,  of  the  atoms).  The  varying 
sensible  properties,  therefore,  appear  merely  for  us 
as  a  change  of  the  beings  themselves. 

Nevertheless,  it  is  very  easy  to  comprehend  that 
this  theory,  even  when  most  strictly  carried  out,  can 
only  suffice  to  eliminate  from  all  external  nature  any 
change  in  reality  itself,  and  to  reduce  it  to  mere 
variation  in  relations  ;  but  that,  on  the  contrary, 
an  actual  interior  changeableness  must,  all  the  more 
inevitably,  find  a  place  for  itself  in  that  real  being 
for  which,  as  for  the  perceiving  subject,  the  above- 
mentioned  appearance  of  an  objective  change  is 
assumed  to  originate.  For  in  order  that  something 
may  appear,  a  being  is  necessary  to  whom  it 
appears.  This  '  appearing,'  however,  has  no  signi- 
ficance except  that  of  'being  experienced.'  Now, 
in  order  that  the  cognitive  being  may  experience, 
sometimes  a  and  sometimes  p,  it  must  manifestly 
pass  over  from  one  state,  in  which  it  previously 
was,  into  another,  which  previously  was  not.  And 
we  certainly  cannot  assume  that  this  passing-over 
is  only  a  variation  in  the  external  relations  of  this 
being  to  other  beings,  but  that  the  being  itself 
would  be  in  no  wise  affected  by  such  variation. 
For,  in  such  a  case,  this  being  would  not  really 


48  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

experience  anything,  but  would  only  appear  to  a 
third  observer  to  be  experiencing  something.  This, 
however,  is  contrary  to  the  assumption ;  for  we 
wanted  to  know,  how  it  is  that  anything  appears 
to  such  a  being  itself,  and  not  how  it  can  seem 
to  a  second  being  as  though  something  were  ap- 
pearing to  the  first  one. 

From  what  is  said  above  it  follows,  therefore,  that 
at  least  the  percipient  being  must  be  conceived  of  as 
one  that  undergoes  genuine  interior  changes,  in  order 
that  the  mere  appearance  of  change  may  originate  at 
all  from  the  changeable  relations  of  other  unchange- 
able beings. 

§  33.  An  opposed  theory  —  that  of  'absolute  Be- 
coming'-—tries  to  avoid  the  contradiction,  while  it 
altogether  abolishes  the  real  subject  of  change  and 
maintains  only  a  variation  of  phenomena,  behind 
which  no  '  Things  '  at  all  lie  concealed. 

Phenomena  are,  nevertheless,  always  phenomena 
of  something  or  other,  for  some  subject  or  other. 
The  theories  which  make  use  of  this  expression  have 
on  this  account,  as  a  rule,  come  to  the  conclusion, 
not  to  deny  all  reality,  but  only  the  independent 
reality  of  individual  things ;  and  to  regard  the  latter 
as  'phenomena'  of  a  single  infinite  Reality,— 
whether  in  the  sense  that  this*  Reality  causes  the 


NO    ACTUAL    ABSOLUTE    BECOMING.  49 

things  to  appear  to  us  as  objective,  or  that  it,  so  far 
as  it  shapes  also  the  nature  of  our  souls,  merely  pro- 
duces in  us,  in  a  general  way,  the  idea  of  a  world  of 
things  without  its  having  any  actual  existence. 

An  actual  'absolute  Becoming'  would  be  taught 
only  by  such  a  theory  as  should  assert  that  the 
actuality  itself  (not  merely  the  phenomenon  of  an 
actual  being)  changes  so  that,  in  the  place  of  one 
actual  being  which  disappears,  there  comes  another 
newly  originated,  without  the  conveyance  of  any 
reality,  common  to  both  and  serving  as  the  common 
subject  of  their  content,  from  the  first  being  over 
into  this  second.  But  such  a  complete  discontinuity 
between  every  two  moments  in  the  world's  course 
would  be  absolutely  incompatible  with  thinking  of 
this  course  as  subjected  to  any  'law'  or  any  'order* 
whatever.  For  no  law  can  ever  combine  necessarily 
what  is  subsequent  with  what  is  previous,  if  the 
previous  state,  which  is  assumed  to  contain  the 
reason  for  a  definite  application  of  the  law  to  the 
subsequent  state,  is  so  absolutely  separated  from  this 
state  that  the  two  do  not  even  belong  to  the  same 
World.  But  that  the  course  of  the  world  is  obedient 
to  laws,  —  according  to  which  it  does  not  merely  run 
on  of  itself,  but  can  also,  within  certain  limits,  be 
changed  by  us  at  will,  —  belongs,  as  an  associated 
impression  of  all  our  experiences,  so  much  to  the 


5<D  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

sphere  of  our  most  assured  knowledge,  that  it  would 
be  scientifically  insipid  to  examine  further  a  theoreti- 
cal fancy  which  is  incongruous  with  it. 

§  34.  The  conception  of  change  in  that  which  is 
real,  is,  therefore,  not  to  be  avoided.  In  order,  nev- 
ertheless, to  avoid  unnecessary  difficulties,  we  must 
raise  the  further  inquiry :  To  what  extent,  then,  are 
we  under  the  necessity  of  requiring  an  application  of 
this  conception  ? 

Now  in  the  actual  praxis  of  apprehending  the 
world,  no  one  supposes  that  a  being  a  can  change 
without  some  principle  of  change  and  ad  infinitum, 
so  that  at  last  it  would  become  a  z,  in  which  no 
recollection  of  a  is  any  longer  to  be  discovered. 
The  sphere  of  change  is  universally  found  to  be 
limited  in  such  a  way  that  any  a  changes  only  into 
a,  alt  a-j, .  .  .  ,  any  b  only  into  p,  plf  p2;  and,  in  general, 
every  real  being  changes  only  into  such  a  'closed 
series '  of  forms  as,  taken  collectively,  are  deduci- 
ble  from  the  original  nature  of  the  being;  while  no 
being  can  ever  pass  out  of  the  series  of  its  own 
forms  over  into  a  series  of  forms  belonging  to 
another  being. 

Moreover,  in  the  praxis  of  explaining  the  world,  it 
is  just  as  firmly  supposed  that  a  being  a  never  passes 
into  a  new  state  a  by  its  own  agency  alone,  but  only 


CHANGE    IMPLIES    COHERENCE.  5  I 

so  far  as  a  definite  '  condition  '  X,  that  is  different, 
however,  from  a,  affects  this  a ;  so  that,  according  to 
the  law  of  identity,  a  in  itself  must,  of  course,  always 
=  a,  —  that  is  to  say,  must  be  unchangeable,  —  and, 
on  the  contrary  a  -j-  X  can  be  =  a,  a  -}-  Y  =  a:,  etc. 

§  35.  Now,  in  the  next  place,  this  conception  of 
change,  when  practically  and  actually  applied,  con- 
tains twice  over  a  certain  supposition  of  which  we 
have  to  become  cognizant. 

That  is  to  say,  first,  when  we  assert  that  every 
being  is  developed  only  into  such  forms  as  can  flow 
'by  way  of  consequence'  from  its  own  nature,  and 
never  into  other  forms,  then  we  manifestly  consider 
all  the  thinkable  predicates,  which  admit  of  being 
represented  as  future  forms  of  whatsoever  beings,  to 
be  cohering  members  of  a  single  system  comprising 
everything  thinkable  ;  and  we  do  this  in  such  a  man- 
ner that  each  thing,  as  a  member  of  this  system, 
possesses  a  definite  degree  of  relationship  to,  or  a 
definite  magnitude  of  difference  from,  all  the  other 
members.  For  only  thus  is  there  any  meaning  to 
the  statement,  that  some  forms,  a,  a1}  .  .  .,  take  their 
rise  from  a  '  by  way  of  consequence '  ;  while  other 
forms,  p,  Pi,  .  .  .,  could  proceed  from  a  only  in  an 
^consequent  way,  and,  therefore,  in  this  case,  not  at 
all. 


52  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

Secondly  :  when  we  make  the  '  conditions  '  affect  a 
so  that  different  changes  of  a  correspond  to  different 
conditions,  we  likewise  assert,  not  merely  that  these 
conditions,  X,  Y,  .  .  .,  must  be  comparable  with  each 
other,  but  also  that  there  must  exist  among  them 
such  a  comparableness  to  the  nature  of  a  and  the 
nature  of  a,  ap  .  .  .,  as  makes  it  possible  that,  in  gen- 
eral, something  follows  from  the  conditions  ;  and 
that,  by  way  of  consequence,  there  follows  from  one 
condition  something  different  from  that  which  fol- 
lows from  the  rest. 

After  this  supposition  is  once  expressed,  it  appears 
trivial  for  the  reason  that  it  actually  lies  at  the  foun- 
dation of  our  entire  consideration  of  the  world  from 
its  very  beginning.  Since  it  contains  no  contradic- 
tion, there  is  nothing  in  it  to  correct  ;  but  it  suffices 
to  become  cognizant  of  it,  and  to  comprehend  that  it 
forbids  every  attempt  to  think  of  the  essence  of  a 
*  Thing '  as  a  unicum,  such  as  were  quite  incommen- 
surable with  other  things.  The  rather  would  an 
intelligence,  which  completely  penetrated  this  es- 
sence, be  able  to  apprehend  it  every  time  by  a  com- 
bination of  such  'elements  of  the  thinkable ' -  —  that 
is,  of  such  predicates  —  as  appertain,  not  merely  to 
this  one,  but  also  to  other  things. 


CHANGE    NOT    MERE    SUCCESSION.  53 

§  36.  The  conception  of  change  is,  nevertheless, 
distinguished  further  from  the  mere  conception  of  a 
series  whose  members  can  be  deduced  from  one 
another  in  thought. 

That  is  to  say,  the  more  such  a  comparableness  of 
all  that  is  thinkable  is  conceded,  the  more  easily 
must  different  forms  permit  of  being  arranged  so 
that  some  of  them  can  be  regarded  as  proceeding 
from  the  others  according  to  a  definite  law  ;  and  the 
latter  again,  in  inverse  order,  from  the  former. 
Thus  every  member  in  a  series  of  numbers  depends 
upon  every  other,  at  pleasure.  None  of  these  mem- 
bers however  actually  originates  from  any  other ; 
and,  likewise,  in  the  whole  series  of  them  no  change 
takes  place  that  invariably  presupposes  a  subject 
subsisting  through  all  the  members  of  the  series. 
On  the  contrary,  there  takes  place  only  a  succes- 
sion of  forms  that  are  indeed  comparable,  but  inde- 
pendent, and  that  do  not  come  into  existence  one 
from  the  other. 

In  '  change '  all  members  of  the  series  are  to  be 
regarded  as  '  states  '  of  one  and  the  same  abiding 
reality,  and  it  is  just  in  this  way  that  there  arises  in 
the  conception  of  change  the  contradiction  which  is 
foreign  to  the  mere  conception  of  a  series ;  namely, 
how  this  reality  can  remain  identical  while  it  is  pass 
ing  out  of  one  state  into  the  others. 


54  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

But  at  this  point  we  raise  the  inquiry,  whether 
this  entire  assertion  of  the  identity  of  the  '  Real '  with 
itself  during  its  changes  does  not  belong  to  those 
exaggerations  which  are  discoverable  in  the  abstract 
conception  of  change,  but  not  in  its  actual  applica- 
tion to  the  praxis  of  explaining  the  World.  Why 
should  we  not  rather  admit  that  a,  when  it  passes 
over  into  a,  does  not  remain  identical,  but  is  itself 
really  changed.  As  soon  as  we  assume  that  such 
change  takes  place  by  means  of  a  condition  X,  and 
that  the  a  must  uniformly  be  transformed  back  again 
into  a  by  means  of  an  opposite  condition  —X,  then 
we  have  in  this  form  of  representation  all  that  we 
need  in  order  to  comprehend  the  actual  change  of 
things  in  experience.  It  is  not  necessary  that  a 
reality  a  remain  uniformly  =  a,  and  that  it  assume 
a,  oj,  .  .  .,  merely  as  its  '  states,'  (a  way  of  speaking, 
from  which  nothing  whatever  can  be  gathered  as  to 
the  actual  transaction  whose  nature  it  should  de- 
scribe) ;  on  the  contrary,  it  suffices  that  a,  while  it 
is  continuously  changing,  remain  always  within  a 
1  closed  series '  of  forms,  every  one  of  which  can  be 
transformed  by  means  of  definite  conditions  into 
every  other,  and  no  one  of  which  can  be  transformed 
by  means  of  any  condition  into  any  form  foreign  to 
this  entire  series. 

This  conception  of  a  constancy  or  fixed  connection 


ALL    CHANGE    IS    CONDITIONED.  55 

of  antecedent  and  consequent  (Consequent)  we,  there- 
fore, substitute  for  the  unserviceable  conception  of 
a  complete  identity  of  the  same  reality  with  itself 
during  its  changes. 

§  37.  The  other  thought  which  lay  in  the  concep- 
tion of  change, — namely,  that  a  does  not  pass  over 
into  a  unconditionally,  but  only  under  some  definite 
condition,  X,  —  calls  for  still  further  deliberation. 
The  question  is,  what  is  meant  when  it  is  said :  a  is 
'  conditioned  '  by  X. 

The  above  expression  is  clear  to  us  only  in  the 
sense  that,  if  we  in  our  consciousness  place  the 
representation  of  a  in  relation  with  the  representa- 
tion of  X,  and  compare  the  two,  then  there  arises 
the  mental  necessity  of  conceiving  of  the  third  rep- 
resentation a.  The  significance  of  this  is :  the  con- 
tent of  a,  for  our  thinking,  has  its  underlying  reason 
in  a  combination  of  a  and  X.  But  in  all  change  of 
what  is  '  real/  it  is  not  merely  the  conception  of  the 
subsequent  state  which  depends  upon  the  content 
of  a  condition,  as  one  mathematical  proposition  may 
depend  upon  a  substitution  which  is  introduced  into 
another;  but  the  state  a  is  produced,  by  means  of 
another  state  and  by  means  of  the  condition  affect- 
ing it,  as  an  actual  state,  —  it  having  been  previously 
without  any  actual  existence. 


56  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

Now,  in  actuality,  nothing  but  '  Things '  and  their 
relations  exists.  If,  therefore,  a  condition  is  to  be 
discovered,  under  which  not  merely  thoughts  result 
from  thoughts,  but  actualities  from  actualities,  then 
this  condition  must  lie  in  some  relation  or  other, 
which  occurs  between  two  or  more  things  after 
having  previously  not  taken  place.  The  inquiry 
now  arises,  in  what  way  the  natures  of  these  differ- 
ent things  can  become  reasons  for  change  in  one 
another ;  that  is  to  say,  how  one  '  Thing '  has  an 
effect  upon  the  other. 


CHAPTER   V. 

OF    CAUSES  AND    EFFECTS. 

§  38.  From  the  repeated  succession  of  single 
events  ordinary  reflection  develops  the  idea  of  an 
inner  connection  between  them,  which  furnishes  the 
reason  for  this  succession  in  time,  and  which  as  it 
is  frequently  generalized,  expresses  this  idea  as  fol- 
lows :  '  Everything  has  a  cause.' 

The  above-mentioned  proposition  is  exaggerated. 
For  not  merely  are  valid  truths  like  those  of  math- 
ematics, —  even  when  a  reason  can  be  discovered 
from  which  insight  into  them  is  gained,  —  produced 
by  no  '  cause ' ;  but  not  even  everything  actual  re- 
quires an  act  of  causation.  It  is  only  the  change  of 
something  actual  that  requires  this.  The  'Being' 
of  an  existence  can  in  itself  be  regarded  as  per- 
fectly unconditioned  and  eternal.  It  is  only  the 
special  nature  of  what  exists,  that  can,  on  manifold 
other  grounds,  excite  a  doubt  respecting  its  uncon- 
ditioned existence  and  an  inquiry  after  its  origin. 
Even  such  an  investigation,  however,  must  termi- 
nate in  the  recognition  of  some  unconditioned  being 
or  other.  And  the  well-known  infinite  regression, 
following  which,  every  cause  pre-supposes  a  new 


58  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

cause,  is  nothing  but  the  token  of  a  mistakable.  use 
of  the  conception  of  '  condition.' 

§  39.  It  is,  further,  incorrect  to  say  that  every- 
thing has  one  cause.  This  expression  gives  the 
appearance  of  speaking  as  though  one  being  suffices 
by  its  own  agency  to  produce  the  effect  '  ready- 
made,'  and  then  somehow  merely  transport  it  to  a 
second  being  as  into  an  empty  space. 

In  the  actual  application  of  the  causal  conception 
we  do  not  perpetrate  this  error :  on  the  contrary,  we 
are  persuaded  that  the  effect  which  a  being  a  exer- 
cises, never  occurs  at  all  without  a  relation  X  in 
which  it  stands  to  a  second  being  b ;  and  that  this 
effect,  therefore,  does  not  depend  on  the  discretion 
of  a,  but  can  be  exercised  by  it  only  under  the  con- 
dition of  this  relation,  and,  when  the  condition  is 
fulfilled,  must  be  exercised. 

We  further  know  that  the  effect  of  a  is  different 
according  as  it  stands  in  the  same  relation  X  either 
to  b  or  to  c,  d,  .  .  .  ;  and  that  it  therefore  depends 
just  as  much  upon  the  nature  of  the  being  (b,  c,  .  .  .) 
which  appears  to  us  to  be  the  '  passive  object,'  as 
upon  the  nature  of  that  (a)  which  we  style  '  efficient 
cause.' 

And  not  less  do  we  know  that  the  effect,  even 
between  the  same  beings  a  and  b,  is  different  ac- 


CAUSES    AND    CONDITIONS.  59 

cording  as  they  stand  in  the  relation  X  or  in  the 
other  relation  Y;  and,  further,  that  in  every  case 
the  changes  of  the  effect  depend,  according  to  a 
universal  law,  upon  the  changes  or  varieties  of  the 
things  a,  1>,  c,  d,  .  .  .  and  the  relations  X,  Y,  Z. 

Finally,  the  effect  produced  will  itself  constantly 
consist  in  a  change  of  both  co-operating  things 
(causes),  and,  likewise,  in  a  change  of  their  relation: 
that  is  to  say,  it  will  be  a  '  reciprocal  effect.' 

§  40.  The  ordinary  usage  of  speech  does  not 
accurately  correspond  to  that  behavior  of  '  Things  ' 
described  above  as  metaphysical. 

Very  frequently  the  reason  (Grund)  for  the  entire 
form  of  the  subsequent  effect  (e.g.,  vegetation)  lies 
in  one  co-operating  cause  (a  kernel  of  grain),  and  the 
other  causes  (water,  warmth,  etc.)  only  furnish  be- 
sides a  condition  which  is  necessary  in  order  to  give 
physical  reality  to  this  effect  thus  provided  with  a 
reason.  According  as  one  regards  the  work  done 
in  primarily  fixing  the  form  or  in  its  subsequent 
actualization  to  be  the  greater,  one  will  sometimes 
designate  the  kernel  of  grain  alone  as  the  'cause' 
of  the  growth,  and  water  and  warmth,  etc.,  only  as 
vital  'stimuli';  or  just  the  reverse,  will  designate 
the  latter  alone  as  causes  of  the  plant-life,  and  the 
kernel  of  grain  merely  as  the  '  passive  object '  of 
their  efficient  causation. 


6O  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

And,  further,  it  is  very  frequently  discovered  that 
the  entire  effect  is  perceptible  only  as  a  change  in  a 
single  element  ;  while  in  some  other  element  no 
effect  is  perceptible,  although  this,  too,  is  really 
changed.  In  such  a  case,  the  latter  is  wont  to  be 
designated  as  the  'active  subject,'  the  former  as  the 
'passive  object.' 

All  the  foregoing  expressions,  accurately  taken, 
are  untrue  ;  they  are  to  be  interpreted  in  accordance 
with  the  remarks  above. 

§  41.  If  by  '  effect '  we  understand  the  actual 
occurrence  of  a  fixed  event,  then  the  explanation  of 
it  is  twofold :  the  content  of  this  event,  by  means  of 
which  it  is  distinguished  from  other  events,  and  its 
actuality. 

The  aforesaid  '  content '  we  understand  as  the 
result  necessarily  to  be  deduced,  according  to  laws 
of  universal  verity,  from  those  fixed  relations  be- 
tween a  and  b  that  form  the  sufficient  reason  for 
this  result ;  and  on  this  point  there  is  in  general 
nothing  further  to  add.  On  the  contrary,  even  if 
this  'reason' — namely,  the  relation  X  between  a 
and  1>  —  enables  us  to  understand  why  only  the 
effect  E,  and  not  some  other  effect  F,  can  pro- 
ceed from  the  reason  ;  still  we  do  not  on  this  ac- 
count understand  besides  how  anything  at  all  can 


IMPULSE   TO    ACTUALIZATION.  6l 

originate  from  that  X.  That  is  to  say  :  An  event  E, 
the  reason  for  which,  so  far  as  its  content  is  con- 
cerned, is  completely  provided  in  certain  relations  of 
things,  does  not  appear  to  be  obliged  to  take  place 
and  to  occur  in  actuality,  on  that  account  alone  ; 
but  such  an  event,  if  nothing  additional  occurred, 
would  remain  continually  unactualized  to  all  eter- 
nity, as  a  result  impending,  necessary,  and  bound 
to  be.  A  special  impulse,  a  '  complementum  possi- 
bilitatisl  appears  necessary  before  this  event,  the 
reason  for  which  is  already  complete,  can  be  actual- 
ized. 

The  above-mentioned  appearance  is  not  contra- 
dicted with  perfect  success  by  asserting  that  every 
event,  the  reason  for  which  is  made  fully  complete, 
takes  place  immediately ;  and  that  where,  in  experi- 
ence, such  occurrence  appears  to  be  delayed,  we 
invariably  find  some  insignificant  part  lacking  to  its 
complete  reason.  It  is  through  the  addition  of  this 
part  which  supplies  the  deficient  reason,  and  not 
through  the  addition  of  a  special  impulse  of  actuali- 
zation to  the  reason,  already  complete,  that  the  im- 
pending event  becomes  one  actually  occurring.  For 
all  the  examples  which  experience  offers  us,  of  delay 
in  the  occurrence  of  an  effect,  do  without  doubt 
admit  of  such  explanation  ;  but  this  is  just  because, 
in  a  way  which  is  not  yet  clear  to  us,  the  matter,  in 


62  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

fact,  stands  as  follows.  The  'complete  reason'  for 
the  content  of  an  event  (by  means  of  which  it  is  dis- 
tinguished from  other  events)  always  includes  like- 
wise the  '  complete  reason '  for  the  actualization  of 
the  same  event,  as  soon  as  the  aforesaid  reason  of 
the  content  is  not  merely  thought  of,  but  is  itself 
actual  as  a  state  of  this  thing  and  of  that  other  thing, 
and  as  a  relation  between  them  both. 

At  this  point  the  problem  presents  itself:  To 
comprehend  why  it  is  that  this  fact  of  the  actual  co- 
existence of  two  different  things  and  of  the  above- 
mentioned  relation,  can  include  the  reason  for  the 
actual  occurrence  of  what  appears  to  our  thought  as 
a  consequence  necessarily  to  be  inferred  from  this 
fact.  That  is  to  say :  We  wish  to  know,  how 
the  aforesaid  '  Things '  can  *  act '  on  one  another. 

§  42.  The  ordinary  opinion  at  this  point  tells  us 
of  the  '  passing-over '  of  an  '  influence '  from  one 
element  to  the  other  (Causa  transiens>  Influxus  phy- 
sictis),  and  thinks  to  see  herein  the  process  of  effi- 
cient causation. 

But  it  is  neither  possible  accurately  to  define  that 
which  is  here  assumed  to  '  pass-over '  ;  nor,  if  this 
could  be  done,  to  make  intelligible  from  it  the  act  of 
causation. 

For,  in  the  first  place,  if  we  consider  what  *  passes 


INFLUENCE    CANNOT    PASS    OVER.  63 

over '  to  be  a  real  element  c,  which  separates  itself 
from  the  real  element  a,  and  'passes  over'  to  an- 
other element  b ;  then  this  is,  to  be  sure,  a  possible 
form  of  representation,  and,  in  fact,  many  apparent 
effects  produced  by  the  natural  elements  on  each 
other  depend  upon  this  way  of  behavior.  But  in 
such  cases,  seriously  speaking,  no  efficient  causation 
is  present.  When  water  (c),  for  example,  with  all  its 
properties  passes  over  from  a  to  b,  the  only  effect 
produced  is  that  these  properties  now  appear  at  the 
place  b  (which  becomes  moist),  and  vanish  at  the 
place  a  (which  dries  off).  If,  however,  that  which 
passes  over  is  assumed  to  be  not  a  real  element,  but 
—  as  the  manifold  names  ' state/  ' influence/  'effi- 
ciency/ 'force/  indicate  —  something  which  cannot 
exist  by  itself,  but  only  as  the  predicate  of  another 
subject;  then  the  ancient  proposition  is  valid, — 
'Attribute  non  separantur  a  substantiis?  In  other 
words  :  A  '  state/  and  the  like,  can  never  be  set  loose 
from  the  '  Thing '  a,  in  such  manner  as  to  exist,  for 
an  instant  between  a  and  b  as  the  same  state,  but  as 
state  of  no  subject,  state  by  itself,  and  then  subse- 
quently be  attached  to  b. 

But,  in  the  second  place :  If  this  *  passing-over '  of 
something  were  to  be  made  a  comprehensible  affair, 
still  the  only  result  would  be,  that  c  would  now  be 
in  the  neighborhood  of  b ;  and  the  real  question  — 


64  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

Why  is  this  fact  of  such  importance  for  b  that  b 
must  change  on  that  account  ?  that  is,  precisely  how 
can  c  produce  an  effect  on  b?  —  would  remain  as 
much  unexplained  as  before. 

In  general:  The  'passing-over'  of  any  element 
whatever,  called  c,  from  a  to  b,  can  very  frequently 
be  observed  to  occur  as  a  preliminary  and,  for  some 
reason,  indispensable  condition,  —  a  condition  with- 
out which  no  effect  would  take  place  in  b ;  but  this 
'  passing-over '  does  not  explain  the  process  of  effi- 
cient causation.  On  the  contrary,  the  efficient  causa- 
tion does  not  begin  until  this  same  'passing-over' 
has  already  taken  place. 

§  43.  The  doctrine  of  Occasionalism  sought  to 
escape  from  all  the  above-mentioned  difficulties. 
Since  it  is  impossible  to  think  of  any  efficacy  as 
passing  over  from  one  element  to  another,  this  con- 
ception ought  to  be  wholly  abandoned,  and  the  course 
of  the  world  considered  as  a  succession  of  events, 
each  of  which  is  only  the  occasion  or  signal  for  the 
occurrence  of  some  other,  but  none  of  which  really 
effectuates  any  other. 

It  is  easily  obvious  that,  in  particular  sciences, 
Occasionalism  has  a  meaning  as  the  demand  of 
methodology,  not  to  direct  useless  efforts  toward  a 
domain  beyond  investigation.  [Such  sciences  are 


THEORY    OF    OCCASIONALISM.  65 

those  in  which  the  investigation  of  the  general 
method  of  procedure  that  one  element  follows  in 
producing  an  effect  on  some  other, — for  example, 
the  body  on  the  soul,  —  has  peculiar  difficulties.  In 
these  cases,  the  only  real  fruit  which  investigation 
wins  does  not  consist  in  the  solution  of  such  a  general 
inquiry,  but  in  the  solution  of  the  special  question  : 
With  what  states  of  the  one  element  (for  example, 
the  soul)  are  certain  states  of  the  other  element  (for 
example,  the  body)  united  according  to  a  general  law.] 
On  the  contrary,  Occasionalism  could  become  a  the- 
ory, an  explanation  of  this  uninvestigated  domain, 
only  if  it  should  succeed  in  demonstrating  precisely 
by  what  means  an  event  a  can  be  or  become  an 
'  occasion  '  for  another  event  b. 

§  44.  The  demonstration  just  alluded  to  has  al- 
ways been  attempted  in  such  manner  that  God  has 
been  considered  as  the  '  Reason '  (Grund)  of  this 
reciprocally  conditioned  'Being'  of  things  and 
events.  From  the  isolated  finite  being  a,  it  has 
been  held,  there  could  never  arise  a  conditioning 
influence  upon  another  being,  b,  different  from  it. 
Only  God,  as  the  Reason  of  all,  could  supply  this 
deficient  reciprocal  relation. 

Now,  in  the  first  place,  it  is  possible  to  say,  that 
God  in  his  omnipotence  arbitrarily  connects  with  a 


66  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

the  consequence  a,  and,  for  this  very  reason  perhaps, 
with  a  second  similar  a,  another  consequence  P. 
Such  arbitrary  and  unregulated  interposition  in  the 
connecting  together  of  events  has  found  no  philo- 
sophical defenders. 

A  second  opinion  makes  the  entire  course  of  the 
world,  down  to  the  infinity  of  time  and  down  to  every 
trifling  detail  of  its  content,  to  be  unchangeably  pre- 
destined by  God  in  the  entire  succession  of  its  events 
('  Prq-established  Harmony').  Now,  without  men- 
tioning other  objections,  we  must  at  this  point  raise 
the  question  :  If  God  withdraws  himself  again  from 
this  world,  after  its  beginning,  and  if,  with  the  be- 
ginning, its  entire  progress  in  the  germ,  is  created ; 
then  in  what  does  the  security  consist  that  the  course 
of  this  world  is  actualizing  the  predetermined  events, 
in  general  and  in  particular,  in  the  order  of  succes- 
sion enjoined,  and  not  in  one  utterly  confused  ?  The 
famous  example  (Geulincx,  and,  alas !  Leibnitz,  too) 
of  two  clocks  that,  because  of  their  first  contrivance, 
always  go  exactly  alike  without  having  any  effect  on 
each  other,  proves  nothing  at  all.  For  each  one  of 
these  two  clocks  can  go  at  all,  and  go  uniformly,  only 
because  its  own  parts  constantly  produce  effects  on 
each  other  according  to  a  fixed  law. 

Another  form  of  the  opinion  teaches  a  universal 
hypothetical  predestination  :  God  has  not  determined 


THEORY    OF    DIVINE    ASSISTANCE. 


in  special  everything  that  is  to  happen,  but  has  only 
determined  in  general  that  if  a  certain  x  happens, 
then  a  definite  ty  is  obliged  always  to  happen.  This 
opinion  also  is  compelled  to  assume  the  conception 
of  efficient  causation.  For  if  a  Thing  n  is  to  be 
subject  to  the  state  ^  as  often  as  the  state  \  is 
present  in  another  Thing  m,  then  n  must  take  some 
notice  of  \s  being  present,  in  order  to  be  able  to 
distinguish  it  from  the  case  of  x's  not  being  present  ; 
that  is  to  say,  either  x  or  in  must  have  some  effect 
on  n. 

Finally,  a  last  form  of  the  opinion  asserts  a  con- 
stant assistance  of  God  (assistentia  or  conctirsus  Dei) 
by  means  of  which  he  at  every  moment  brings  it 
about  in  special  that,  on  a's  having  just  been  present, 
the  proper  sequel  P  originate.  This  theory,  too,  does 
not  eliminate  the  conception  of  efficient  causation, 
but  contains  it  twice  over.  For  in  order  that  God 
may  attach  to  every  a  its  p,  and  to  every  x  its  i|r,  it  is 
necessary,  in  the  first  place,  that  the  presence  of  the 
a  or  of  the  \,  at  the  moment  when  one  of  them  is 
present,  have  some  effect  on  God,  and  that  the  ex- 
istence of  a  have  a  different  effect  from  that  of  ;  in 
the  second  place,  it  is  necessary  besides  that  God,  in 
consequence  of  the  consistency  of  his  own  being, 
react  upon  the  things  concerned  ;  and  of  course  in 
one  way  to  produce  p,  and  again  in  a  different  way  to 
produce  <|/. 


68  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

It  would  render  no  further  assistance  for  the  expla- 
nation of  efficient  causation  if  we  planned  to  investi- 
gate the  relation  C,  in  which  a  and  b  are  absolutely 
obliged  to  stand  in  order  to  yield  a  definite  effect. 

Universally  C  is  assumed  to  be  changeable,  and  the 
effect  arising  is  assumed  also  to  change  with  its 
( changing.  C  is  therefore,  to  speak  precisely,  one 
part  of  the  reason  which  determines  the  content  of 
the  effect  arising.  A  universal  reason,  however, — 
one  by  the  agency  of  which  everything  in  general 
actually  originates,  —  would  only  be  discovered  in 
case  all  such  existing  relations  C,  Ci,  C2,  .  .  .  could  be 
compared,  and  the  characteristic  common  to  them 
all  determined.  Even  if  this  were  possible,  however, 
the  common  character  r  which  such  an  effectuating 
relation  would  then  have,  would  only  be  made  good 
as  a  matter  of  fact ;  that  is,  we  should  be  able  to  say  : 
two  elements  a  and  b  can  never  have  any  effect  on 
each  other  unless  the  relation  C  between  them  is  one 
species  of  the  universal  relation  r.  But  how  this  r 
brings  it  to  pass  that  something  actual  follows  from 
all  of  its  own  species,  while  nothing  follows  from 
other  relations,  would  remain  as  wholly  unexplained 
as  before. 

§  46.    The  result  of  the  foregoing  discussion  is  as 
follows  :  The  conception  of  efficient  causation  is  inevi- 


CAUSATION  REAL  BUT  INEXPLICABLE.      69 

table  for  our  apprehension  of  the  World,  and  all 
attempts  to  deny  the  reality  of  efficient  causation,  and 
then  still  comprehend  the  course  of  the  world,  make 
shipwreck  of  themselves.  But  just  as  certain  is  it 
that  the  nature  of  efficient  causation  is  inexplicable ; 
that  is  to  say,  it  can  never  be  shown  in  what  way 
causation  in  general  is  produced  or  comes  to  pass. 
On  the  contrary,  all  that  can  ever  be  shown  is,  what 
preparatory  conditions,  what  relations  between  the 
real  beings,  must  in  every  case  be  given,  in  order 
that  this  perpetually  incomprehensible  act  of  causa- 
tion may  take  place. 

That  the  inquiry  into  the  '  bringing-to-pass '  of  effi- 
cient causation  is  necessarily  unanswerable,  and  in 
its  very  nature  senseless,  is  shown  by  the  circulus 
into  which  it  straightway  leads.  For,  if  we  want  to 
get  an  insight  into  the  causative  process  of  causation 
itself,  we  naturally  take  for  granted,  as  something 
necessarily  familiar,  the  causal  efficiency  of  that  very 
cause  which  is  assumed  to  produce  the  causation  to 
be  explained  ;  we  are  therefore  explaining  efficient 
causation  by  itself. 

§  47.  Although  it  is  impossible  to  gain  any  posi- 
tive information  as  to  the  event  by  means  of  which 
causation  in  general  is  brought  to  pass,  we  must, 
nevertheless,  at  least  in  thought,  supplement  our  con- 


7O  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

ception  of  causation  with  all  those  auxiliary  thoughts 
through  which  its  content  becomes  possible. 

Now,  in  the  first  place,  the  following  fact  is  obvi- 
ous :  If  a  is  to  exercise  any  effect  which  it  did  not 
previously  exercise  upon  a  b  that  is  now  present,  but 
was  not  previously  present,  or  that  is  now  standing 
in  a  relation  C  to  a,  but  did  not  previously  stand  in 
this  relation,  then  it  is  not  enough  that  b  is  now  pres- 
ent ;  on  the  contrary,  a  must  take  some  note  of  this 
new  fact.  Dropping  the  figure  of  speech,  all  this 
means  :  there  must  be  present  in  a  a  certain  state  a 
that  is  dependent  upon  the  presence  of  b,  —  a  state 
which  is  wanting  if  b  is  wanting,  and  which  forms  for 
a  the  sufficient  reason  of  its  producing  an  effect  after 
having  previously  produced  no  effect.  That  is  to  say, 
in  brief,  in  order  that  a  may  have  an  effect  upon  b,  it 
must  be  induced  to  exercise  this  effect  by  being  itself 
subject  to  some  effect  from  b.  Exactly  the  same 
thing  is  true  of  the  causal  action  of  b  on  a.  The 
carrying-out  of  this  consideration  teaches  us  that 
every  two  elements  which  are  to  produce  an  effect 
on  each  other  must  previously  have  had  some  effect 
produced  upon  themselves,  and  so  on,  in  infinitum. 
It  is  therefore  impossible,  in  general,  to  speak  of  the 
absolute  beginning  of  a  reciprocal  causation  between 
'  Things.'  The  rather,  —  a  conclusion  that  easily  fol- 
lows, —  must  the  reciprocal  causation  of  all  things  be 


THINGS    NOT    INDEPENDENT.  7 1 

regarded  as  an  eternal,  uninterrupted  matter  of  fact. 
In  the  World  causal  action  does  not  alternate  with 
non-action,  but  it  is  only  the  form  of  the  individual 
effects,  within  the  sphere  of  unceasing  efficient  cau- 
sation, that  is  changed. 

§  48.  We  remark,  however,  in  the  second  place, 
that  the  '  passing-over '  of  an  influence  from  one  being 
a  to  the  other  being  b  is  still  assumed  even  in  the 
above-mentioned  mode  of  conceiving  of  the  matter ; 
that  is  to  say,  what  is  or  happens  within  the  one 
being  a  is  considered  as  the  sufficient  reason  why 
somewhat  is  or  happens  also  in  the  other  being  b. 

Now  as  long  as  a  and  b  have  the  value  of  beings 
independent  of  each  other  and  self-subsisting,  —  no 
matter  how  similar,  comparable,  or  related  their 
natures  may  otherwise  be,  —  so  long  is  the  above 
assumption  without  a  reason  for  its  possibility :  the 
states  of  a  have  nothing  to  do  with  b,  and  conversely. 
All  the  pains-taking,  however,  to  bring  these  'Things/ 
which  are  of  themselves  quite  isolated,  into  some 
relation  in  a  supplementary  way,  by  means  of  ideas 
of  the  'passing-over*  of  some  influence,  have  been 
shown  to  be  perfectly  fruitless. 

If,  therefore,  causal  action  is  to  appear  possible  at 
all,  this  assumption  of  the  independence  of  'Things' 
toward  one  another  must  be  denied  absolutely.  A 


72  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

state  a,  which  takes  place  in  the  element  a,  must,  for 
the  very  reason  that  it  is  in  a,  likewise  be  an  '  affection ' 
in  b ;  but  it  does  not  necessarily  have  to  become  such 
an  '  affection  '  of  b  by  means  of  an  influence  issuing 
from  a. 

The  foregoing  requirement  can  be  met  only  by 
the  assumption  that  all  individual  things  are  substan- 
tially One  :  that  is  to  say,  they  do  not  merely  become 
combined  subsequently  by  all  manner  of  relations, 
each  individual  having  previously  been  present  as  an 
independent  existence  ;  but  from  the  very  beginning 
onward  they  are  only  different  modifications  of  one 
individual  Being,  which  we  propose  to  designate  pro- 
visionally by  the  title  of  the  Infinite,  of  the  Absolute 
=  M. 

The  formal  consequence  of  this  assumption  is  as 
follows :  The  element  a  is  only  =  M(x),  the  element 
b  =  M(y),  etc.  Every  state  a  which  takes  place  in  a 
is  therefore  likewise  a  state  of  this  M  ;  and,  by  means 
of  this  state,  M  is  necessitated  according  to  its  own 
nature  to  produce  a  succeeding  state  p,  which  makes 
its  appearance  as  a  state  of  b,  but  which  is  in  truth  a 
state  of  this  M,  by  means  of  which  its  preceding  mod- 
ification M(y)  is  changed. 

Efficient  causation,  therefore,  actually  takes  place, 
but  it  takes  place  only  apparently  between  the  two 
finite  beings  as  such.  In  truth,  the  Absolute  pro- 


CHANGE    EFFECTED    BY    THE    INFINITE.  73 

duces  the  effect  upon  itself,  since  by  virtue  of  the 
unity  and  consistency  of  its  own  Being  it  cannot  be 
affected  with  the  state  with  which  it  is  affected  as  the 
being  a,  without  likewise  being  affected  with  the  suc- 
ceeding state  in  the  being  b,  —  a  state  which  appears 
to  our  observation  as  an  effect  of  a  on  b. 

It  is  true  that  the  manner  in  which  it  comes  to 
pass,  that  even  within  the  one  Infinite  Being  one 
state  brings  about  another,  remains  still  wholly  unex- 
plained ;  and  on  this  point  we  must  not  deceive  our- 
selves. How  it  is  in  general  that  '  causal  action'  is 
produced  is  as  impossible  to  tell  as  how  '  Being '  is 
made.  The  only  meaning  of  this  last  consideration 
was  to  remove  the  hindrance  which,  consisting  in 
the  self-subsistence  of  individual  'Things,'  makes  the 
occurrence  of  this  inexplicable  process  always  contra- 
dictory in  whatever  the  process  itself  may  be  sup- 
posed to  consist. 

Finally,  it  is  to  be  remarked  that  the  conception  of 
the  Infinite,  or  of  the  One  Real  Being,  which  we  have 
here  made  use  of,  merely  designates  a  postulate  in  a 
provisional  way.  But  the  inquiry  how  we  are  to  con- 
ceive of  this  Infinite  itself,  and  of  those  modifications 
of  the  same  Infinite  which  we  explain  the  individual 
things  to  be,  is  reserved  for  subsequent  investiga- 
tion. 


SECOND   PRINCIPAL   DIVISION. 


COSMOLOGY. 


SECOND   PRINCIPAL  DIVISION. 
COSMOLOGY. 

PRELIMINARY    REMARK. 

§  49.  The  common  apprehension  of  the  World  is 
the  result  of  the  following  assumption-:  A  multipli- 
city of  self-subsisting  Things  produces  the  change- 
able course  of  the  world  by  means  of  the  fact  that 
this  multiplicity  stands  in  reciprocal  relations :  these 
relations  change ;  and  with  every  such  change  there 
arises  a  change  also  in  the  peculiar  states  of  the 
Things. 

Now  the  assumption  of  a  multiplicity  of  self-sub- 
sisting Things  was  shown  to  be  impossible  at  the 
conclusion  of  the  Ontology.  But  even  the  common 
opinion  would  not  strictly  carry  out  this  assumption. 
For  since  it  made  the  Things  be  related  to  one 
another,  and  made  them  all  together  form  one  world, 
it  obviously  pre-supposed  the  self-subsisting  exist- 
ence of  some  background,  or  some  medium,  which  is, 
to  be  sure,  not  real  itself,  but  in  which  the  relations 
of  one  reality  to  another  pursue  their  course. 


78  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

Now  the  question  arises  :  In  what  way  can  such  a 
background,  a  non-real  form,  exist  outside  of  what  is 
real,  —  a  form  in  which,  by  its  arrangement,  the 
'Reality'  presents  to  our  view  a  coherent  'world- 
whole/  a  Cosmos  ?  It  scarcely  need  be  stated,  that 
Space  and  Time  (and  Motion)  are  the  most  essential 
of  those  forms,  the  consideration  of  which  is  incum- 
bent upon  Cosmology. 


CHAPTER  I. 

OF  SPACE,  TIME,  AND  MOTION. 

§  50.  Metaphysic  does  not  raise  the  question,  —  at 
least  not  at  first,  —  whence  our  ideas  of  space  origi- 
nate ;  but  only  what  significance  they  have  after  they 
are  finished,  and  what  application  can  be  made  of 
them  to  the  sphere  of  reality  in  consequence  of  such 
significance. 

In  accordance  with  the  logical  form  of  its  mental 
representation,  space  is  distinguished  as  an  '  intui- 
tion '  from  the  conceptions  which  we  otherwise  form 
of  objects. 

Every  conception  comprehends  a  general  rule  for 
the  combination  of  certain  marks,  and  requires  obedi- 
ence to  this  rule  of  every  exemplar  that  is  to  fall 
under  it.  Such  conception,  however,  leaves  it  per- 
fectly indefinite  upon  how  many,  and  upon  what 
kind  of  exemplars  it  is  itself  to  be  stamped  ;  nor  does 
it  establish  between  the  particular  exemplars  the 
slightest  reciprocal  relation  to  be  of  necessity  fol- 
lowed by  them.  For  what  is  called  the  co-ordina- 
tion of  such  species  or  exemplars  within  the  sphere 
of  their  general  notion,  is  merely  significant  of  the 
community  of  their  subordination  under  this  general 


8O  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

notion,  but  of  absolutely  no  other  definite  relation 
on  the  part  of  one  exemplar  to  another. 

Everything  spatial  is  also  subjected  to  such  a 
common  rule  of  combination,  and  this  rule  may  be 
expressed,  for  example,  as  follows  :  Between  any  two 
separate  points  one,  and  only  one,  straight  line  is 
possible.  But  this  law  does  not  merely  hold  good 
for  every  single  case  of  application,  separately ;  for 
example,  for  every  single  pair  of  points  in  such  man- 
ner  as  to  leave  it  quite  doubtful  how  this  pair  is 
related  to  another  pair  that  follows  the  same  law. 
On  the  contrary,  it  is  just  this  law  which  likewise 
combines  all  cases  of  its  application  together  in  such 
a  way  that  every  pair  of  points  stands  in  the  same 
relation  of  law  to  every  other  pair,  as  do  the  points 
of  every  single  pair. 

Space  appears  to  us,  therefore,  not  as  a  Universal 
which  occurs  in  a  certain  indefinite  number  of  exam- 
ples that  are  in  other  respects  without  any  cohe- 
rence ;  but  it  appears  as  a  Whole  which  combines,  as 
its  parts  into  a  synchronous  sum,  all  the  particular 
cases  of  the  application  of  the  law  that  prevails  in  it, 
in  accordance  with  this  same  law. 

This  is  the  reason  why  the  name  for  space  chosen 
by  Kant,  —  viz.,  an  intuition,  —  is  to  be  preferred  to 
that  of  conception  :  there  is  only  one  space,  and  this 
space  is  continuously  extant;  all  particular  spaces 


SPACE    NOT    SELF-SUBSISTING   FORM.  8 1 

are  only  parts  of  this  Whole,  and  are  likewise  con- 
tinuously present. 

§  51.  The  customary  opinion,  for  just  the  reason 
mentioned  above,  very  easily  apprehends  space  as  a 
ready-made,  .empty,  and  yet  self-subsisting  'form,' 
which  precedes  and  furnishes  a  place  to  whatever  is 
real. 

The  conception  of  such  a  form,  however,  is  not  a 
general  notion  borrowed  from  examples  elsewhere, 
and  justified  by  means  of  these  examples;  —  a  con- 
ception which  could  be  used  for  the  explanation  of 
space,  because  space  might  be  brought  under  it. 
The  conception  originated  rather  from  the  analogy 
of  space-containing  vessels,  which  can  pass  for 
'  empty  forms '  merely  in  a  relative  way ;  because 
some  other  material  can  be  put  into  the  space 
included  by  them.  But  the  vessels  themselves  con- 
sist of  some  real  material,  and  are  therefore  not 
'empty  forms'  in  the  sense  in  which  space  might  be 
called  so.  That  the  conception  of  an  empty  form, 
which  is  framed  by  nothing  real,  but  precedes  every- 
thing real,  is  in  itself  impossible,  follows  from  the 
consideration  of  this  very  example. 

Those  other  expressions,  which  style  space  'the 
total  of  the  relations  of  things,'  or  '  the  arrangement 
of  things,'  or  '  the  total  of  the  proportions  between 


82  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

them,'  are  all  erroneous  in  that  they  do  not  at  all 
express  what  we  actually  mean  by  space.  For,  in 
fact,  space  is  not  at  all  a  definite  arrangement,  or 
relation,  or  form  of  things  ;  but  only  the  possibility  of 
all  this  :  it  is  the  incomprehensible  principle,  —  in 
itself  wholly  without  form,  arrangement,  and  relation, 
—  which  makes  possible  indefinitely  many  different 
'  forms,'  '  arrangements,'  or  '  relations  '  of  things. 

§  52.  If  space  were  actually  a  cohering  totality  of 
relations  between  '  Things,'  then,  for  that  very  rea- 
son, it  could  not  possibly  have  any  existence  of  its 
own,  independent  of  things  and  comprising  or  pre- 
ceding them. 

It  is  true  that  we  are  accustomed  to  speak  of  rela- 
tions as  though  they  could  actually  exist  between 
things  in  such  a  manner  as  to  bind  together  two  of 
them  without  being  themselves  in  either  one  of  the 
two.  This  manner  of  mental  representation,  how- 
ever, is  quite  obviously  a  simple  consequence  of  our 
intuition  of  space ;  for,  by  means  of  this  intuition,  it 
is  impossible  to  represent  under  the  word  '  between ' 
any  mere  negation  of  reality  (any  mere  not-being) ; 
but  it  is  possible  to  represent  only  a  positive,  intu- 
itive kind  of  that  distinct  or  separate  being  which 
belongs  to  the  elements  of  reality. 

Space  itself,  therefore,  cannot  be  proved  to  have 


SPACE    NOT    A    REAL    EXISTENT.  83 

an  independent  existence  by  an  appeal  to  relations 
which  are  held  to  have  existed  between  reality,  and 
yet  to  have  been  neither  a  mere  nothing,  nor  such 
reality  itself.  The  truth  is  rather  that  space  furnishes 
merely  the  inducement  to  correct  this  false  idea  of 
the  relations,  and  to  become  aware  that,  in  fact, 
nothing  can  be  outside  of  'the  Existent' ;  and,  there- 
fore, that  nothing  '  is '  but  the  Existent  and  its  inte- 
rior states. 

Accordingly,  if  relations  of  space  cannot  pass  for 
inner  states  of  'Things,'  but  are  obliged  and  de- 
signed merely  to  pass  for  external  relations  between 
them,  then  it  follows  that  they  can  only  exist  as 
inner  states  of  the  spirit  which  is  percipient  of  the 
things,  —  that  is  to  say,  as  forms  of  our  intuition ; 
but  they  have  no  such  existence  of  themselves  as  to 
make  our  intuition  a  mere  means  for  perceiving 
them. 

Finally,  if  what  is  said  above  is  true  with  refer- 
ence to  all  the  determinate  relations  in  which  things 
appear  actually  to  be  standing  at  a  determinate  mo- 
ment of  time,  and  therefore  of  the  space-picture  that 
the  world  preserves  at  the  aforesaid  moment  of  time, 
then  it  is  yet  much  more  true  of  the  universal  idea 
of  infinite  empty  space,  which  as  such  is  merely  a 
possibility  of  relations.  Much  more  is  it  true  that 
such  space  cannot  exist  except  as  a  mental  picture, 


84  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

which  originates  only  in  and  for  our  intuition,  when- 
ever this  intuition  is  reminded  of  that  —  occurring 
in  all  its  individual  space-intuitions  —  which  is  com- 
mon to  them  all  and  conformable  to  law. 

§  53.  The  above  proposition  concerning  the  '  ideal 
character  of  Space '  is  established  by  Kant  on  some- 
what different  grounds ;  and  it  was  used  by  him  and 
his  school  chiefly  in  order  to  make  conspicuous  the 
perfect  incomparableness  of  the  true  nature  of 
Things  to  the  apparent  form  which  they  assume  in 
our  intuition. 

But  such  expressions  as  the  following — "Space 
is  a  subjective  form  of  intuition  which  we  set  over 
against  'Things,'  and  into  which  things  fall  only  as 
seen  from  our  point  of  view,  although  they  are  in 
themselves  quite  incomparable  to  all  that  is  spatial " 
—  are  contradictory ;  because,  of  course,  whatever 
is  assumed  to  be  able  even  to  '  fall  into '  any  form  or 
other,  must  necessarily  somehow  or  other  be  com- 
mensurate with  this  form  :  it  cannot,  therefore,  be 
absolutely  incomparable  to  it. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  do  not  have  merely  the 
empty  intuition  of  infinite  space  ;  but  we  perceive 
in  space  different  phenomena  at  places  which  we 
cannot  perceive  in  another  order  at  our  pleasure,  but 
must  see  as  they  are.  There  must,  consequently,  be 


SPACE   AS    INTELLECTUAL    RELATION.  8$ 

a  reason  in  the  things  which  assigns  to  them  these 
determinate  places.  That  is  to  say,  even  if  Things 
are  not  themselves  spatial,  and  even  if  no  relations 
of  space  subsist  between  themselves,  still  there  must 
be  other  non-spatial  or  intellectual  relations,  which 
can  be  portrayed  in  general  by  means  of  space- 
relations,  and  which  in  special  furnish  the  reason 
why,  whenever  they  are  apprehended  in  space-form 
by  any  intuition,  each  thing  must  appear  to  be  at 
a  determinate  point  of  space. 

§  54.  If  inquiry  is  made,  In  what  do  the  '  intellec- 
tual relations'  of  Things  consist?  —  then  it  would 
not  suffice  to  look  for  them  merely  in  the  likeness  or 
similarity,  and  different  degrees  of  relationship  and 
opposition,  which  belong  to  their  natures.  For  all 
this  is  unalterably  fixed  for  every  two  things ;  the 
spatial  arrangement  of  the  world  would,  therefore, 
if  it  be  dependent  only  thereon,  always  be  the  same. 
But  since  things  change  their  place,  the  reason  for 
their  various  places  must  lie  in  the  reciprocal  effects 
which  they  exercise  upon  each  other  in  a  changeable 
way. 

With  the  above  assumption  the  inaccuracy  of  the 
expression  cited  in  the  foregoing  article  is  likewise 
rectified ;  namely,  '  intellectual  relations '  can  as  lit- 
tle take  place  between  things  as  can  other  relations. 


86  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

There  exist  only  the  states  with  which  each  thing  is 
interiorly  affected ;  and  this  is  certainly  not,  as  the 
ordinary  opinion  assumes,  by  virtue  of  a  ( relation ' 
between  two  things  antecedent  to  such  reciprocal  cau- 
sation and  furnishing  its  reason,  but  is  without  any 
media  whatever.  It  is  not  until  after  the  '  Things/ 
because  they  are  all  together  mere  modifications  of 
one  Absolute,  have  immediately  and  without  any 
intervening  mechanism  acted  upon  each  other,  that 
they  appear  to  our  thinking  (if  it  compares  this  case 
of  their  causal  action  with  that  of  their  non-action) 
to  stand  in  a  '  relation '  which  conditions  the  action  ; 
whilst,  —  precisely  the  reverse,  —  their  causal  action, 
if  it  is  to  be  thought  of,  merely  compels  our  think- 
ing to  place  the  ideas  of  things  in  another  relation 
than  if  their  non-action  is  to  be  thought  of. 

Finally,  it  is  self-evident  that  the  bare  reciprocal 
action  of  two  things  a  and  b  is  no  reason  at  all,  why 
our  soul  (c)  should  have  an  intuition  of  a  and  b  in 
general ;  and  still  less  in  any  definite  order.  On  the 
contrary,  it  is  only  because  a  and  b,  by  virtue  of 
their  nature  and  by  virtue  of  the  states  with  which 
they  are  themselves  affected  by  each  other,  act  upon 
c  (our  soul)  and  produce  in  it  the  impressions  a  and 
p,  that  the  soul  can  be  necessitated  to  perceive  a  and 
b  in  general,  and  indeed,  on  account  of  the  definite 
degree  of  relationship  or  opposition  which  takes 


SPACE   EXISTS    IN    THINGS.  8/ 

place  between  a  and  p,  to  have  an  intuition  of  them 
in  a  definite  reciprocal  position.  Whilst,  at  another 
moment  when,  by  virtue  of  an  altered  reciprocal 
action  between  a  and  b,  a  and  p  also  pass  over  into 
the  new  values  a'  and  p',  the  soul  will  have  an  intui- 
tion of  both  in  a  correspondingly  different  spatial 
order. 

§  55.  According  to  the  ordinary  view,  therefore, 
space  exists  and  things  exist  in  it:  according  to 
our  view,  only  Things  exist,  and  between  them 
nothing  exists,  but  space  exists  in  them.  That  is 
to  say,  to  the  individual  being  the  other  beings  with 
which  it  stands,  either  immediately  or  mediately,  in 
reciprocal  causation,  appear  arranged  in  one  space 
according  to  the  kind  and  magnitude  of  the  effect 
exercised  upon  this  being  by  them,  —  a  space  which 
is  extended  merely  within  the  individual  as  its  intui- 
tion, and  in  which  it  assigns  to  itself  a  definite 
place. 

Kant  had  understood  the  'ideal  character  of 
Space  '  in  such  a  way  as  to  make  space  only  a  htiman 
form  of  intuition  ;  other  and  higher  beings  may  not 
be  restricted  to  it.  The  later  systems  endeavored, 
on  the  contrary,  to  abolish  this  anthropomorphic 
limitation.  They  either  sought  diligently  for  the 
proof  that  space  is  a  necessary  logical  result  of  the 


88  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

development  of  that  total  Idea  which  strives  after  its 
manifestation  everywhere  in  the  world  (like  the 
idealistic  systems  of  Schelling  and  Hegel)  ;  or  else 
they  imagined  to  show  how  the  apprehension  of 
space  must  inevitably  arise  in  every  being  which 
forms  ideas  at  all,  and  combines  manifold  ideas  with 
each  other  (like  the  realistic  systems  of  Herbart  and 
others).  Not  one  of  such  deductions  escapes  the 
blame  of  having,  in  some  manner  or  other,  secretly 
smuggled  in  under  the  abstract  conceptions  from 
which  it  was  to  be  deduced,  the  specifically  spatial 
element  of  space,  —  the  very  thing,  therefore,  which 
was  to  be  deduced.  A  decisive  sentence,  accord- 
ingly, seems  impossible.  Although  it  is  very  im- 
probable that  the  World  should  appear  to  other 
beings  as  non-spatial  and  yet  intuitive  in  some 
other  fashion,  still  the  necessity  of  the  intuition  of 
space  for  every  percipient  being  does  not  admit  of 
demonstration. 

§  56.  We  certainly  do  not  by  any  means  possess 
an  immediate  intuition  of  infinite  '  Time,'  but  merely 
one  that  is  obtained  by  help  of  the  intuition  of 
space,  and,  at  the  same  time,  in  opposition  to  it. 
That  is  to  say :  When  we  conceive  of  a  line  in 
space,  the  points  of  which  all  exist  together  in  like 
fashion,  we  gain  from  it  a  complete  intuitive  picture 


TIME    NOT    A    REAL    EXISTENT.  89 

applicable  to  the  precisely  opposite  case  of  time, 
whose  line  consists  of  points,  of  which  each  one 
exists  only  when  the  other  does  not  exist. 

The  above-mentioned  fact  is  aptly  enough  desig- 
nated by  the  customary  definition :  Space  is  the 
form  of  that  which  has  juxtaposition  ;  time,  the  form 
of  that  which  has  succession.  This  '  succession? 
however,  consists  in  a  one-sided  dependence  of  any 
two  states  of  an  actual  being,  at  and  o.2,  in  such  man- 
ner that  a.!  is  the  condition  of  the  actuality  of  04,  but 
not  02  of  the  actuality  of  a^  If  we  represent  the 
individual  cases  conceivable  of  the  occurrence  of 
this  dependence,  as  summarized  in  one  (of  course, 
infinite)  whole,  and  if  we  represent  them,  indeed,  as 
following  the  -  same  law  which  holds  good  for  every 
individual  case  ;  then  there  arises  the  intuition  of 
infinite  'empty  Time/  every  moment  of  which,  on 
one  side,  depends  upon  one  of  its  neighbors,  and,  on 

the  other  side,  furnishes  the  ground  for  another  of 

« 

its  neighbors. 

Considerations  quite  similar  to  those  in  the  case 
of  space  teach  us  that  no  substantial  existence,  how- 
ever constituted,  can  appertain  to  time  also  ;  but 
that  it  must  exist  only  as  an  intuition  in  the  repre- 
sentative act  of  the  spirit.  It  is  not  necessary  to 
examine  in  detail  the  contradictions  in  which  the 
two  attempts  to  conceive  of  objective  time  involve 
us,  to  wit :  — 


9O  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

(1)  Motionless  empty  time,  in  which  events  elapse, 
is,  so  far  as  it  is  motionless,  not  '  time,'  but  another 
back-ground,  on  which,  in  order  to  elapse,  the  events 
themselves  are  afresh  in  need  of  time ; 

(2)  Elapsing  empty  time,  which  takes  the  events 
along  with  itself,  can,  in  fact,  neither  elapse,  since 
no  moment  in  it  is  different  from  another,  nor  take 
the  events  along,  since  no  one  of  its  moments  has 
any  more  relation  than  another  to  any  one  definite 
event. 

If  we  carry  out  the  above  consideration  we  are 
led  to  the  following  result :  Empty  time  neither  is, 
nor  elapses,  between  events  or  before  them  ;  but,  if 
the  living  causal  action  of  '  Things '  upon  each  other 
as  arranged  in  definite  one-sided  relations  of  depend- 
ence become  the  object  of  perception  for  a  percipi- 
ent being,  then  in  each  case  that  which  conditions 
must  appear  to  precede,  that  which  is  conditioned  to 
follow,  and  the  total  occurrence  to  elapse  within  the 
course  of  an  infinite  time. 

§  57.  The  mental  representation  of  the  above- 
mentioned  '  ideal  character  of  time  '  is  much  more 
difficult  to  apprehend  than  the  analogous  one  of 
space,  to  wit :  — 

In  order  to  have  an  intuition  of  the  supersensible 
relations  of  the  manifold  in  the  form  of  space,  the 


TIME    AS    NECESSARY    TO    INTUITION.  9 1 

soul  itself  is  in  no  need  of  space;  or, — the  soul  can 
bring  forth  what  is  spatial,  as  the  product  of  its  own 
act  of  intuition,  without  its  productive  procedure 
itself  requiring  to  be  spatial.  If,  on  the  contrary, 
we  saV)  —  Relations  of  a  manifold,  that  really  have 
no  time-form,  appear  in  time-form,  if  they  act  upon 
a  percipient  being,  —  then  we  presuppose  either,  at 
the  very  least  this  causal  action  as  an  event  elapsing 
in  time ;  or  else,  if  we  should  intend  to  assume  that 
this  action  also  is  a  timeless  impression,  it  still 
appears  as  though  our  mental  act  of  representation 
could  not  posit  one  part  of  the  aforesaid  manifold 
as  previous,  and  the  other  as  subsequent,  without 
accomplishing  the  very  act  of  positing  the  first,  pre- 
viously, and  the  act  of  positing  the  second,  subse- 
quently. Even  if,  therefore,  everything  that  has 
time-form  were  eliminated  from  the  entire  objective 
world,  it  still  appears  that  the  act  of  intuition  itself 
would  require  time  for  the  procedure  by  means  of 
which  it  has  the  intuition  of  that  which  really  has  no 
time-form,  as  though  it  were  in  time. 

To  the  above  objection  we  now  reply,  that  —  quite 
the  contrary  —  we  should  never  have  a  mental  repre- 
sentation of  that  which  is  '  successive/  if  our  act  of 
representation  were  itself  successive.  In  such  a 
case,  to  be  sure,  we  should  represent  a  first,  and  b 
afterward ;  but  only  by  means  of  a  third  act  of  men- 


92  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

tal  representation,  nevertheless,  should  we  descry 
the  fact  that  these  two  representations  followed  each 
other  in  us  ;  and  for  this  third  act  they  do  not  follow 
each  other,  but  are  comprehended  in  one  synchro- 
nous intuition,  —  although  in  such  manner  that, 
according  to  its  nature,  a  is  placed  before  b  as  its 
conditioning  reason,  that  is  to  say,  as  previous  to  it. 

However  extraordinarily  difficult  it  may  be  to  alter 
the  mental  habit  opposed  to  such  a  view,  still  we  are 
compelled  to  consider  in  like  manner  even  our  whole 
life,  and  the  succession  of  events  allotted  to  us  as 
it  arises  in  our  recollections.  We  are  not  indeed 
denying  that  the  aforesaid  one-sided  dependence  of 
its  constituent  parts,  which  we  regard  as  succession 
in  time  because  we  are  necessitated  to  apprehend  it 
in  one  mental  act  under  the  form  of  time,  really 
subsists  within  that  timeless  actuality  of  which  alone 
our  assertions  were  made.  We  are  merely  denying 
that  an  empty  time,  existing  outside  of  events  and 
outside  of  our  act  of  representation,  is  required  in 
order -that  the  aforesaid  one-sided  dependence  may 
take  place,  or  appear  to  us,  as  sequence  of  time. 

Even  the  whole  of  our  life,  therefore,  is  a  whole  so 
articulated  that  all  the  other  parts  seem  to  stand 
in  definite  intervals  of  nearer  or  more  remote  rela- 
tion to  that  particular  consciousness  which  is  filled 
up  with  one  part  of  the  same  whole ;  that  is  to 


TIME    NOT    ESSENTIAL    TO    CAUSATION.  93 

say,  the  series  of  states  which  furnish  the  condition 
for  this  particular  moment  of  time,  must  appear  to 
the  consciousness  of  the  moment  as  a  longer  or 
briefer  'time-past.' 

§  58.  Secondly,  an  objection  to  the  ideal  character 
of  time,  fundamentally  the  same  as  the  foregoing, 
can  be  formulated  as  follows  :  A  happening  or  an 
acting  that  has  not  time-form  is  in  itself  inconceiv- 
able, yet  must  be  assumed  if  we  would  intend  to 
maintain  the  appearance  in  time  of  that  which  is 
really  without  time-form. 

Now  it  is  correct,  that  we,  because  we  are  once 
for  all  bound  to  the  form  of  time-intuition,  do  always 
apprehend  happening  and  causal  acting  as  in  time, 
and  that  happening  without  time-form  is  a  contradic- 
tion of  the  usages  of  speech.  But,  on  the  other 
hand,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  essential  thought 
which  constitutes  the  conception  of  causal  action, 
—  namely,  the  thought  of  the  efficient  conditioning 
of  one  thing  by  means  of  another,  —  does  not 
require  *  time '  to  validate  it.  That  is  to  say  :  The 
existence  or  the  elapse  of  an  '  empty  time '  can  never 
make  any  more  intelligible  than  it  would  be  with- 
out this,  precisely  how  an  a  sets  about  it  in  order  to 
condition  or  produce  a  b.  As  soon  as  the  complete 
reason  for  b  lies  within  a,  then  time  can  have  nothing 


94  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

to  do  with  making  the  existence  of  b  more  easy  or 
more  difficult.  If,  in  experience,  an  elapse  of  time 
appears  to  us  necessary  in  order  that  the  cause  a 
may  bring  forth  its  effect  z,  nevertheless  time  does 
not  in  such  a  case  work  favorably  by  means  of  its 
empty  extension  between  a  and  z ;  on  the  contrary, 
it  is  only  because  a  is  not  the  immediate  reason  for 
z,  but  simply  the  reason  for  b,  b  for  c,  c  for  d,  .  .  .,  y 
for  z,  that  a  cannot  pass  over  into  z  except  by  means 
of  a  series  of  intermediate  states  which  is  repre- 
sented to  our  intuition  as  the  rilling  up  of  a  definite 
duration  of  time. 

§  59.  We  cannot  define  '  Motion '  in  a  primitive 
way  as  the  passing  through  of  a  certain  space.  This 
could  be  said  only  in  case  space  were  somewhat 
objective  which  could  be  passed  through,  or  the 
passing  through  of  which  required  to  be  made  good 
as  a  kind  of  performance  or  work.  But  space  is  only 
an  intuition  for  us  ;  and  even  for  us  not  prirfto  loco 
an  intuition  of  an  infinite  magnitude  of  extension, 
but  —  stated  accurately  —  only  the  mental  represen- 
tation of  that  coherent  system  of  places  which  apper- 
tain to  the  different  real  elements,  by  virtue  of  their 
supersensible  relations  to  one  another  in  our  intui- 
tion. 

'  Motion,'  therefore,  means  for  us  primarily  '  change 


MOTION    AS    CHANGE    OF    PLACE.  95 

of  place.'  To  wit :  If  those  relations  between 
1  Things'  (real  elements),  for  the  sake  of  which  the 
latter  must  appear  at  determinate  places,  are 
changed,  then  the  things  must  appear  at  the  new 
places  which  the  sum  of  their  changed  relations 
prescribes  to  them. 

§  60.  If  we  added  nothing  further  to  what  has 
already  been  said,  then  it  would  follow  from  our 
definition,  that  a  thing  ceases  to  appear  at  its  old 
place  a,  and  begins  to  appear  at  its  new  place  «, 
without  having  appeared  in  all  the  points  between 
a  and  w, — that  is  to  say,  without  having  passed 
through  the  distance  o«.  But  such  an  event  happens 
only  in  fairy  tales ;  in  the  realm  of  actuality,  a  thing 
changes  its  place  merely  in  case  it  passes  over  from 
the  previous  place  a  to  the  new  one  w  through  all 
the  intermediate  places. 

Made  attentive  by  experience  in  the  foregoing 
manner,  we  recognize  the  incompleteness  of  our 
metaphysical  conception  of  motion,  and  endeavor  to 
supplement  it.  For  this  purpose,  however,  it  does 
not  suffice  to  appeal  to  *a  universal  law  of  con- 
tinuity,' according  to  which  a  transition  can  be 
made  from  a  magnitude  of  one  value  (a)  to  another 
of  the  same  kind  («)  only  by  passing  through  all  the 
intermediate  values.  For,  in  itself,  this  proposition 


96  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

is  only  a  law  of  our  mathematical  imagination,  and 
affirms :  If  two  fixed  values,  a  and  »,  are  given,  then 
the  difference  between  them  is  not  arbitrary  but  is 
also  fixed ;  and,  in  thought,  the  a  cannot  be  made 
to  increase  to  «,  without  adding  the  total  differ- 
ence «  — a;  nor  can  this  be,  without  previously  think- 
ing of  every  one  of  its  parts  as  added  to  a.  On 
the  contrary,  the  question  which  interests  us, — 
namely,  whether  '  Things  in  themselves  '  are  bound 
by  the  same  law  which  our  mental  representation 
follows,  is  by  no  means  decided  by  this  method. 

We  look  for  its  decision  in  the  following  way  : 
the  place  a  of  a  being  a  is  fixed  by  means  of  its 
relation  to  b,  c,  .  .  .  z.  The  reason  for  a  new 
place  CD  occurs  whenever  the  relation  which  pre- 
viously existed  between  c  and  d  is  changed.  Just 
so  the  reason  for  another  new  place  <•>'  of  the 
same  being,  whenever  the  previous  relation  between 
f  and  g  is  changed.  If  now  both  the  reasons,  last 
alluded  to,  for  the  new  place  of  the  being  were 
fixed  only  by  their  qualitative  content,  —  that  is 
to  say,  in  this  case,  by  the  situation  of  the  place 
which  they  require  to  have, — then  there  would 
exist  no  principle  of  decision,  in  accordance  with 
which  one  of  these  reasons,  if  they  operated  simul- 
taneously, must  be  preferred  to,  or  made  equal 
with,  the  other.  We  are  therefore  compelled  to 


FIXING    OF    PLACE    BY    RELATIONS. 


apprehend  every  relation  which  fixes  one  of  these 
places,  not  merely  as  a  fixing  of  this  place  in 
opposition  to  some  other,  but  at  the  same  time  as 
a  magnitude  of  the  force  with  which  the  relation 
strives  to  fulfil  the  demand  made  on  it. 

Now  the  same  thing  holds  good  also  of  that 
relation  which  fixed  the  original  place  a  of  a  thing; 
it,  too,  must  be  apprehended  as  a  magnitude  which 
withstands  the  reason  for  the  new  place  «,  and 
does  not  simply  disappear  when  the  reason  occurs 
at  co,  but  requires  to  be  overcome  by  it.  This 
takes  place  only  by  means  of  the  magnitude  a 
vanishing  through  all  the  intermediate  values  down 
to  the  zero-point  ;  and  by  means  of  the  reason  for  « 
thus  increasing  correspondingly  until  it  obtains 
the  intensity  which,  possibly,  remains  with  it  after 
the  removal  of  a,  and  which  now  fixes  the  new 
place  «. 

Now  if,  as  a  universal  rule,  the  totality  of  the 
relations  of  one  '  Thing'  to  all  the  others  is  the 
reason  for  its  appearance  at  a  fixed  place,  then  all 
the  changed  relations,  which  successively  occur 
during  the  conflict  of  both  the  aforesaid  reasons, 
must  also  manifest  themselves  in  an  unbroken 
sequence  of  the  phenomena  of  the  '  Thing  '  at 
intermediate  places  fixed  by  these  reasons.  That 
is  to  say  :  The  element  moved  passes  from  its  old 


98  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

place  a  to  the  new  one  <•>  only  in  case  it  appears 
in  regular  succession  at  all  the  points  between  a 
and  «;  and  therefore  (in  the  simplest  case)  tra- 
verses in  space  the  length  of  the  straight  line  a«. 

§  61.  If  motion  is  change  of  place,  it  would 
further  seem  to  follow  that  it  must  cease  of  itself 
after  attaining  the  new  place  which  is  fixed  by 
the  changed  relations.  This  contradicts  the  well- 
known  principle  of  mechanics  (that  of  the  persist- 
ence of  motion,  or  'inertia'),  according  to  which 
every  motion  once  begun  continues  in  a  straight 
line  and  uniformly  to  infinity,  if  it  is  not  hindered. 

Of  the  correctness  of  the  above-mentioned  law 
there  is  no  doubt.  A  direct  metaphysical  deduc- 
tion of  it,  however,  is  impossible ;  for  all  the  more 
general  points  of  view,  to  which  it  could  be  referred 
back,  are  unproductive.  For  example :  The  pro- 
position that  the  conditioned  effect  must  disappear 
with  the  cessation  of  the  conditioning  cause  (a 
proposition  which  runs  counter  to  the  law)  is 
obviously  not  universally  correct ;  since  there  are 
numerous  effects  which  require  indeed  a  productive 
cause,  but  do  not  require  for  their  continuation  a 
maintaining  cause.  But  the  contradictory  proposi- 
tion,—  Whatever  once  is  or  happens,  that  just  is 
and  happens,  and  can  never  of  itself  cease  to  be, 


PERSISTENCE    OF    MOTION.  99 

but  must  be  done  away  with  by  means  of  some- 
what that  is  and  happens  of  a  similar  kind  —  may, 
indeed,  express  the  fact ;  yet  it  is  not  so  lucid  as 
to  be  esteemed  a  self-evident  necessity  of  thought, 
or  strictly  deducible  from  other  propositions. 

Nothing  else  seems  to  be  left  but  the  attempt 
to  demonstrate  the  law  of  the  '  persistence  of 
motion '  in  apagogical  fashion  as  a  necessary  postu- 
late. We  pass  it  over  to  the  philosophy  of  nature 
to  show  that  no  motion  or  '  Becoming '  of  any  kind 
whatever  could  actually  take  place,  that  the  length 
of  no  line  of  finite  magnitude  could  be  traversed, 
unless  the  effect,  which  the  cause  productive  of 
the  motion  brings  about  in  an  element  by  means 
of  a  momentary  action,  is  regarded  as  a  velocity,  — 
that  is  to  say,  as  an  effort  to  traverse  a  definite 
space  in  every  unit  of  time  to  all  eternity. 


CHAPTER   II. 

OF     MATTER. 

§  62.  In  experience  we  meet  with  various  sen- 
suous images  which  we  call  'bodies,'  and  in  them 
all,  in  spite  of  their  variety,  with  certain  common 
modes  of  behavior,  such  as  extension  and  resistance 
to  the  diminution  of  the  space  occupied  ('  impene- 
trability '),  etc.  These  modes  of  behavior,  when 
taken  altogether,  we  can  designate  as  'the  attribute 
of  materiality " ;  and  every  sensuous  image  that  has 
this  attribute  is,  on  this  account,  called  a  material 
substance.  It  is  the  problem  of  Metaphysic  to  show, 
in  what  manner  certain  of  themselves  supersensible, 
unextended,  real  beings,  can  furnish  us  with  those 
sensuous  images  called  '  matter.' 

If  it  is  replied  to  the  above  question,  that  what 
is  aforesaid  takes  place  because  one  and  the  same 
matter  is  existent  in  all  these  bodies,  but  that  it  is 
once  for  all  time  made  the  peculiarity  of  this  matter 
to  be  extended  and  to  offer  resistance ;  then  mani- 
festly, on  the  one  hand,  the  materiality  is  not  ex- 
plained, and,  on  the  other  hand,  a  hypothesis  is 
introduced  which  were  admissible  only  on  the  sup- 
position that  it  had  special  reasons  from  another 


CONSTRUCTIONS    OF    MATTER.  IOI 

quarter  in  its  support.  For  otherwise  it  is  just  as 
conceivable  that  '  Materiality '  depends  upon  a  formal 
mode  of  the  combination  of  real  elements,  without 
these  elements  requiring  to  be  alike  as  respects 
their  essence.  If  this  latter  assumption  is  still  to 
be  made,  it  must  furnish  express  grounds  from  an- 
other quarter  for  such  an  identity  of  all  reality. 

Finally,  it  is  obvious  that  'one  matter/  or  'uni- 
versal matter,'  can  never  be  spoken  of  as  though 
it  were  barely  matter  and  nothing  further.  Since 
'  materiality '  is,  rather,  simply  a  formal  attribute 
that  presupposes  a  subject  conceivable  of  itself  to 
which  it  appertains,  this  '  universal  matter '  also 
must  be  discriminated  as  a  concretely  determinate 
essence  from  other  conceivable  but  not  actual 
kinds  of  matter. 

§  63.  The  attempts  at  an  explanation  of  matter 
can  proximately  have  two  distinct  designs  : 

The  realistic  systems  which  seek  everywhere 
for  the  causal  connection  of  actuality,  and  accord- 
ingly inquire  under  what  conditions  aught  arises, 
endures,  and  perishes,  in  their  explanations  arrive 
at  special  'constructions  of  matter/  —  that  is  to 
say,  at  attempts  at  comprehending  how  materiality 
is  constituted  out  of  certain  reciprocal  effects  or 
activities  of  elements  that  are  in  themselves  non- 
material  but  real 


102  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

The  idealistic  systems,  which  set  their  heart 
only  on  the  significance  that  the  existence  of 
every  individual  has  for  the  complete  expression 
of  the  one  comprehensive  World-Idea,  arrive  merely 
at  'deductions  of  matter';  —  that  is  to  say,  they 
show  that  the  existence  of  matter  is  indispensable, 
if  the  aforesaid  World-Idea  is  to  attain  complete 
expression :  but  they  do  not  tell  in  what  manner 
this  postulate  is  actually  fulfilled. 

A  great  crowd  of  attempts,  finally,  have  not 
made  this  distinction  between  the  two  designs  at 
all  clear  to  themselves,  and  vacillate  confusedly 
between  construction  and  deduction. 

§  64.  Kant's  theory  of  the  *  Construction  of  mat- 
ter '  contains,  — 

(i)  the  correct  thought  that  matter  does  not  fill 
space  with  its  bare  existence ;  since,  in  itself  con- 
sidered, the  co-existence  of  innumerable  things  at 
precisely  the  same  spot  involves  no  contradiction. 
Although  one  portion  of  matter  resists  the  penetra- 
tion of  another,  or  even  its  own  disruption,  still  it 
does  this  by  means  of  the  forces  of  attraction  and 
repulsion  which  it  exercises  on  other  portions  of 
matter,  and,  as  well,  within  itself  from  part  to  part ; 
and  it  is  on  this  latter  exercise  of  the  forces  that 
even  its  own  extension  depends.  But 


KANT  S  THEORY  OF  MATTER.         IO3 

(2)  fault  is  to  be  found  with  this  construction  of 
matter  in  that  it  is  never  made  quite  clear  who  the 
subjects   are   which    exercise    the    aforesaid   forces. 
If   that  which  attracts   or   repels,   is   itself   already 
extended  body,  then  it  is  not  '  matter,'  but  only  the 
subsequent  behavior  of  ready-made  material  objects 
toward  one  another,  which  is  constructed  by  it.     If 
the   aforesaid    subjects   are   not    matter,   then   they 
must  be  so-called  '  Things-in-themselves.'     But  since 
Kant  did  not  permit  any  kind  of  positive  assertions 
concerning   such  entities,  they  could  not  be  made 
use  of   in  this  connection ;    and   the   deficiency   in 
clearness  still  remains.     Later  adherents  of   Kant, 
like   Fries,    simply   confessed    that    the    subject   of 
those    forces    is    already    'matter,'   and   that    it   is 
incomprehensible  how  this  matter  itself  comes  into 
being. 

(3)  Finally :   Kant,  from  reasons  not  to  be  pur- 
sued in  this  connection,  had  a  special  interest  in 
having  continuous  space  filled   up  by   matter   also 
continuous ;    and,   therefore,   in   having  the  various 
condensations  and  rarefactions  of  bodies  explained, 
not  by  the  diminution  or — respectively  —  the  aug- 
mentation   of    the    empty     spaces    between    their 
alleged  atoms,  but  in  such  manner  that  the  larger 
space  should  be  just  as  completely  filled  up  as  the 
smaller  by  the  self-expansive  matter.     Such  a  thing 


IO4  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

appeared  possible  to  him  by  means  of  the  assump- 
tion that  the  two  forces  of  repulsion  and  attraction 
could  increase  or  diminish  in  various  proportions ; 
and  from  this  there  results  a  continuous  condensa- 
tion and  rarefaction.  On  the  contrary,  it  must  be 
remembered  that  the  assumption  of  two  opposed 
forces  belonging  to  the  same  subject  in  relation  to 
the  same  object  remains  an  insoluble  contradiction ; 
and,  as  well,  that  no  insight  at  all  can  be  gained 
into  the  question,  by  what  means  a  change  in  the 
strength  of  one  or  the  other  forqp  should  be  brought 
about. 

§  65.  Herbart's  '  Construction  of  matter '  begins 
(i)  with  an  accurate  specification  of  the  subjects 
concerning  which  he  is  to  discourse.  Real  beings 
of  simple  quality  and  devoid  of  all  extension,  they 
have  positions  in  space  that  are  mere  mathematical 
points.  So  far  as  their  nature  is  concerned,  they 
need  have  no  relation  to  each  other,  and  do  not,  in 
themselves,  act  upon  each  other.  Still  they  can 
enter  into  a  certain  relation  to  one  another,  in 
which  the  differences  of  their  qualities  become  the 
cause  of  their  reciprocal  action.  This  relation  is 
called  the  '  Propinquity '  (das  '  Zusammen ')  of  the 
real  beings ;  in  what  it  consists  is  not  systematically 
stated.  But  after 


HERBART'S  CONSTRUCTION  OF  MATTER.        105 

(2)  this  effectuating  relation  has  once  attained  this 
spatial    title    of    'propinquity/    the    actual    spatial 
meaning  of  this  word   is   by  a  subreption   regarded 
as  identical  with  abstract  ontological   'propinquity,' 
and    therefrom    arises    the    following    assumption : 
Real  beings  act  on  each  other  only  when  in  spatial 
contact.     Hence  it  follows 

(3)  with  reference  to  the  construction  of  matter : 
Matter  cannot  consist  of  real  beings   separated  by 
intervening  spaces.     For  since  these   beings  could 
not  in  such  a  case  act  upon  each  other,  they  could 
not  possibly  have  any  cohesiveness  whatever.     But 
real  beings,  since  they   are    unextended,   can    have 
no    contact    with    each    other;    they  would,  if   they 
attempted  it,  all  fall  together  in  a  single  point,  and 
the  '  matter '  obtain  no  extension.     On  this  account, 
finally,  — 

(4)  the    impossible    demand    is    set    up,    that   the 
unextended  real  beings  must  be  partly  within,  and 
partly  outside  of  each  other,  in  order  to  give  rise  to 
both  the  cohesiveness  and  the  extension  of  matter. 
No  theory  has  ever  been  able  to  make  it  intelligible 
in  what  way  such  a  thing  as  this  is  to  be  conceived 
of. 

§  66.    The   fault   of  this    last   theory  of   the    con- 
struction of  matter  consists  in  space  being  regarded, 


IO6  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

though  in1!,  concealed  fashion,  as  an  actually  existent 
yet  unreal  medium,  which  can  accomplish  some  re- 
sistance to  the  reciprocal  actions  of  things,  in  case 
they  are  remote  from  each  other. 

According  to  our  view,  however,  the  remoteness 
of  two  elements  from  each  other  is  only  the  form 
in  which  we  behold  the  magnitude  and  diversity  of 
those  reciprocal  actions  of  Things,  upon  us  and  upon 
each  other,  that  have  already  taken  place ;  and  such 
a  phenomenon,  therefore,  can  neither  be  regarded 
as  a  favoring  or  hindering  condition  for  those  recip- 
rocal actions  on  which  the  phenomenon  itself  de- 
pends. That  is  to  say,  —  briefly  expressed :  All 
real  elements  can  act  immediately  at  and  from  any 
degree  of  remoteness ;  and  it  is  just  by  means  of 
these  actions  that  they  prescribe  to  one  another 
the  places  in  space  at  which  they  are  to  appear. 

Matter  consists,  therefore,  of  a  multiplicity  of  real 
beings,  each  of  which  is  of  a  super-sensible  nature 
and  unextended,  and  all  of  which,  by  means  of 
influence  acting  at  a  distance,  prescribe  to  one 
another  the  reciprocal  position  that  belongs  to  each 
as  a  spatial  expression  for  all  its  intellectual  rela- 
tions to  all  the  rest. 

Matter  does  not,  therefore,  continuously  fill  a 
space  ;  but  it  consists  of  discrete  elements  between 
which  there  exist  intervals  where  nothing  real  is 


THE  CONCEPTION  OF  FORCE.  IO/ 

found.  Still  it  would  permit  of  easy  demonstration 
that  such  a  system  of  interacting  particles  distrib- 
uted in  space,  on  occasion  of  its  reciprocal  action 
with  other  systems  similarly  composed,  or  by  means 
of  its  reactions  on  an  external  influence  of  any 
kind,  would  exhibit  perfectly  the  same  sensible 
properties  which  we  customarily  suppose  should  be 
ascribed  only  to  a  'matter'  that  fills  up  its  space 
without  any  break. 

§  67.  Concerning  the  conception  of  '  Force/  of 
which  use  was  made  above  in  an  accessory  way, 
what  follows  holds  good  :  If  two  elements  a  and 
b  fall  into  a  definite  relation  C,  then  for  such  a 
case  there  always  prevails  a  universal  law,  accord- 
ing to  which  a  certain  consequence  X  must  origi- 
nate (it  must  in  general  consist  of  some  alteration 
of  a  and  b).  Now  because  this  law  prevails  uni- 
versally, we  are  able  to  transpose  this  achievement 
of  producing  X  from  the  future  into  the  present, 
and  ascribe  the  capacity  for  it  to  the  elements  a 
and  b  as  a  property  constantly  inhering  in  them, 
—  that  is  to  say,  as  a  'force.' 

The  above-mentioned  expression  is  not  accurate. 
For  this  capacity  does  not  belong  to  the  a  abso- 
lutely, but  only  in  case  that  it  stand  in  some  rela- 
tion with  b.  This  law  is  observed  in  physics  by 


IO8  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

never  speaking  —  when  wishing  to  be  accurate  — 
of  the  force  of  a  single  element,  but  always  of 
the  force  which  two  elements  exercise  upon  each 
other ;  in  this  way  the  fact  is  recognized  that 
force  is  not,  properly  speaking,  a  constant  attri- 
bute of  the  elements,  but  a  capacity  for  an  achieve- 
ment that  arises  in  them  under  certain  conditions. 
The  same  fact  is  expressed  by  modes  of  speech 
that  are  in  themselves  devoid  of  significance  :  The 
force  is  said  to  be  existent  in  a,  but  latent,  and  to 
be  exerted  only  under  determinate  conditions  (con- 
ditions under  which,  rather,  it  first  originates). 

Further,  the  effect  which  arises  between  a  and 
b  is  also  dependent  on  the  relation  (C)  between 
them,  and  on  its  alterations.  Speaking  accurately, 
this  means  that  at  each  moment  there  originates 
from  the  sum  of  all  conditions  a  force  valid  for 
this  moment ;  and  at  the  next  moment  a  fresh 
force  from  the  altered  conditions.  If  it  is  assumed, 
however,  that,  so  long  as  a  and  b  remain  the  same, 
the  form  of  their  reciprocal  action  (be  it  attraction 
or  repulsion)  is  not  altered  without  the  intermix- 
ture of  a  third  cause,  and  that,  likewise,  the  altera- 
tions in  the  intensity  of  this  action  are  proportional 
to  the  alterations  in  the  magnitudes  of  the  rela- 
tion C ;  then  this  assumption  can  be  expressed, 
for  use,  as  follows :  The  element  a  constantly 


SPACE    AND    REAL    BEING.  ICK) 

possesses  a  force  that  is  invariable  so  far  as  its 
form  of  action  is  concerned,  —  for  example,  attrac- 
tion ;  but  its  exertion  depends  on  the  alterations  of 
a  condition,  C  (for  example,  the  distance  between  a 
and  1>)  according  to  an  assignable  law. 

Finally,  nothing  at  all  hinders  a  and  b  from 
exercising  a  quite  different  reciprocal  action  y 
under  a  quite  different  relation  r ;  or  hinders  a 
from  developing  a  quite  different  action  z  in  rela- 
tion to  a  second  quite  different  element  e.  Fol- 
lowing the  above  manner  of  representation,  we 
can  ascribe  simultaneously  to  the  same  element  a 
the  many  forces  x,  y,  z,  .  .  .  that  are  partially 
opposed  to  one  another.  A  contradiction  were 
involved  in  this  only  in  case  these  forces  were 
regarded  as  properties  of  a  with  an  actual  constant 
existence  ;  the  contradiction  vanishes,  because  each 
of  these  forces  belongs  to  a  only  under  certain 
conditions,  and,  indeed,  each  force  under  different 
conditions  from  the  others. 

§  68.  It  were  a  conceivable  possibility  that  the 
unity  of  one  real  Being,  —  in  virtue  of  its  syn- 
chronous relations  to  several  others  that,  in  turn, 
are  compelled  by  their  relations  to  still  other 
beings  to  be  at  different  positions, — were  neces- 
sitated to  appear  simultaneously  at  different  points 


IIO  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

of  space  ;  and  our  conviction  with  regard  to  space 
would  readily  permit  of  this  as  possible  without 
annulling  the  inner  unity  of  this  Being  with  mani- 
fold phenomenal  aspects.  Nevertheless,  such  a 
thing  as  this  were  conceivable  only  on  the  condi- 
tion that  none  of  these  phenomena,  too,  should 
maintain  an  independent  existence ;  that  is  to  say, 
every  influence  which  touches  one  of  them  must 
eo  ipso  touch  the  whole  real  Being,  and  there  must 
never  be  any  process  of  mediation  required  in  order 
to  transmit  the  states  suffered  by  one  apparent  part 
of  this  Being  to  another  part.  —  Of  this  truth  there 
are  three  applications : 

(1)  For  example,  all   bits   of   gold   in    the  world 
could   be   regarded   as   locally  different   phenomena 
of   a   single  'gold-substance.'      But   the   experience 
that  what  happens  to  one  bit  of  gold  is  altogether 
a    matter   of    indifference    to    another    bit    remote 
from   the   first,    teaches   us   that   no    unity   of   sub- 
stance belonging  to  all  gold   is  assumable,  in    any 
serviceable  meaning  of  the  words ;   the  rather  that 
the   individual   bits   of    gold    are    independent    real 
substances. 

(2)  It  could  be  assumed,  as  was  previously  found 
of  use,  that  there  are  unextended,  definitely  shaped, 
indivisible  'atoms.'    If  such  a  statement  is  not  merely 
to  mean  that,  in  the  present  course  of  nature,  cer- 


SPACE    AND    REAL    BEING.  Ill 

tain  very  minute  particles  undergo  no  alteration, 
because  the  requisite  conditions  for  this  alteration 
are  not  forthcoming  ;  but  if  it  is  to  mean  that  every 
atom  is,  according  to  its  very  conception,  a  unity  of 
being  in  itself  real  and  indivisible,  whose  simulta- 
neous appearance  at  all  points  of  a  limited  volume 
is  necessary  for  reasons  alluded  to  above  :  then  it 
would  be  apparent  that  this  assumption  of  its  real 
unity  does  away  with  the  advantages  which  it  was 
designed  to  get  from  its  extension  and  form.  For 
it  is  wont  to  be  assumed  that  these  atoms  have  one 
or  more  axes,  at  the  terminal  points  of  which  their 
action  is  different.  But  this  is  incompatible  with 
the  unity  of  the  reality  throughout  the  entire  vol- 
ume, and  is  only  compatible  with  the  assumption  of 
a  multiplicity  of  active  parts  which  are  independent  ; 
and  it  is  by  means  of  the  relations  in  the  positions 
of  these  parts  that  the  different  properties  of  the 
different  points  give  conditions  to  the  total  form 
of  the  atom. 

(3)  The  assumption  that  one  matter  fills  a  limited 
volume  continuously,  while  being  likewise  divisible 
ad  infinitum,  and  yet  before  division  does  not  consist 
of  parts,  but  is  a  real  unity,  is  impossible  for  the 
same  reasons.  Whatever  permits  of  separation  from 
a  totality  in  such  manner  as  to  be,  when  separated, 
completely  independent  and  able  to  exercise  forces 


112  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

that  are  qualitatively  the  same  precisely  as  those 
of  the  aforesaid  totality,  —  only  diminished  in  pro- 
portion to  its  magnitude,  —  that  must  already  have 
existed  in  the  aforesaid  totality  itself  as  an  inde- 
pendent element,  or  system  of  elements ;  and  such 
totality  cannot  have  been  an  individual  being,  but 
must  have  been  simply  the  resultant  of  a  composi- 
tion of  such  independent  elements. 

After  all  has  been  said,  we  come  back  to  the 
view  which  is  the  one  now  taken  for  granted  also  in 
physics,  —  namely, 

Every  volume  filled  up  with  matter  consists  of  an 
infinite  number  of  real  beings,  which  in  themselves 
have  no  extension,  but  which,  by  means  of  their 
intellectual  relations  to  one  another,  prescribe  places 
in  space  that  are  merely  mathematical  points ;  and 
these,  by  means  of  the  sum  of  all  their  reciprocal 
actions,  effectuate  both  extension  in  general,  and 
also  the  form,  cohesion,  and  force  of  resistance  that 
belong  to  the  extended  whole. 


CHAPTER  III. 

OF  THE  COHERENCY  OF  NATURAL  EVENTS. 

§  69.  On  considering  the  conception  of  causality, 
it  was  found  that  the  various  real  beings  which 
underlie  the  course  of  nature,  when  taken  together, 
must  be,  either  directly  or  indirectly,  comparable ; 
that  none  of  them  need  be  a  Unicum  whose  na- 
ture were  disparate  from  that  of  all  the  rest ;  but 
rather  that  all  the  contents  which  constitute  the 
nature  of  *  Being '  must  form  a  coherent  system  in 
which  each  of  them  has  its  fixed  place.  It  was  fur- 
ther shown  that  all  real  beings  ultimately  can  only 
be  modifications  of  one  single  infinite  Reality. 

Both  these  propositions  we  are  to  apply  to  the 
inquiry  whether  there  is  in  nature  only  one  Matter, 
or  matter  diversified  into  species. 

If  the  term  '  one  matter '  is  understood  to  mean 
that  there  is  one  actuality,  from  which  the  appar- 
ently different  elements  in  the  course  of  nature 
actually  proceed,  and  to  which  they  return,  in  such 
manner  that  this  (one)  '  matter '  is  the  unvarying 
point  of  transition  through  which  the  creative  force 
of  the  Infinite  brings  forth  the  particular  elements 
hi  time  ;  then  the  decision  of  the  question  belongs 


114  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

entirely  to  experience.  Experience,  to  be  sure,  has 
hitherto  not  demonstrated  a  transition  of  the  chemi- 
cal elements  into  one  another,  or  their  derivation 
from  one  universal  original  matter ;  but  at  least  a 
considerable  diminution  of  the  number  of  elements 
is  not  improbable  in  its  view. 

If,  on  the  contrary,  we  should  consider  the  indi- 
vidual elements  as  modifications  —  constant  and 
unalterable  in  the  course  of  nature  —  of  that  '  one 
matter '  which,  in  this  case,  would  have  no  separate 
existence  at  all  outside  of  these  elements  ;  then  this 
thought  has  no  speculative  value.  For  it  would 
only  combine  —  and  that  in  inept  fashion  —  the 
assertion  of  the  existence  of  the  aforesaid  elements 
with  the  thought  (correct  enough  in  itself)  that  all 
these  elements  possess  a  series  of  common  proper- 
ties, on  account  of  which  the  conception  of  'mate- 
riality' belongs  to  them.  Now  it  follows  from  the 
first  of  the  propositions  alluded  to  above,  that,  if  we 
conceive  of  the  totality  of  these  properties  which  are 
formative  of  'materiality/  as  constituting  the  es- 
sence of  a  '  Thing ' ;  then  the  nature  of  each  par- 
ticular kind  of  matter  must  always  admit  of  being 
expressed  as  a  modification  or  function  of  this  '  uni- 
versal matter ' ;  .but  without  such  '  universal  matter,' 
on  this  account,  underlying  realiter  the  individual 
elements  in  the  form  of  a  '  stuff '  modified  by  them. 


REALITY    ORGANIZED    WITHOUT    MEDIA.  I  15 

As  a  consequence,  therefore,  from  all  that  has 
previously  been  said,  we  derive  the  following  propo- 
sition :  The  one  infinite  Reality  is  without  media 
organized  into  a  system  of  specifically  diversified 
elements.  But  since  its  diversity  must  always  admit 
of  comparability,  the  diversified  elements  are  equiva- 
lent one  with  another  (of  course,  according  to  a  di- 
versified measure),  in  relation  to  one  and  the  same 
effect  chosen  for  the  purpose  of  comparison.  Be- 
cause they  are  ultimately  equivalent,  they  always 
admit  of  being  apprehended  as  mere  modifications 
or  functions  of  one  and  the  same  fundamental 
Essence  ;  and  this  essence,  called  '  universal  matter,' 
can  therefore  serve  as  a  very  useful  formula  for  the 
calculation  of  events,  without  signifying  any  separate 
real  actuality. 

§  70.  The  order  of  natural  occurrences  must  be 
considered  from  two  points  of  view  :  first,  inquiry 
can  be  directed  toward  the  Plan  which  rules  in  the 
combination  of  things  and  occurrences ;  and,  second, 
inquiry  must  be  directed  toward  the  general  Laws 
of  procedure  according  to  which  each  step  in  the 
actualization  of  that  plan  is  brought  about. 

The  very  separation  of  these  two  inquiries,  how- 
ever, forms  the  essential  character  of  a  mechanical 
view  of  nature,  in  the  most  general  sense  of  this 


Il6  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

word  as  opposed  to  many  more  restricted  signi- 
fications which  it  has  acquired  in  the  natural  sci- 
ences. 

The  principle  of  such  '  Mechanism '  consists  in 
the  following  truth :  Everything  that  happens  in 
nature  depends  upon  real  elements  which,  even  if 
they  do  not  belong  to  one  'stuff,'  nevertheless 
admit  of  being  regarded  as  modifications  of  a  single 
whole, — that  is  to  say,  as  measures  comparable 
with  each  other.  Whatever  the  inner  states  may 
be  into  which  these  elements  fall  by  means  of  their 
action  on  one  another,  the  kinetic  energies  in  which 
the  same  elements  express  themselves  are  always 
comparable  with  one  another ;  and  their  alterations 
are  connected  with  definite  mathematical  conditions 
(position,  distance,  etc.). 

At  every  moment,  therefore,  at  which  two  beings, 
a  and  b,  occur  in  a  certain  combination  C,  this  cir- 
cumstance furnishes  the  sufficient  reason  for  one, 
and  only  one  consequence  X ;  and,  throughout,  if 
either  a  or  b  or  C,  or  all  together,  is  altered,  the 
alteration  of  the  consequence  X  into  B,  which  is 
necessarily  connected  therewith,  admits  of  being 
calculated  according  to  an  invariable  law.  That  is 
to  say,  in  other  words  :  No  momentary  state  of  a 
being,  when  in  combination  with  a  definite  sum  of 
external  circumstances,  can  ever  produce  more  than 


MECHANISM  ACCORDING  TO  PLAN. 


one  definite  effect  ;  and,  conversely,  every  effect 
that  arises  is  just  what  ensues  from  those  given  con- 
ditions with  inflexible  necessity. 

§  71.  Now,  within  the  limits  of  this  mechanical 
view,  a  definite  plan  for  the  coherency  of  events  can 
be  considered  as  realizable  only  in  case  the  content 
of  this  plan  (quite  apart  from  all  design  that  might 
be  striving  to  accomplish  it)  is  besides  the  una- 
voidable result  of  a  definite  combination  of  given 
circumstances. 

The  whole  of  the  course  of  nature  is,  on  the 
mechanical  view,  to  be  traced  back  with  inflexible 
necessity  to  the  supposition  of  an  original  position 
and  original  motion  of  the  elements,  —  a  position 
and  a  motion  which  are  taken  for  granted  as  primi- 
tive and  not  to  be  deduced  from  anything  further 
back  ;  —  as  well  as  to  general  laws,  according  to 
which  this  particular  result  ensued  from  this  par- 
ticular beginning,  while  from  another  beginning  a 
quite  different  result  would  have  ensued. 

Every  more  circumscribed  example  of  develop- 
ment according  to  a  plan,  this  view  regards  as  a 
single  case  in  which,  out  of  the  general  course  of 
nature,  and  fully  accounted  for  by  it,  single  groups 
of  its  elements  are  arranged  into  a  totality  whose 
cohering  unity  consists  only  in  the  reciprocal  actions 
of  the  combined  elements  themselves. 


Il8  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

In  opposition  to  the  above  view  another  is  ad- 
vanced, which  discovers  not  impossibility,  to  be  sure, 
but  absurdity,  in  the  thorough-going  maintenance  of 
this  mechanical  doctrine.  From  reasons  which  we 
are  to  estimate  later,  the  thought  is  held  to  be 
insupportable  that  not  merely  some  casual  structure, 
but  even  a  phenomenon  which,  like  organism,  obvi- 
ously expresses  a  most  significant  idea,  is  assumed 
not  to  develop  from  within  itself,  but  to  be  merely 
the  inevitable  resultant  of  many  conditions  in  them- 
selves indifferent  to  one  another,  and  only  co-operat- 
ing as  a  matter  of  fact. 

For  this  reason  it  is  denied  that  everything  in 
nature  is  the  necessary  result  of  circumstances ;  and 
the  conception  of  an  organic  or  dynamic  '  impulse ' 
is  opposed  to  that  of  a  physical  or  mechanical 
'force.' 

'  Force  '  is  always  —  in  the  way  previously  shown 
—  a  constantly  like  capacity  for  an  ever  like  achieve- 
ment ;  only  with  respect  to  its  intensity  is  it  alter- 
able under  quite  definite  conditions.  '  Impulse,'  on 
the  contrary,  is  a  faculty  for  very  manifold  achieve- 
ments ;  and  which  of  these  shall  be  exercised  at 
each  moment  does  not  depend,  at  least  absolutely, 
on  conditioning  circumstances  that  actually  exist, 
but  on  regard  for  an  end  that  does  not  yet  exist,  but 
is  impending. 


FORCE    AND    IMPULSE.  I  IQ 

Concerning  '  force '  the  further  assertion  was 
made,  that  it  is  compelled  always  to  achieve  what- 
ever, under  given  conditions,  it  is  able  to  achieve. 
Concerning  '  impulse '  the  assertion  is  made,  that  it 
is  able  to  keep  back  a  part  of  its  effect ;  in  other 
cases  to  reinforce  or  somewhat  alter  its  activity, — 
of  course,  with  reference  to  the  goal  that  is  to  be 
reached. 

'  Force '  was  never  known  to  pass  over  from  one 
form  of  causal  action  to  another  without  a  definite 
inducement :  '  Impulse/  on  the  contrary,  begins 
its  effects,  starting  from  a  state  of  rest,  by  means 
that  lie  within  itself. 

Now  it  is  through  its  own  action  that  the  living 
totality  to  which  impulse  appertains,  is  held  to 
define  for  itself  its  own  form  and  the  connection  of 
its  development ;  but  the  external  real  elements  it 
employs  as  means  in  its  service. 

§  72.  Let  it  now  be  supposed  that  such  an  im- 
pulse of  development  were  considered  as  the  attri- 
bute of  a  single  real  Being ;  and  let  it  be  left 
undecided  how  this  impulse  were  in  itself  possible  : 
still  the  other  question  remains,  namely,  Under 
what  conditions  can  it  accomplish  that  which  is 
ascribed  to  it  ? 

If  now  one  Being  is  to  accommodate  itself  to  the 


I2O  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

changeable  circumstances  with  a  changeable  activity, 
in  such  manner  that  the  latter  is  at  the  same  time 
always  adapted  to  a  definite  final  purpose,  then  it  is 
necessary 

(1)  that  the  Being  experience  some   influence  in 
general  from  the   aforesaid   circumstances,  and,  be- 
sides, that  the  influence  be  changeable  and  propor- 
tional to  the  variety  of  the  circumstances ; 

(2)  that  this  influence  in  the  Being  itself  beget  a 
reaction  which  is  adjusted  not  merely  with  reference 
to  it,  but  also  with  reference  to  its  relation  to  the 
final  purpose. 

The  further  question  now  arises,  In  what  way  the 
final  purpose  —  that  is  to  say,  a  somewhat  that  is  to 
be,  but  as  yet  is  not  —  can  be  represented  in  this 
Being  in  such  manner  as  to  be  able  to  exercise  its 
co-determining  influence  upon  these  reactions. 

From  our  point  of  view  such  a  thing  -is  conceiv- 
able only  in  case  the  Being  either  has  a  conscious- 
ness of  the  final  purpose,  and,  consequently,  the 
idea  of  the  purpose  as  a  living  state  of  this  Being 
is  the  force  which  can  give  conditions  to  the  other 
states  of  the  Being,  and  so  to  its  own  reactions, 
too ;  or  else  in  case  the  Being  works  unconsciously 
indeed,  but  its  unconscious  nature  is  originally  con- 
structed therefor  in  such  a  manner  that  the  various 
impressions  which  various  conditions  bring  to  pass 


IDEA    OF    FINAL    PURPOSE.  121 

in  it,  undesignedly  and  necessarily  combine  into  the 
totality  of  the  development  required. 

In  the  last  case,  this  development  is  quite  obvi- 
ously a  perfectly  mechanical  result ;  and  is  not  at 
all  distinguished  from  the  rest  of  mechanism  by 
means  of  any  peculiar  principle  of  action,  but  merely 
by  means  of  a  special  nature  belonging  to  the  subject 
which  is  active,  and  yet  conditioned  by  the  circum- 
stances in  a  purely  mechanical  way.  In  the  first 
case,  the  same  thing  is  true,  only  in  a  more  con- 
cealed fashion.  For  the  idea  of  the  final  purpose, 
too,  cannot  determine  the  method  of  its  accom- 
plishment which  the  moment  requires,  in  a  man- 
ner devoid  of  all  principle ;  but  what  accords  with 
the  purpose  is  discovered  by  a  comparison  of  the 
purpose  with  the  circumstances  of  the  instant. 
Such  comparison  does  not  allow,  so  far  as  its 
result  is  concerned,  of  any  arbitrariness  whatever; 
and  for  the  very  reason  that  it  takes  place  through 
the  instrumentality  of  thought,  it  is  positively  in 
no  less  degree  than  other  events  dependent  on  the 
subordination,  under  general  laws,  of  the  contents 
compared  (viz.,  the  final  purpose  and  the  form  of 
the  circumstances). 

§  73.  All  that  is  above-mentioned,  however,  would 
simply  comprehend  how,  within  the  Being  itself,  a 


122  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

definite  purpose-full  impulse  can  be  awakened  ;  but 
not  as  yet  how  this  impulse  can  actualize  what  it 
intends. 

If  now  the  impulse  were  to  be  directed  only  to  a 
succession  of  inner  states  in  the  Being  itself,  then 
it  might  appear  possible  that  a  definite  amount  of 
force  for  the  forming  of  other  states  of  the  same 
Being  were  communicated  to  it,  in  so  far  as  the 
impulse  itself  is  one  state  of  this  Being. 

If,  however,  an  effect  from  the  impulse  is  to  be 
shown  in  the  elaboration  according  to  a  plan  of  other 
real  elements  that  are  originally  foreign  to  the 
subject  of  the  impulse  (and  this  is  the  case,  for 
example,  in  all  organic  architectonic  impulses  such 
as  assimilate  foreign  material) ;  then  it  is  obvious 
that  the  intensity  of  the  impulse  within  the  one 
Being  leads  to  nothing  unless  it  meet  with  a  like 
obedience  to  its  commands  in  other  beings.  Now, 
since  these  other  beings  by  no  means  experience  of 
themselves  the  '  impulse  '  to  actualize  the  final  pur- 
pose of  the  aforesaid  first  Being ;  and  since,  rather 
every  being  would  naturally  have  its  own  special 
impulse  :  therefore,  a  Being  A  cannot  make  other 
elements,  Tb,  c,  d,  of  service  to  its  special  impulse, 
except  so  far  as  it  can  bring  some  compulsion  to 
bear  upon  them  ;  —  that  is  to  say  so  far  as  A  can 
exert  forces  that  can  be  exerted  in  a  definite  mea- 


IMPULSE  ALONE  INEFFECTUAL.         123 

sure  by  and  upon  every  other  being  as  well,  accord- 
ing to  a  law  common  to  all  the  elements.  For 
every  element  1>,  c,  or  d,  wants  to  be  under  the 
necessity  of  performing  one  of  its  own  actions  in 
pursuance  of  the  same  right  as  that  to  which  it  is 
itself  subjected  ;  and  not  in  pursuance  of  the  par- 
ticular preference  of  some  other  element. 

The  end  of  the  above  consideration  is  this:  The 
conception  of  an  'impulse'  adjusting  the  elements 
in  accordance  with  a  plan  is  undoubtedly  permis- 
sible ;  but  an  impulse  never  effectuates  anything 
unless  that  which  it  wants  is,  in  itself,  already  the 
inevitably  necessary  result  of  the  conditions  present 
at  the  instant. 

§  74.  '  Impulse,'  accordingly,  is  not  usually  as- 
cribed to  one  simple  element,  but  to  a  combined 
multiplicity  of  such  elements.  And,  indeed,  it  is 
assumed  to  be  attached  to  no  single  one  of  them 
except  in  a  partial  way,  so  that  it  were  the  collec- 
tive sum  of  the  partial  impulses  of  these  elements ; 
it  rather  appertains  to  the  totality  of  such  a  system, 
—  a  totality  which,  in  this  case,  is  thought  of  as 
in  opposition  to  all  the  parts  of  which  it  consists. 
According  to  Aristotle,  the  Whole  is  previous  to  the 
parts,  and  produces,  —  not,  of  course,  the  real  sub- 
stratum of  which  they  consist,  but  that  specific 


124  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

form  in  them  by  means  of  which  they  are  parts  of 
this  whole.  To  express  the  same  thing  in  more 
modern  fashion  ;  the  Idea  of  the  whole  is  previous 
to  the  reality  in  which  it  is  actualized,  and  rules 
it  in  accordance  with  its  own  final  purpose. 

It  is  scarcely  worth  the  trouble  to  repeat  that 
these  expressions  designate  an  actual  process,  but 
do  not  explain  it.  Of  course  the  whole,  or  the 
idea  of  the  whole,  can  be  distinguished  in  thought 
from  its  corporal  actualization ;  but  it  must  then 
also  be  demonstrated,  how  and  where  in  '  Being ' 
this  abstraction  of  the  whole  can  exist  as  an 
efficient  power  and  can  give  conditions  to  reality. 

Experience  shows  —  what  can  be  known  a  priori 
—  that  an  organic  whole  is  never  actualized  unless 
it  exist  in  the  shape  of  a  smaller  and  already  extant 
system  of  elements,  from  whose  combination  and 
reciprocal  action  with  external  nature  the  subse- 
quent whole  must  proceed  after  the  manner  of  a 
mechanism.  In  this  way  alone  does  the  whole 
exist  as  potentia ;  —  that  is  to  say,  in  a  case  like 
this,  not  as  power,  but  as  bare  '  possibility.' 

Just  so,  we  can  gain  no  insight  into  the  manner 
in  which  an  '  Idea/  that  is  in  all  cases  originally 
nothing  but  the  thought  of  a  thinker,  can  become 
'  in  Being '  an  efficient  power ;  unless  it,  too,  be  first 
realized  as  a  system  of  relations  and  reciprocal 


CLAIMS    OF    DETERMINISM.  125 

actions  between  different  elements.  This  realiza- 
tion must  be  of  such  a  nature  that  the  development 
which  we  deduce  from  the  '  Idea,'  is,  in  fact,  in  this 
case  too,  produced  a  tergo  by  causes  acting  accord- 
ing to  law  ;  and  the  development  coincides  with  the 
Idea,  only  because  its  demands  were  likewise  pre- 
destined as  inevitable  consequences  in  that  recipro- 
cal position  of  the  elements  which  was  given  from 
the  first. 

§  75.  According  to  all  above-said,  our  entire  view 
of  nature  would  issue  in  thorough-going  Deter- 
minism :  all  that  happens  would  be  the  inevitable 
and  blindly  necessitated  result  of  all  that  has  pre- 
viously happened ;  and  the  entire  history  of  the 
world  would  be  restricted  to  the  successive  unfold- 
ing of  a  series  of  states,  all  of  which  lay  already 
contained  in  the  primitive  state  of  the  world  as 
a  future  made  necessary  thereby. 

The  bare  consideration  of  nature  and  of  its 
economic  coherency  would  furnish  absolutely  no 
inducement  to  alter  this  view ;  metaphysical  cos- 
mology, therefore,  concludes  with  it  just  as  pro- 
perly as  the  view  itself  everywhere  underlies  natural 
science  considered  as  barely  setting  forth  the  facts. 

If,  nevertheless,  our  entire  spirit  is  not  satisfied 
with  this  view,  the  cause  of  the  repugnance  lies  in 


126  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

the  fact  that,  although  in  itself  possible  and  free 
from  contradictions,  the  view  still  appears  incredi- 
ble and  preposterous  when  estimated  in  accordance 
with  its  significance  and  its  value.  Our  mind 
wants  that  not  all  in  the  world  be  'mechanism,' 
but  that  some  One  be  '  freedom '  as  well ;  that  not 
all  be  shaped  by  external  conditions,  but  that  some 
One  at  least  shape  its  own  being  and  its  own  future 
for  itself. 

Even  in  these  demands  of  the  mind  there  can 
lie  concealed  a  certain  portion  of  an  inborn  truth. 
In  how  far  this  is  the  case,  and  in  what  manner 
legitimate  inference  from  our  previous  views  permits 
of  satisfying  these  demands,  is  left  over  for  the 
last  Division  of  our  work. 


THIRD    PRINCIPAL    DIVISION. 


PHENOMENOLOGY. 


THIRD    PRINCIPAL    DIVISION. 


PHENOMENOLOGY. 

CHAPTER   I. 

OF  THE  SUBJECTIVITY  OF  COGNITION. 

§  76.  In  the  ontological  discussion  we  have  spoken 
of  the  '  Being  and  States  of  the  Existent/  without 
ability  to  specify  precisely  in  what  both  consist. 
In  the  cosmological,  we  have  taken  it  for  granted 
that  the  world  of  phenomena  as  it  appears  to  our 
intuition  proceeds  from  these  unknown  reciprocal 
actions  of  'Things.'  Finally,  at  the  conclusion  of 
the  Cosmology,  demands  of  the  mind  were  stirred 
that  are  to  be  prospectively  satisfied  only  by  means 
of  an  insight  into  that  actual  nature  of  things 
which  constitutes  what  corresponds  to  the  formal 
conditions  of  Ontology  and  Cosmology. 

Now  all  inner  states  of  all  other  things  are  unat- 
tainable by  us  ;  of  only  our  own  souls,  which  we  hold 
to  be  one  of  these  real  beings,  have  we  an  immediate 
experience.  Hence  there  arises  the  hope  of  learning 


I3O  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

from  this  example  just  what  positively  constitutes, 
in  other  things  as  well,  their  essential  '  Being.'  On 
this  account  the  last  Division  of  the  Metaphysic 
could  perhaps  be  called — as  of  old  —  'Psychology.' 
But  in  this  connection  the  soul  is  of  essential  inter- 
est to  us  only  so  far  as  it  is  the  subject  of  cognition. 
We  therefore  at  this  point  resume  the  inquiry 
previously  announced ;  after  we  have  developed 
those  conceptions  concerning  the  coherency  of  all 
Things  which  are  necessary  to  our  thinking,  —  How 
must  we  now  think  concerning  the  nature  and  mean- 
ing of  our  own  cognition,  in  so  far  as  it,  too,  is 
subject  to  one  of  those  same  conceptions,  namely, 
to  that  of  the  reciprocal  action  of  different  elements 
(in  this  case,  Subject  and  Object)?  On  this  account, 
this  conclusion  of  the  matter  may  be  called  *  Phenom- 
enology. ' 

§  77.  From  all  the  foregoing  with  reference  to  our 
cognition  it  follows,  that  — 

(i)  We  recognize  by  means  of  no  sensible  quality 
an  objective  attribute  of  *  Things  '  ;  no  such  quality 
can  be  a  copy  of  the  Things  themselves,  but  each 
can  simply  be  a  result  of  their  influence.  This  re- 
sult, however,  like  every  effect,  does  not  depend  in 
a  one-sided  way  upon  the  nature  of  the  being  which 
exercises  the  influence,  but  just  as  much  upon  the 


THE    COGNITION    OF    THINGS.  13 1 

nature  of  the  being  which  receives  the  influence. 
Every  sensation  —  as  for  example,  color  —  is  there- 
fore only  the  subjective  form  in  which  an  excitation 
of  our  peculiar  Being,  sustained  through  the  instru- 
mentality of  external  influence,  comes  to  conscious- 
ness in  us, 

(2)  Although  no  single  sensation  is  a  copy  of  the 
reality,  yet  definite  relations  with  one  another  of  the 
single  real  '  Things '  seem  to  come  to  our  perception 
in  the  very  forms  of  combination  in  which  different 
sensations  are  brought  to  us  in  juxtaposition  or  suc- 
cession ;  and  this  happens  in  such  a  way  that,  while 
we  could  not,  of  course,  cognize  the  single  things, 
yet  we  could  cognize  the  changeable  relations  be- 
tween them.  But  the  Cosmology  has  shown  that 
the  universal  forms  of  Space  and  Time,  within 
whose  confines  all  the  aforesaid  special  forms  as- 
sumed in  combination  by  the  manifold  impressions 
become  specifically  marked  off,  are  themselves  like- 
wise only  forms  of  our  intuition  ;  and  it  is  only  we 
who  perceive  in  these  forms  the  graduated  reciprocal 
conditions  of  Things  that  are  not  in  themselves 
subjects  of  intuition,  but  are  only  apprehensible  as 
abstract  conceptions.  The  World  of  Space  and  Time 
is,  therefore,  'phenomenon';  the  'real  Being/  which 
answers  to  it  and  produces  it  within  us,  is  dissimilar 
to  it. 


132  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

(3)  There,  consequently,  remained  nothing  left 
for  us  but  to  maintain  that  only  a  formal  cognition 
is  possible  of  the  '  Being  '  of  those  '  Things  '  which 
we  proceeded  to  assume  ;  that  is  to  say,  we  were 
able  to  define  those  forms  of  our  thoughts  by  means 
of  which  we  defined  the  modes  of  relation  belonging 
to  the  unknown  Existent,  in  such  a  manner  that  our 
ideas  of  it  accorded  both  with  the  general  logical 
laws  of  our  thinking,  and  also  with  those  more  sig- 
nificant suppositions  which  our  reason  makes  con- 
cerning the  same  necessary  coherency  of  things. 

Now  the  aforesaid  logical  laws,  as  well  as  these 
metaphysical  suppositions  of  our  reason,  are  nothing 
further  than  definite  species  and  forms  of  its  activ- 
ity, which  is  excited  by  the  content  of  the  ideas  that 
are  present  within  us.  That  is,  to  wit :  If,  in  con- 
sciousness, different  ideas,  a,  1>,  c,  d,  .  .  .,  are  given  in 
all  manner  of  relations,  x,  y,  z,  .  .  .,  to  one  another, 
then  the  soul  is  so  framed  by  nature  that  this  very 
fact  of  a  multiplicity  of  ideas  serves  as  a  stimulus 
for  it  to  interpret  an  interior  connection  into  these 
ideas; — that  is  to  say,  to  regard  the  content  of  one, 
for  example,  as  the  '  cause  '  of  the  content  of  the 
others. 

From  this  peculiar  nature  of  the  soul,  in  order  to 
explain  the  throng  of  ideas  that  are  present  within 
ourselves,  there  ensues  —  as  would  easily  be  found 


SUBJECTIVE    IDEALISM.  133 

from  carrying  out  the  above  considerations  —  the 
entire  habit  of  assuming  an  external  World  of 
'  Things ' :  and  it  is  from  the  influence  of  these 
*  Things '  upon  us,  that  the  aforesaid  ideas  are  held 
to  originate  in  us  ;  while  from  their  interchangeable 
proportions  originate  the  given  reciprocal  relations 
of  the  ideas. 

That  is  to  say :  It  becomes  at  this  point  a  matter 
for  inquiry,  whether  simply  the  aforesaid  most  ab- 
stract and  fundamental  conceptions  which  we  frame 
of  '  things  '  and  '  events  '  contain  any  truth  what- 
ever; and  whether  they,  too,  are  not  merely  subjec- 
tive habits  of  our  own  activity,  by  means  of  which  a 
non-existent  external  world  is  mirrored  before  us. 

§  78.  The  above  considerations  lead  at  once  to 
the  view  of  'subjective  Idealism';  —  to  the  view, 
namely,  that  all  which  we  call  *  cognition'  is  only  a 
play  of  our  own  activity.  The  perception  of  the 
world  is  then  a  product  of  our  creative  faculty  of 
imagination  ;  the  elaboration  of  perception  by  means 
of  theoretical  conceptions,  and  its  interpretation  by 
reference  to  a  Kingdom  of  '  Things,'  only  a  further 
carrying  out  of  this  activity,  which  still  further 
articulates  its  product  after  it  has  constructed  it. 
The  same  view  holds,  on  the  contrary,  that  outside 
of  the  cognitive  spirit  this  world  of  '  Things '  has  no 


134  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

existence  ;  and,  finally,  that,  so  long  as  cognition 
consists  in  an  agreement  of  the  idea  with  its  object, 
we  cannot  speak  of  '  a  truth  of  cognition '  in  any 
thing  like  the  ordinary  sense,  or  even  of  an  ( act 
of  cognition '  in  general  (considered  as  somewhat 
accommodated  to  its  external  object),  but  only  of  an 
'  act  of  representation  '  which  is  productive  of  its 
own  subject-object  (Fichte). 

§  79.  In  opposition  to  the  above  view  the  fol- 
lowing remarks  hold  good  : 

(i)  The  demonstration  of  the  'thorough-going 
subjectivity  of  all  the  elements  of  our  cognition,' 
—  sensations,  pure  intuitions,  and  pure  notions  of 
the  understanding,  —  is  in  no  respect  decisive 
against  the  assumption  of  the  existence  of  'a 
world  of  Things  outside  ourselves.'  For  it  is 
clear  that  this  ' subjectivity  of  cognition'  must  in 
any  case  be  true,  whether  '  Things '  do,  or  do  not 
exist.  For  even  if  '  Things '  exist,  still  our  cogni- 
tion of  them  cannot  consist  in  their  actually  find- 
ing an  entrance  into  us,  but  only  in  their  exerting 
an  action  upon  us.  But  the  products  of  this 
action,  as  affections  of  our  being,  can  receive  their 
form  from  our  nature  alone.  And,  as  it  is  easy  to 
persuade  ourselves,  even  in  case  '  Things '  do  actu- 
ally exist,  all  parts  of  our  cognition  will  have  the 


SPIRITUAL    BEING    IS    REALITY.  135 

very  same  'subjectivity'  as  that  from  which  it  might 
be  hastily  concluded  that  '  Things '  do  not  exist. 

§  80.  (2)  The  assertion  that  the  World  is  the 
creation  of  his  own  faculty  of  imagination  could 
not  possibly  be  accomplished  with  complete  free- 
dom from  obscurity  by  anyone  except  some  lone 
individual  indulging  in  philosophic  speculation. 
Since  it  is  quite  too  absurd  that  this  one  person 
deem  the  remaining  spirits,  too,  in  whose  society 
he  is  conscious  of  living,  as  merely  products  of 
his  own  fantasy ;  and  since  rather  the  same  kind 
of  reality  for  all  spirits,  at  least,  must  be  credited ; 
therefore  the  question  arises  :  How  do  these  indi- 
vidual spirits  A,  B,  C,  D,  .  .  .,  come  to  produce, 
by  means  of  their  faculties  of  imagination,  four 
(or,  if  the  case  requires,  n)  pictures  of  the  world, 
which  have  as  a  whole  the  same  content,  but 
which  so  vary  in  their  particular  features  that  the 
other  spirits,  B,  C,  D,  .  .  .,  appear  to  A  at  definite 
places,  and  they,  in  turn,  to  A  at  another  place ; 
—  in  brief,  that  all  appear  to  each  other  in  such 
manner  as  to  make  it  possible  for  one  to  seek  for 
and  to  meet  with  the  other,  for  the  sake  of  a 
mutual  action  in  this  non-existent  phantom-world  ? 

Obviously,  the  reason  for  such  a  noteworthy 
correspondence  between  the  imaginations  of  the 


136  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

individual  beings  cannot  lie  in  them  as  individuals, 
but  must  lie  in  some  one  individual  and  yet  uni- 
versal Power  which  is  equally  effective  in  all  the 
individuals ;  and  this  Power  —  instead  of  first  cre- 
ating actual  'Things'  outside  these  beings,  in  order 
afterward  to  produce  in  them  the  '  appearance  of 
Things '  by  the  circuitous  way  of  an  influence 
from  these  '  Things  '  upon  the  aforesaid  beings  — 
directly  causes  this  same  '  appearance '  to  arise 
in  every  one  of  them. 

Idealism,  therefore,  would  accord  with  the  com- 
mon view  in  this  respect,  that  our  perception  of 
the  World  must  have  some  reason  outside  our- 
selves ;  but  not  in  this  respect,  that  such  reason 
must  be  sought  in  a  multiplicity  of  '  Things ' 
acting  upon  us. 

§  81.  With  the  modifications  made  above,  sub- 
jective Idealism  does,  in  fact,  succeed  in  explaining 
the  course  of  the  world.  Things  would,  of  course, 
be  no  longer  '  things j  but  only  particular  actions 
which  the  '  Absolute  Being '  exercises  in  all  finite 
spirits  in  conformable  fashion.  But  these  '  partic- 
ular actions,'  k,  1,  m,  n,  .  .  .,  since  they  are  deeds 
of  one  and  the  same  Being,  would  naturally  so 
cohere,  in  accordance  with  the  law  governing 
them,  that  always,  when  k  is  exercised,  the  exer- 


ACTIONS    OF    THE    ABSOLUTE. 


cising  of  another  act  m  also  follows  ;  and  always, 
if  the  act  k  is  altered  to  \,  then  m  also  passes 
over  into  j*.  That  is  to  say,  the  entire  coherency 
of  natural  phenomena  according  to  law,  for  which 
we  are  wont  to  believe  the  existence  of  certain 
unalterable  individual  elements  or  atoms  to  be 
necessary  as  subjects  of  the  events,  is  also  possi- 
ble, in  case  the  '  actions  of  an  individual  Absolute,' 
constantly  maintained  or  interchanged  in  accord- 
ance with  fixed  law,  are  regarded  as  substituted 
for  such  '  Things  '  ;  and  as  constituting  a  system 
of  reasons  —  with  manifold  members  and  effective 
simply  in  us,  but  not  extant  outside  us  —  that 
determine  the  content  and  vicissitudes  of  our 
perceptions. 

§  82.  The  above-mentioned  Idealism,  neverthe- 
less, has  failed  to  get  rooted,  not  barely  in  the 
common  mode  of  conception,  —  for  which  it  is 
quite  too  much  of  a  foreign  growth,  —  but  also 
in  philosophy.  It  has  been  objected  to  it,  that 
its  so-called  '  actions  of  the  Absolute'  could  serve 
as  a  substitute  for  'Things,'  but  still  are  not  actual 
Things.  That  there  must  be  Things  t  however,  is 
firmly  adhered  to,  from  a  motive  very  obscure  and 
little  analyzed.  We  want  to  possess  in  that  Nature 
which  we  immediately  perceive,  something  really 


138  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

self-existent  and  not  barely  a  somewhat  apparent 
to  us. 

If  now  the  question  is  raised,  precisely  in  what 
does  that  good  consist  which  would  be  actualized 
by  means  of  such  a  reality  to  'Things,'  and  which 
the  world  would  lack,  in  case  only  actions  of  the 
Absolute  existed  in  its  stead  ?  —  then  it  would 
easily  be  discovered  that  the  bare  objective  ex- 
istence, maintenance,  and  actual  self-motion  of 
'  Things,'  and  their  actual  but  blind  action  on 
each  other,  would  not  have,  of  itself,  in  the  least 
degree  more  value  than  the  perfectly  correspond- 
ing relations  between  the  actions  of  the  Absolute. 

Precisely  what  we  want  is  this,  —  that  the 
'Things'  really  enjoy  these  states  of  their  own, 
and  not  merely  be  thought  of  by  us  as  existing 
in  them.  That  is  to  say,  'Reality'  is  4  Being  for 
self ' ;  —  an  expression,  by  which  we  designate  that 
most  general  characteristic  of  self-apprehension, 
which  is  common  to  all  forms  of  spiritual  life, 
to  feeling,  to  representation,  to  effort,  and  to 
volition. 

§  83.    Now  if  such  is   the   exact   motive   for  our 
for   the   assumption    of    real    Things,    it 
necessary  merely  to   be   persuaded   that 
"•0    means    be  —  as    has    thus    far 


ALL    REALITY    SPIRITUAL.  139 

been  tacitly  assumed  —  a  certain  species  of  exist- 
ence called  'Reality/  which,  wherever  it  is  extant, 
has  there  made  possible  the  ' Being  for  self  or 
spiritual  life  of  what  is  thus  existent.  Quite  the 
reverse,  however,  must  we  admit  that  to  be  spirit 
is  the  only  conceivable  reality :  that  is  to  say,  only 
in  the  idea  of  spiritual  life  do  we  understand  with 
a  perfect  clearness  what  'real  Being'  means;  and, 
on  the  contrary,  every  as  yet  non-spiritual  but 
'Thing-like'  reality  is  conceived  of  by  us  only 
through  the  instrumentality  of  a  collection  of 
abstract  conceptions  that  make  upon  us  the  de- 
mand for  somewhat  more,  of  which  we  do  not 
know  precisely  in  what  way  it  is  to  be  fulfilled. 

For  example  :  In  the  Metaphysic  we  have  hitherto 
considered  'Thing'  as  the  'subject  of  its  own  predi- 
cates/ or  as  the  '  support  of  its  own  properties/  as 
'  substratum  of  its  own  states/  If  now  that  one  of 
these  expressions,  which  is  perhaps  the  best,  is  ana- 
lyzed, and  the  question  is  raised  :  In  what  precisely 
does  the  relation,  which  the  expression  designs  to 
designate,  consist  ?  —  then  it  will  be  discovered  that 
only  the  Spirit  or  the  Ego,  which  has  learned  in  a 
living  experience  to  feel  itself  to  be  the  independent 
and  sole  personality  in  contrast  with  all  its  own  par- 
ticular excitations,  has  any  knowledge  of  what  it 
means  to  be  the  'subject  of  states/  or  to  suffer  and 


I4O  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

to  experience  certain  states.'  In  what  way,  on  the 
contrary,  a  distinction  of  its  own  genuine  being  from 
its  temporary  states  can  be  conceived  of  in  a  blind 
'Thing'  devoid  of  self -enjoyment,  is  quite  impossible 
to  see. 

We  have  further  required  of  every  '  Thing,'  —  a 
requirement  connected  with  the  foregoing,  — '  unity 
in  the  midst  of  change.'  But  how  this  requisition 
could  be  satisfied,  and  precisely  where  besides  the 
series  of  its  successive  states  this  '  unity '  might 
subsist,  we  do  not  know.  It  is  the  spirit  that  first 
solves  this  riddle  by  means  of  the  miraculous  phe- 
nomenon of  Memory,  which  through  a  living  co- 
herence in  one  consciousness,  of  what  is  really 
successive,  first  reveals  to  us  the  only  possible  mean- 
ing for  the  aforesaid  'unity.' 

We  have,  finally,  spoken  of  the  'affection  and 
action '  of  '  Things.'  But  these  names,  too,  have  a 
real  significance  only  in  case  the  '  affection '  is  actu- 
ally suffered,  —  that  is,  consists  in  some  feeling  or 
other;  and  in  case  the  'action'  is  an  effort  or  volition, 
and  not  a  bare  procedure  of  a  result  from  a  cause 
which  thereat  neither  does  nor  suffers  anything,  or 
else  is  altered  without  any  experience  of  it. 

All  endeavors  are  vain,  on  the  one  hand,  to  avoid 
assuming  this  character  of  spiritual  life  in  Things, 
and  yet,  none  the  less,  still  try  to  say,  precisely  in 


SECONDARY  REALITY  OF  THINGS. 


what  their  'Being/  their  'Unity/  their  'States/  in 
brief  their  whole  '  Reality/  consists.  None  of  these 
words  signify  anything  which,  in  its  universality, 
were  clear  and  comprehensible,  and  of  which  the 
spiritual  life  might  form  only  a  special  example  with 
other  examples  existing  besides  ;  but  they  are  all 
abstractions  which,  from  the  spirit  as  their  sole 
subject,  abstract  a  formal  mode  of  behavior  that,  in 
fact,  is  possible  for  its  nature  alone.  Thus  they' 
induce  in  the  unreflecting  mind  the  semblance  of  an 
ability  to  signify  something  of  themselves,  and  come 
to  be  assumed  of  all  manner  of  subjects. 

§  84.  The  foregoing  considerations  lead  to  the 
opinion  that  there  can  be  no  '  Things  '  which  are 
merely  things  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  a  non- 
self-existent,  unconscious,  blindly  acting  reality. 
Nothing  but  the  following  alternative  remains  : 
Either  we  ascribe  to  all  'Things/  as  soon  as  they 
are  assumed  to  '  be  '  realiter  outside  ourselves,  the 
most  common  characteristic  of  spiritual  life,  —  to 
wit,  some  form  or  other  of  '  Being  for  self  '  ;  or 
else,  if  we  do  not  want  to  concede  such  an  '  ani- 
mating of  all  Things/  we  must  deny  that  they  can 
be  realiter  outside  ourselves.  For  the  conception  of 
whatever  has  not  Being  for  self  does  not  admit  of 
being  distinguished  in  any  tenable  fashion  from  the 


142  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSJC. 

conception  of  a  bare  action,  or  a  bare  state  of  that 
'  Infinite  Substance,'  which  we  in  the  Ontology,  and 
in  this  connection  afresh,  have  discovered  to  be  the 
foundation  of  all  finite  Being. 


CHAPTER   II. 

OF    THE  OBJECTIVITY    OF    COGNITION. 

§  85.  After  we  have  comprehended  the  unavoid- 
able and  thorough-going  subjectivity  of  our  cogni- 
tion, and  have  conceded  that  we  always  see  ' Things' 
merely  as  they  look  when  they  come  before  our 
sight,  and  never  as  they  look  when  nobody  sees 
them  ;  and  after  we  have  finally  reflected  that  this 
fact  is  no  limitation  whatever  of  our  Jiuman  cogni- 
tion, but  must  happen  just  the  same  in  the  case 
of  every  superior  being,  in  so  far  as  its  cognition 
depends  upon  its  reciprocal  action  with  other  beings, 
—  then  the  inquiry  arises  :  What  kind  of  significance, 
ultimately,  has  such  a  cognition  as  this,  which  uni- 
formly misses  of  its  object  ? 

We  answer  :  The  name  '  Cognition '  is  the  expres- 
sion of  a  prejudice,  —  to  wit,  the  assumption  that  the 
course  of  mental  representation  which  originates 
from  external  stimuli  within  the  spirit  has  the  prob- 
lem of  reproducing  in  copy  these  '  stimuli '  from  which 
it  springs.  In  science  our  act  of  representation 
naturally  serves,  in  every  case,  the  purpose  of  ascer- 
taining a  matter  of  fact ;  but  in  the  totality  of  the 
World  it  has  another  position.  It  is  a  prejudice, 


144  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

that  the  World  exists,  without  the  kingdom  of  spirits, 
ready-made  and  completed  in  effective  consistence  of 
its  own  ;  and  that  the  life  of  mental  representation 
which  spirits  lead  is  simply  a  kind  of  half-idle  ap- 
pendage, by  means  of  which  the  content  of  the  World 
is  not  increased,  but  only  its  ready-made  content 
once  more  copied  in  miniature.  The  rather  is  the 
fact,  that  a  world  of  ideas  is  awakened  within  these 
spirits  by  means  of  the  influence  of  Things  upon 
them,  in  itself  one  of  the  most  significant  events  in 
the  entire  course  of  the  world  ;  —  an  event,  without 
which  the  content  of  the  world  would  not  simply  be 
imperfect,  but  would  straightway  lack  what  is  most 
essential  to  its  completion. 

In  brief :  The  mental  representation  of  spiritual 
beings  is  not  designed  to  copy  Things,  which,  be- 
cause they  have  no  such  power  of  representation, 
are  inferior  to  spirit;  but  'Things'  (so  far  as  this 
name  has  now  any  meaning  left  at  all)  exist  besides, 
in  order  to  produce  by  their  influences  that  course 
of  mental  representation  belonging  to  the  spiritual 
beings,  which,  accordingly,  has  its  value  in  itself 
considered,  and  in  its  own  peculiar  content,  and 
not  in  its  accord  with  an  objective  matter  of  fact. 

§  86.  To  give  an  example:  We  object  to  the  fac- 
ulty of  sense  that  it  shows  us  colors  and  tones  which 


IDENTITY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    BEING.  145 

exist  nowhere  outside  ourselves,  but  are  only  affec- 
tions of  ourselves :  it  is  therefore  constantly  de- 
ceiving us ;  for  the  waves  of  light  and  sound  which 
constitute  what  is  truly  objective,  it  does  not  permit 
us  to  see. 

We  answer :  Such  is  undoubtedly  the  state  of  the 
case ;  but  color  and  sound  are  no  worse,  because 
they  are  simply  our  sensations.  The  rather  do  they 
constitute  the  precise  purpose  which  external  nature 
meant  to  reach  with  its  waves  of  ether  and  of  air. 
It  could  not  accomplish  this,  however,  of  itself  alone ; 
but  for  its  fulfilment  had  rather  an  absolute  need  of 
spirit,  in  order  that  the  latter  might  realize  in  its 
own  state  of  sensation  the  beauty  of  shimmering 
light  and  ringing  sound. 

§  87.  '  The  doctrine  of  the  Identity  of  Thought 
and  Being '  (Schelling,  Hegel)  asserts,  what  is  appar- 
ently the  same  as  the  foregoing  view,  and  yet  is 
really  different  from  it,  in  more  general  form.  The 
true  Being  of  non-spiritual  Actuality  (the  modus 
existendi  of  which  is  here  left  pretty  obscure)  con- 
sists simply  in  an  'Idea,'  for  the  actualization  of  which 
it  is  intended.  Only  the  thinking  of  spiritual  beings, 
however,  apprehends  ideas  as  ideas.  In  thinking, 
accordingly,  does  that  first  become  actualized  which 
Things  only  in  themselves  —  that  is  to  say,  in  this 


146  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

connection,  Things  according  to  their  plan  —  really 
are.  It  is  not  our  cognition,  therefore,  that  is  un- 
suitable to  reproduce  the  nature  of  Things ;  but 
Things  are  unsuitable  to  produce  their  own  nature, 
that  is  to  say,  that  for  which  they  are  intended.  It 
is  thought  which  first  makes  them  ready,  as  it  were. 

§  88.   The   above  doctrine   admits   of   a  threefold 
signification  : 

(1)  If    by  the   'Being   of   Things'   we    designate 
that  by  means  of  which  the  Thing  is  distinguished 
from  our  idea  of  the  thing,  then  it  is  quite  certain 
that    this    '  Being  '    is    not    identical    with    being 
thought.     Or,   conversely,   thought    is    in   no   condi- 
tion  to  comprehend  precisely  wherein  the  '  Being ' 
consists    with    whose   manifold    formal    relations    it 
is  itself  employed. 

(2)  If  again  we  use  c  Being '  in  the  same   sense, 
and   therefore  as   synonymous  with  'being  affected 
and   producing    effects,'   then    the   before-mentioned 
proposition  means  as  follows.:  The  thinking  'Being' 
of  Spirit  is  not  one  species  of  this  Being,  and  the 
blind  '  Being  '  of  Things   another  species  ;  but  the 
latter,  too,  is  a  thought.     That  is  to  say :  All  that 
we   are  wont   to   apprehend  as   the  unconscious  ac- 
tivity of  Things,   is   only  an   unrecognized   process 
of  thought  within  them. 


ESSENCE    OF    THINGS    AND    SPIRIT.  147 

^ 

(3)  If  we  call  that  the  '  true  Being '  of  a  Thing, 
by  means  of  which  it  is  distinguished  from  some 
other  Thing,  then  this  doctrine  would  assert  that 
such  essentia  of  Things  does  not  consist  in  any 
Reality  which  is  of  quite  foreign  species  and  inac- 
cessible to  all  the  means  belonging  to  the  spirit  ; 
but  it  is  rather  perfectly  exhaustible  by  means  of 
our  thoughts,  or,  at  least,  by  means  of  thought  in 
general. 

§  89.  Herein  lies  the  truth,  that  the  essence  and 
Being  of  Things  cannot  be  opposed  to  the  essence 
and  Being  of  Spirit,  as  though  the  former  were  a 
second  principal  division  of  the  world  and  a  per- 
fect stranger  to  the  latter.  So  long,  however,  as 
the  word  'thinking'  retains  the  special  meaning  by 
which  it  distinguishes  one  definite  mode  of  the 
spirit's  activity  from  other  modes,  the  Being  and 
essence  of  things  certainly  is  not  identical  with 
such  'thinking.' 

In  order  to  pass  judgment  on  this  matter  one 
must  reflect  upon  the  exact  share  which  thinking 
is  wont  to  have  even  in  the  sum-total  of  what  we 
really  know.  And  on  this  point  there  is  mani- 
festly a  very  general  illusion.  To  wit :  as  often 
as  we  in  speech  have  designated  anything  with  a 
name,  the  semblance  of  having  constructed  or  pen- 


148  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

etra,ted  the  so-named  content  by  means  of  an  oper- 
ation of  'thinking'  arises  in  our  minds,  although 
very  often  this  '  thinking '  makes  a  very  small  con- 
tribution to  what  we  mean  by  the  name.  —  For 
example  : 

(1)  If  we  say,   *  sweet,'   'blue,'   'warm,'  then  the 
entire    work    performed    by    thinking    consists    in 
designating  by  the  adjective  form  of  the  name,  as 
though   it  were  an   independent    property  inhering 
in  another  subject,  a  content  which  is  wholly  and 
merely   an   experience    in    the    form   of    immediate 
sensation,  but   which   can   be   neither  produced  nor 
imparted   by   the   medium   of  thinking.     That   is  to 
say  :  Thinking  reflects  upon  the  formal  relation  of 
this    content   to   others ;    it   does    not    exhaust    the 
content  itself. 

(2)  Only   by   experience    can    '  weal '    be    distin- 
guished from   '  woe,'    '  pleasure  '    from    '  pain  ' ;   and 
no   operation   of  thinking  makes   it  comprehensible 
to  a  subject  possessed  of  the  greatest  intelligence, 
but  of  no  feeling,  what  both  names  signify.     They, 
therefore,  designate  a  content  which  is  known  only 
if  it  is  experienced. 

(3)  The   same   thing  is  true  of  our  metaphysical 
conceptions.     What  '  Being '  signifies,  no  '  thinking ' 
makes    obvious    to    one   who    does    not    from    self- 
feeling   understand    his    own    being.     'Action   and 


THOUGHT    AND    EXPERIENCE.  149 

affection  *  only  that  being  comprehends  who  has  in 
itself  had  experience  of  both.  Even  the  abstract 
conception  of  conditionating  were  without  signifi- 
cance for  us,  if  we  did  not  know  from  our  own 
experience,  from  our  own  volition  and  effort,  what 
it  means  for  one  element  to  have,  or  to  have  de- 
sired, a  power  over  some  other. 

In  pursuance  of  these  examples  we  learn  that 
all  our  'thinking'  by  no  means  altogether  compre- 
hends, or  in  the  least  degree  exhausts,  what  we 
could  regard  as  the  '  actual  constitution '  and  '  inner 
Being '  of  Things  ;  and  that  it  rather  merely  com- 
bines with  one  another  in  formal  relations  the 
ideas  which  designate  the  subject-matter  of  expe- 
rience, whether  in  the  form  of  sensation,  of  feel- 
ing, or  otherwise. 

§  90.  'Being'  could  be  posited  as  identical  with 
such  'Thinking,'  only  in  case  the  significance  of  the 
'  Existent '  were  so  far  degraded  as  to  make  the 
entire  content  of  thought,  which  the  actuality  were 
called  on  to  express,  consist  still  in  simply  those 
formal  relations  of  the  manifold  that  logical  think- 
ing comprehends  and  judges  of. 

In  fact,  such  is  the  meaning  of  Hegel,  who  not 
without  significance  calls  that  Logic  which  is  else- 
where styled  Metaphysic.  If,  therefore,  things  exist 


150  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

and  events  happen  simply  in  order  that  the  formal 
relations  of  Identity  and  Opposition,  Unity  and  Mul- 
tiplicity, Indifference  and  Polarity,  of  Universal, 
Particular  and  Singular,  etc.,  may  be  actualized  in 
the  most  manifold  manner  possible,  and  set  forth  in 
Phenomenon ;  —  then,  of  course,  the  essence  of 
'  Things '  is  so  pitiful  and  insignificant  that  our 
thinking  succeeds  perfectly  well  in  adequately  com- 
prehending it. 

§  91.  The  teaching  of  Fichte  had  been  different. 
The  problem  of  the  spirit,  he  held,  does  not  lie  in 
the  cognition  of  a  blind  '  Being '  (the  conception 
of  which  appeared  to  him  as  impossible  as  it  ap- 
pears to  us),  but  in  action.  The  aforesaid  world 
external  is  not,  but  appears  to  us  in  order  to  serve 
as  material  of  our  duty,  as  inducement  or  object 
of  our  action.  Of  course,  the  world  cosmographi- 
cally  and  historically  determined,  with  which  we 
see  ourselves  surrounded,  is  not  to  be  deduced  for 
human  cognition  as  somewhat  necessary  to  this 
final  purpose,  but  must  be  barely  assumed  as  a 
given  matter  of  fact.  Of  those  metaphysical  prin- 
ciples, on  the  other  hand,  in  accordance  with  which 
we  trace  out  an  inner  coherency  within  this  pheno- 
menal world,  it  can  be  shown  that  they  are  nat- 
ural to  our  spirit  on  account  of  this,  —  and  only 


THE    HIGHEST    GOOD.  15  I 

on  account  of  this,  —  because  the  spirit  is  in- 
tended for  action.  For  *  Things'  considered  as 
fixed  points  in  the  course  of  phenomena,  altera- 
tion of  these  things  according  to  law,  and  recipro- 
cal determinateness  of  them  by  causality,  and  so 
forth,  —  all  these  are  forms  of  the  inner  coherency 
which  a  spirit,  that  wills  to  act,  must  inevitably 
assume  in  that  world  on  which  its  action  is  di- 
rected. 

§  92.  The  above-mentioned  thought  is  not  quite 
satisfactory,  because  it  makes  all  actuality  exist 
merely  in  the  service  of  human  action  ;  this  action 
itself  however  is  only  considered  from  its  formal 
side,  as  activity  and  self-determination,  while  that 
content  whose  actualization  were  alone  worth  the 
trouble  of  action  is,  on  the  contrary,  neglected. 

For  the  aforesaid  'action'  of  Fichte  we  substi- 
tute the  morally  Good,  for  which  the  action  is  sim- 
ply the  indispensable  form  of  actualization  ;  we 
besides  conceive  of  the  '  beautiful,'  too,  and  the 
'  happy  '  or  '  blessedness,'  as  united  with  this  Good 
into  one  complex  of  all  that  has  Value.  And  now 
we  affirm :  Genuine  Reality  in  the  world  (to  wit, 
in  the  sense  that  all  else  is,  in  relation  to  It,  subor- 
dinate, deduced,  mere  semblance  or  means  to  an 
end)  consists  alone  in  this  Highest-Good  personal, 


152  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

which  is  at  the  same  time  the  highest-good  Thing. 
But  since  all  the  Value  of  what  is  valuable  has 
existence  only  in  the  spirit  that  enjoys  it,  there- 
fore all  apparent  actuality  is  only  a  system  of  con- 
trivances, by  means  of  which  this  determinate 
world  of  phenomena,  as  well  as  these  determinate 
metaphysical  habitudes  for  considering  the  world 
of  phenomena,  are  called  forth,  in  order  that  the 
aforesaid  Highest  Good  may  become  for  the  spirit 
an  object  of  enjoyment  in  all  the  multiplicity  of 
forms  possible  to  it. 

The  -objectivity  of  our  cognition  consists,  there- 
fore, in  this,  that  it  is  not  a  meaningless  play  of 
mere  seeming;  but  it  brings  before  us  a  World 
whose  coherency  is  ordered  in  pursuance  of  the 
injunction  of  the  Sole  Reality  in  the  world,  —  to 
wit,  of  the  Good.  Our  cognition  thus  possesses 
more  of  truth  than  if  it  copied  exactly  a  world  of 
objects  that  has  no  value  in  itself.  Although  it 
does  not  comprehend  in  what  manner  all  that  is 
phenomenon  is  presented  to  its  view,  still  it  un- 
derstands what  is  the  meaning  of  it  all ;  and  is 
like  to  a  spectator  who  comprehends  the  aesthetic 
significance  of  that  which  takes  place  on  the  stage 
of  a  theatre,  and  would  gain  nothing  essential  if 
he  were  to  see  besides  the  machinery  by  means 
of  which  the  changes  are  effected  on  that  stage. 


CHAPTER    III. 

SUMMARY    AND    CONCLUSION. 

§  93.  The  view  last  approved  —  namely,  that  all 
metaphysical  truth  consists  only  in  the  forms  which 
must  be  assumed  by  a  world  that  depends  upon 
the  principle  of  the  Good  —  can  avail  only  as  a 
consideration  to  fix  the  limits  of  Metaphysic,  by 
whose  instrumentality  we  assign  to  the  totality 
of  the  principles  treated  of,  their  correct  position 
in  our  total  view  of  the  world.  But  since  those 
metaphysical  suppositions,  which  we  conceive  of  as 
dependent  on  the  Good,  are  once  for  all  the  una- 
voidable habitudes  of  our  spiritual  organization,  they 
are  in  themselves  much  more  clear  to  our  view, 
and  certain,  and,  on  account  of  their  manifold 
application  to  the  innumerable  contents  of  expe- 
rience, much  more  easy  of  accurate  description, 
than  is  that  '  Highest  Good '  which  we  conceive 
of  as  their  source. 

Therefore,  although  we  apprehend  the  Highest 
Good  as  the  one  Real  Principle  on  which  the 
validity  of  the  metaphysical  axioms  in  the  world 
depends,  still  we  cannot  regard  it  as  a  principle 
of  cognition  that  can  be  profitably  converted  into 


154  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

a  major  premise  from  which  to  deduce  the  sum  of 
metaphysical  truth.  Our  presentation  of  the  sub- 
ject, accordingly,  has  no  further  problems  to  solve, 
which  lie  in  this  direction. 

§  94.  On  the  contrary,  our  further  problems  lie 
in  the  following  direction  :  The  very  name,  the 
'  Highest  Good,'  designates  the  content,  the  esscn- 
tia  of  the  highest  principle,  but  not  the  form  of 
existence  which  we  must  attribute  to  it  in  order 
to  comprehend  it  as  a  conditioning  cause  of  the 
world  of  phenomena. 

In  this  respect  three  thoughts  require  to  be 
united :  — 

(1)  the   thought    of    one    Infinite    Being    to   the 
necessary  assumption  of  which  Ontology  led  us ; 

(2)  the  thought  briefly  developed,  that  no  meta- 
physical  reality   can   possibly   exist    except    in   the 
form  of  spirituality ; 

(3)  the  thought  just  touched  upon,  and  not  fur- 
ther demonstrable  as  a  matter  of  strict  metaphysic, 
that   the   highest    reason   for  the  formation   of   the 
World,  and  of  our  metaphysical  thoughts  about  it, 
is  to  be  sought  for  solely  in  the  Idea  of  the  High- 
est Good,  —  Person  and  Thing. 

The  association  of  these  three  propositions  yields 
the  result,  that  the  substantial  '  Ground '  of  the 


SPIRIT    ALONE    HAS    SELF-BEING.  155 

world  is  a  Spirit,  whose  essence  our  cognition 
were  able  to  designate  only  as  the  living  and 
existent  Good.  All  that  is  finite  is  action  of  this 
Infinite.  '  Real  beings '  are  those  of  his  actions 
which  the  Infinite  permanently  maintains  as  cen- 
tres of  out-and-in-going  effects  that  are  susceptible 
of  acting  and  of  being  affected ;  and,  indeed,  their 
reality  —  that  is,  the  relative  independence  which 
belongs  to  them — consists,  not  in  a  'Being  outside 
the  Infinite '  (for  such  a  Being  no  definition  could 
make  clear),  but  only  in  this,  that  they  as  spiritual 
elements  have  Being  for  self.  This  '  Being  for  self ' 
is  the  essential  factor  in  that  which  we,  in  a  for- 
mally unsatisfactory  way,  designate  as  '  Being  out- 
side the  Infinite.'  On  the  contrary,  what  we  are 
accustomed  to  call  ' Things'  and  'events  between 
things,'  is  the  sum  of  those  other  actions  which 
the  highest  Principle  variously  executes  in  all  spirits 
so  uniformly  and  in  such  coherency  according  to 
law,  that  to  these  spirits  there  must  appear  to 
be  one  world  of  substantial  and  efficient  'Things/ 
existing  in  space  outside  themselves.  The  mean- 
ing, however,  of  the  general  laws,  according  to 
which  the  Infinite  Spirit  proceeds  in  the  creation, 
preservation,  and  government  of  the  apparent  world 
of  Things,  is  to  be  found  in  their  being  conse- 
quences of  that  Idea  of  the  Good,  which  is  its 
own  nature. 


156  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

§  95.  In  case  we  characterize  —  as  was  just  done 
—  an  action  of  the  Infinite  as  a  'consequence'  of 
another  nature,  or  of  its  own  nature  ;  and,  in  gen- 
eral, as  often  as  we  make  that  which  is  highest  of 
all  the  object  of  investigation,  there  always  arises 
the  appearance  of  positing  a  'kingdom  of  abso- 
lutely valid  truth '  previous  even  to  the  '  supreme 
Source  of  all  actuality ' :  in  accordance  with  this 
truth  would  the  decision  be,  what  property  1>  must, 
even  in  the  Infinite,  succeed  the  other  property  a. 

The  above  thought  has  been  expressly  formu- 
lated as  follows  :  A  '  negative  Absolute '  -  —  that  is, 
an  unconditioned  truth  (comprising  the  laws  of 
Metaphysic  and  Mathematics) — does,  in  fact,  pre- 
cede all  actuality,  as  a  kind  of  immemorial  neces- 
sity ('  absolute  Prius ')  ;  and  it  defines  under  what 
formal  conditions,  and  in  what  modes,  all  must  be, 
in  case  aught  whatever  is  to  be.  Within  these 
unyielding  limits  thus  drawn,  a  'positive  Abso- 
lute '  with  freedom  then  creates  an  actuality  which, 
accordingly,  satisfies  the  formal  conditions  of  the 
aforesaid  '  negative  Absolute '  without  originating 
from  it  so  far  as  its  material  content  is  concerned 
(Herm.  Weisse). 

§  96.  Our  previous  reflections  led  to  the  oppo- 
site conclusion. 


GOD  THE  GROUND  OF  REALITY. 


Over  and  over  again  were  we  made  to  see  that 
no  'law'  and  no  'truth'  can  exist  within  the 
World,  before,  outside,  between  or  above  the  '  Things/ 
concerning  which  it  is  assumed  to  hold  good  :  law 
or  truth  is,  and  acts,  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  realized 
as  a  'state'  or  'activity'  of,  or  within,  the  living 
Existent. 

Still  less,  therefore,  can  a  collection  of  laws 
already  valid  be  thought  of  as  existing  in  a  per- 
fectly void  Nothing,  before  the  World  and  God 
was,  in  accordance  with  which  God  directed  him- 
self in  creating  this  world;  —  and  every  other  God 
would  be  compelled  also  to  direct  himself  when 
creating  another  world  ! 

Rather,  the  absolute  living  and  creative  Spirit 
alone  is  ;  and  He  is  the  first  principle  of  all  in  such 
manner  that  even  the  truth,  according  to  which  he 
seems  to  create,  is  only  extant  after  his  creative 
act. 

That  is  to  say  :  Since  God  unfolds  the  infinite 
activities,  which  become  for  Him  and  for  finite 
spirits  the  object  of  knowledge,  therefore,  this  knowl- 
edge can,  on  comparison  of  those  manifold  actions, 
comprehend  the  meaning  common  to  them  all  in 
universal  propositions.  It  is  these  propositions 
which,  in  the  first  place,  because  they  hold  good 
throughout  the  whole  created  world,  admit  of  be- 


158  OUTLINES    OF    METAPHYSIC. 

ing  considered  with  reference  to  every  particular 
of  the  world,  even  when  yet  unobserved  or  still 
future,  as  rules  by  anticipation.  And,  on  the 
same  account,  do  they  come  to  be  considered  by 
us,  with  an  erroneous  generalization,  as  a  power 
controlling  all  the  future  and  all  actuality:  just 
as  though  they  were  not  merely  the  laws  which, 
proceeding  from  the  primal  Existent  One,  hold 
good  for  the  world  that  sprung  from  Him ;  but  as 
though  they  preceded  all  actuality,  and  even  that 
primal  Reality  from  which  they  spring,  like  some 
inscrutable  Fate. 

§  97.  One  must  hold  firmly  to  the  above  reflec- 
tion, in  order  to  avoid  questions  that  are  unanswer- 
able ;  for  example  :  How  does  the  Supreme  Being 
begin  to  sustain  such  relations  to  itself  as  to  be  a 
conscious  Spirit  ?  Precisely  in  what  do  those  modi- 
fications of  this  Being  consist  which  we  assume 
to  take  place  ?  How,  further,  does  this  Being 
begin  to  be  at  all,  and  impart  to  particular  ones 
of  his  own  actions  that  independence  by  means 
of  which  they  become  '  substances '  ? 

At  this  point  there  is  obviously  a  demand  for 
explanations  which  depict  these  processes  accord- 
ing to  the  analogy  of  those  procedures  by  means 
of  which  one  matter  of  fact  follows  from  another 


UNANSWERABLE    QUESTIONS.  159 

within  the  already  created  world.  But  every  pro- 
cedure or  machinery  of  this  kind  is  only  conceiv- 
able in  some  such  manner  as  combines  into  one 
activity  the  already  subsisting  elements  of  an  ac- 
tuality already  constituted  in  accordance  with  laws 
that  hold  good  in  its  case.  Therefore,  we  cannot 
be  forever  asking  anew  the  question,  By  means  of 
what  machinery  or  procedure  does  actuality  in  gene- 
ral, or  its  original  matters  of  fact,  come  to  be  con- 
stituted ? —  for  it  is  just  from  these  matters  of  fact 
that  the  whole  possibility  of  reestablishing  any 
machinery  or  procedure  whatever  is  derived. 

The  supreme  principles  and  the  original  forms 
of  their  activity  never  admit  of  being  '  explained,' 
'constructed/  or  'deduced.'  Our  cognition,  in 
the  most  favorable  case,-  masters  only  the  interior 
order  of  that  manifold  which  depends  upon  these 
principles.  But  how  the  principles  themselves 
have  power  to  'be'  or  to  'act,'  is  an  unanswerable, 
idle  inquiry. 


INDEX. 


INDEX. 


A. 

Absolute,  idea  of,  in  Metaphysic,  7  f . ;  in  Schelling,  8 ;  in  Hegel,  8,  20;  the 
ground  of  Things,  72  f. ;  Things  are  modifications  of,  86,  136  f. ;  nega- 
tive, 156. 

Actuality,  belongs  to  cause,  60. 

Aristotle,  categories  of,  3  f. ;  doctrine  of  whole  and  parts,  123. 

Atoms,  as  elements  of  Things,  46  f. ;   no  f. 


B. 

Becoming,  conception  of,  45  f. ;  absolute,  48  f. 

Being,  conception  of,  15  ff.,  i8ff.,  27  f. ;  never  mere  position,  19 f.;  never 
unrelated,  21  f.,  23f. ;  of  Things,  determinate,  26 f.;  the  Infinite,  73, 
109  f.,  154;  unity  of  the  one  real,  109  f.,  113,  119  f.,  121  f. ;  for  Self,  the 
sole  Reality,  139. 

Body,  conception  of  a  material,  loof. 


Categories,  of  Aristotle,  3  f. ;  of  Kant,  3  f.,  5 ;  Fichte's  deduction  of,  6. 
Cause,  conception  of,  57 f.,  68;    never  single,  58;  nor  transient,  62  f.,  64, 

71 ;  efficient,  needed  to  explain  the  World,  68  f. ;  Thing  as  a,  70. 
Change,  conception  of,  45  f.,  50  f. ;  connected  with  state  of  Thing,  53  f. 
Cognition,  subjectivity  of,  129  f.,  133, 134  f. ;  objectivity  of,  143. 
Cosmology,  conception  of,  10,  77  f. 


D. 


Determinism,  as  a  conclusion  of  cosmology,  125  f. 


Essence,  of  Things,  35,  38,  40  f.,  45,  52,  114;  as  a  law,  35,  37;  applied  to 
soul,  43  f. 


164  INDEX. 


F. 

Fichte,  deduction  of  the  categories,  6;  Idealism  of,  7, 134,  150. 

Final  Purpose,  in  Mechanism,  121  f. 

Force,  cannot  pass  over,  62 f.;    an  attribute,  63;   conception  of,   107 f.; 

opposed  to  impulse,  n8f. 
Fries,  view  of  matter,  103. 

G. 

God,  doctrine  of  Occasionalism  concerning,  65  f.,  67  f;  the  Highest  Good 

154 ;  the  Ground  of  all  reality,  157  f. 
Good,  the  highest  reality,  151  f.,  153,  154  f. 


H. 

Hegel,  doctrine  of  the  Absolute,  8 ;  conception  of  Being,  20 ;  deduction  of 
space,  88 ;  on  identity  of  Thought  and  Being,  145,  149. 

Herbart,  conception  of  Metaphysic,  9  f. ;  doctrine  of  position,  22  f. ;  doc- 
trine of  quality,  28  f. ;  conception  of  change,  46 ;  construction  of  matter, 
104  f. 

I. 

Idea,  as  a  real  action,  42,  124 f.;  as  actuality,  145  f. 

Idealism,  of  Fichte,  7,  134 ;  its  deductions  of  matter,  102 ;  subjective,  133  f., 

136  f. 

Identity,  of  states  of  Things,  54. 

Impulse,  opposed  to  Force,  118 ;  ascribed  to  many  elements,  123  f. 
Infinite,  the  ground  of  Things,  72  f.,  113;  provisional  conception  of,  73  f. 


K. 

Kant,  categories  of,  3  f.,  5 ;  doctrine  of  Things,  7 ;  doctrine  of  space,  80,  84  f., 
87 ;  construction  of  matter,  102  f. ;  on  Things  in  themselves,  103. 


Law,  as  essence  of  Thing,  35  f.,  37;  as  necessary  to  Becoming,  49. 
Leibnitz,  Pre-established  Harmony  of,  66  f. 


INDEX.  165 


M. 

Matter,  conception  of,  100  f.,  105 ;  deductions  of,  102 ;  elements  of  a  correct 
view  of,  102  f.,  io6f.,  112,  113;  Kant's  doctrine  of,  102 f.;  Herbart's 
construction  of,  104 f.;  unity  of,  114. 

Mechanism,  principle  of,  115,  n6f.;  as  related  to  plan,  117  f. 

Metaphysics,  definition  of,  i  f.,  n,  15 ;  Absolute  in,  7  f. ;  Hegel's  conception 
of,  8,  10, 149;  Herbart's  conception  of,  gf. ;  divisions  of,  lof. ;  problems 
of,  79,  ico. 

Motion,  conception  of,  94  f.,  96;  change  of,  as  defining  Things,  96 f. ;  per- 
sistence of,  98  f. 


O. 

Occasionalism,  doctrine  of,  64  f. ;  cannot  furnish  a  theory,  65 ;  Leibnitz's 

view  of,  66. 
Ontology,  conception  of,  10, 15  f. 


P. 

Phenomenon,  always  of  some  Thing,  48  f. ;  the  world  considered  as,  131  f. 

Flan,  as  related  to  Mechanism,  117  f. 

"  Position,"  conception  of,  15  f.,  17,  30  f. ;  never  without  relation,  20  f.,  23  f., 

enters  into  our  conception  of  Thing,  31. 
Propinquity,  Herbart's  doctrine  of,  104  f. 


Q- 

Quality,  of  Things,  26,  28  f.,  32  f.,  34,  35;  37  f.,  130 ;  Herbart's  view  of,  28  f. ; 
always  adjective,  29 ;  Simple  cannot  change  their  content,  32  f. ;  known 
only  by  experience,  148  f. 


R. 

Reality,  conception  of,  35  f. ;  as  ideal  content,  41  f.,  42  (note);   unity  of, 

48  f.,  109  f.,  113,  115;  identity  of,  53  f.;  is  self-being,  138  f.,  154  f.;   of 

Things,  139  f. 
Eelations,  necessary  to  Being,  i8ff. ;  involved  in  Things,  25  f.,  85;  classes 

of,  31  f. ;  as  explaining  causation,  68 ;    intellectual,  of  Things,  85 ;   of 

time-form,  91. 


l66  INDEX. 


S. 

Schelling,  doctrine  of  Absolute,  8;  deduction  of  space,  88;  on  identity  of 

Thought  and  Being,  145. 
Soul,  idea  of  the  essence  of.  43  f. 
Space,  78  ff. ;  conception  of,  79  ff. ;  an  intuition,  79,  80 ;  not  self-subsisting 

form,  81,  105  f. ;   erroneous  definitions   of,  81  f. ;  not  between  Things, 

82 f.;  ideal  character  of,  84 f.;   Kant's  doctrine  criticised,  84^,87;  no 

deduction  of,  87  f. ;  as  filled  by  matter,  102  f.,  106. 
Spirit,  as  real  Being,  145,  146  f. ;  the  Highest  Good,  151  f.,  153,  158  f. 
State,  belonging  to  Thing,  45  f. ;  connected  with  change,  53  f. 
"  Stuff,"  conception  of,  29  f.,  38  f. ;  as  related  to  essence,  39. 
Substance,  conception  of,  30  f.  (see  "  Stuff"). 


T. 

Things,  Kant's  doctrine  of,  7 ;  ordinary  view  of,  16,  77 ;  no  unrelated  Being 
in,  22  f. ;  true  conception  of,  25  f.,  30  f. ;  properties  of,  26  f.,  28  f. ;  quality 
of,  never  simple,  28  f.,  37,  130 ;  essence  of,  32  f.,  36,  37  f.,  42,  45,  52, 139  f. ; 
unity  of, 34,  71  f.,  77, 140;  reality  of,  37,  130 f.,  136 f.,  140 f.,  146 f. ;  law,  as 
the  essence  of,  36 f.;  an  Idea,  42;  states  belong  to,  54 f.;  action  of, 
55  f.,  58  f.,  69,70;  never  independent,  71  f. ;  no  space  between,  82;  as 
modifications  of  one  Absolute,  86,  114,  155 ;  motion  of,  94  f.,  97 ;  knowl- 
edge of,  in  themselves,  96 f.,  103  f. 

Thought,  as  related  to  reality,  42. 

Time,  conception  of,  88  f.,  90;  no  intuition  of,  as  infinite,  89;  relation  to 
space,  89 f.;  empty  time  impossible,  90,  92;  ideal  character  of,  90 f., 
93  f. ;  difficulties  of,  90  f. 


W. 

Weisse,  on  the  Absolute,  156. 

World,  in  Space  and  Time,  131  f. ;  objectivity  of,  134  f.,  143 f.;  and  God, 
157- 


HEBREW    LESSONS. 


BY  H.  G.   MITCHELL,  PH.D.,  OF  BOSTON  UNIVERSITY. 


IT  has  long  been  the  custom  to  introduce  the  beginner  to  some  of  the 
languages  by  simple,  practical  lessons.  The  acquisition  of  French  and 
German,  even  Greek  and  Latin,  has  thus  been  rendered  not  only  easy,  but 
delightful.  Instructors  in  the  less  familiar  languages  have,  however,  for 
some  reason,  been  slow  to  adopt  the  reasonable  method.  It  is  not  strange, 
therefore,  that  a  text-book  for  elementary  instruction  in  Hebrew,  answering 
the  wants  of  beginners,  should  still  be  considered  a  desideratum. 

The  author  of  the  book  here  announced,  after  several  years  spent  in 
instruction,  has  embodied  the  results  of  his  experience  in  a  series  of  lessons, 
by  which,  as  has  been  abundantly  proven,  a  learner  can  in  a  few  weeks 
obtain  a  good  foundation  for  the  study  of  the  Old  Testament  in  the 
original.  The  possibility  of  this  result  will  appear  upon  a  glance  at  the 
plan  of  these  lessons : 

1.  They  are  confined  to  the  elements  of  the  language. 

2.  They  are  arranged  in  logical  order. 

3.  They  are  illustrated  and  enforced  by  abundant  exercises  from  the 
Bible. 

4.  They  require  a  vocabulary  comprising  almost  all  the  most  common 
words  of  the  language. 

5.  They  are  supplemented  by  extended  selections  from  historical  books 
of  the  Bible,  especially  adapted  to  reading  at  sight,  for  which,  however, 
the  vocabulary  suffices. 

It  is  clear  that  by  this  plan  the  student  is  as  quickly  as  possible  made 
acquainted  with  the  language,  and  placed  in  a  position  with  comparative 
ease  to  become  a  Hebrew  scholar. 

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typographical  excellence  of  the  work.  It  is  printed  with  the  utmost  care 
for  accuracy  and  distinctness,  from  very  large,  clear  type,  imported  expressly 
for  the  purpose. 

The  book  has  been  examined  and  cordially  endorsed  by  many  of  the 
most  competent  judges,  and  is  already  in  extensive  use. 


Retail  and  Mailing  Price,  $2.00. 

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PHILOSOPHY. 


SEELYE'S-HICKOK'S    EMPIRICAL    PSYCHOLOGY;    or,    The  Human 
Mind  as  Given  in  Consciousness.      Mailing  Price,  $1.25. 


SEELYE'S-HICKOK'S  MORAL  SCIENCE.     Mailing  Price,  $1.25. 


HICKOK'S    RATIONAL    PSYCHOLOGY;    or,    The  Subjective  Idea  and 
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HICKOK'S    CREATOR   AND    CREATION;    or,    The  Knowledge  in  the 
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HICKOK'S  HUMANITY  IMMORTAL ;    or,  Man  Tried,   Fallen,   and  Re- 
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THESE  books  discuss  the  most  difficult  and  important  problems 
of  human  thought.  Though  each  is  complete  in  itself,  they  pursue 
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The  EMPIRICAL  PSYCHOLOGY  gives  the  basis  of  all  physical  and 
logical  science. 

The  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY  connects  all  science  with  philosophy. 

The  CREATOR  AND  CREATION  gives  the  philosophy  of  all  mechan- 
ical and  vital  forces. 

The  MORAL  SCIENCE  is  already  in  the  field  of  philosophy,  and 
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The  LOGIC  OF  REASON  frees  empiricism  from  all  scepticism  in 
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The  HUMANITY  IMMORTAL  gives  the  Divine  history  of  human 
experience  from  its  origination  to  its  consummation. 


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THE  HAEVABD  EDITION 


SEAKESPEAEE'S   COMPLETE  WOEKS. 

BY  HENRY  N.  HUDSON,  LL.D., 

AUTHOR  OF  THE  "LIFE,  ART,  AND  CHARACTERS  OF  SHAKESPEARE," 
EDITOR  OF  "  SCHOOL  SHAKESPEARE,"  ETC. 


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THE  HARVARD  EDITION  has  been  undertaken  and  the  plan  of  it  shaped 
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as  may  be  required  by  people  who  read  Shakespeare,  not  to  learn  philology 
or  the  technicalities  of  the  scholiast,  but  to  learn  Shakespeare  himself ;  to 
take  in  his  thought,  to  taste  his  wisdom,  and  to  feel  his  beauty. 


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A  STUDY  OF  THE  DRINK  QUESTION, 

ENTITLED 

"THE  FOUNDATION  OF  DEATH." 


By  AXEL   GUSTAFSON.      600   pp.    12mo.      RETAIL    AND 
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TMs  book  has  already  been  accepted  in  England  as  the  most  com- 
plete work  on  the  subject  ever  published,  and  one  that  will  be  "  the 
Bible  of  temperance  reformers  for  years  to  come."  It  is  pronounced 
the  fairest,  most  exhaustive,  freshest,  and  most  original  of  all  the 
literature  on  the  subject  that  has  yet  appeared.  It  is  impartial  and 
careful  in  its  evidence,  fair  and  fearless  in  its  conclusions,  and  its 
accuracy  is  vouched  for  by  the  best  physiologists  and  physicians. 

In  preparation  for  this  work,  the  author  has  made  exhaustive  and 
impartial  researches  in  the  alcohol  literature  of  nearly  all  countries, 
having  examined,  in  the  various  languages,  some  three  thousand 
works  on  alcohol  and  cognate  subjects,  from  a  large  proportion  of 
which  carefully  selected  quotations  are  made. 

The  scope  of  the  work,  as  to  the  variety  of  standpoints  from  which 
it  is  treated,  is  indicated  in  the  following  list  of  chapters:  — 

I.    Drinking  among  the  Ancients. 
II.    The  History  of  the  Discovery  of  Distillation. 

III.  Preliminaries  to  the  Study  of  Modern  Drinking. 

IV.  Adulteration. 

V.    Physiological  Results;  or,  The   Effects  of  Alcohol  on  the 

Physical  Organs  and  Functions. 

VI.    Pathological  Results;  or,  Diseases  caused  by  Alcohol. 
VII.    Moral  Results. 

VIII.    Heredity;  or,  The  Curse  entailed  on  Descendants  by  Alcohol. 
IX.    Therapeutics;  or,  Alcohol  as  a  Medicine. 
X.    Social  Results. 

XI.    The  Origin  and  Causes  of  Alcoholism. 
XII.    Specious  Reasonings  concerning  the  Use  of  Alcohol. 
XIII.    What  can  be  done  ? 

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iPissHsss 

OVERDUE. 


LD  2l-95m-7,' 


37 


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